Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Nov. 19, 2018 |
METRO COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., ET AL. VS. NANCY VAN ISTENDAL (C-000036-16, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0275-17T4)
In this appeal, defendant argued that she was an oppressed minority shareholder under N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c) even though she contracted to be an employee at-will. After serving as plaintiff's Chief Financial Officer for thirteen years, she claimed that she had a reasonable expectation of continued employment and that her at-will designation was irrelevant and erroneous. A Consent Order entered by the parties in prior litigation between them validated their Shareholder Agreement and confirmed defendant's at-will status. The court rejected defendant's reliance upon unpublished out-of-state cases as factually distinguishable and unpersuasive that defendant urged us to adopt for the proposition that an oppressed shareholder may have an expectation of continued employment. The court declined to do so, and affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of defendant's counterclaim on the basis that her at-will status was paramount. |
Appellate |
Nov. 16, 2018 |
INVESTORS BANK VS. JAVIER TORRES, ET AL. (F-001463-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3029-16T4)
Defendant challenged plaintiff's right to foreclose, arguing N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 precluded the enforcement of a note, lost prior to the assignment of a concomitant mortgage, because plaintiff never owned or controlled the underlying debt. The court interpreted the statute as allowing the enforcement of a lost note where the assignor – which provided a lost-note affidavit to plaintiff – possessed the note and was entitled to enforce it when the loss occurred, and plaintiff proved the terms of the note and its right to enforce it. |
Appellate |
Nov. 15, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMES M. HARRIS (13-10-2986, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3694-15T4)
The court reverses two murder convictions. The motion to suppress a photograph of a gun and ammunition similar to that used in the double murder should have been granted because the photograph was mistakenly provided by Sprint in response to a communications data warrant (CDW) that did not seek photographs. The State argued that the photograph was in plain view, but as the file containing the photograph was clearly identified as a photograph, and labeled as outside the time frame of the CDW, the court rejects the plain view argument. Admission of that photograph was not harmless error, given the State's repeated emphasis on the photograph in summation as well as the fact that the jury declared itself deadlocked three times. |
Appellate |
Nov. 15, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ROBERT ANDREWS (16-06-1781, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0291-17T4)
The trial court's order compelling defendant to disclose the passcodes to his cell phones does not violate his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, although the defendant's act of producing the passcodes conveyed implicit facts as to the ownership, control, and ability to access the phones, the conveyance of these facts was a foregone conclusion because defendant did not give the State any information it did not already possess. The order also does not violate defendant's right against self-incrimination under New Jersey's common law, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, or N.J.R.E. 503. |
Appellate |
Nov. 14, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CALVIN BASS (83-06-2420, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0407-17T4)
Defendant challenges the denial of his fourth petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arising from a 1984 murder conviction. He contends that the revised waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1), effective March 1, 2016, should have been retroactively applied by the PCR judge pursuant to our holding in State in Interest of J.F., 446 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2016). Although defendant was fourteen years and one month of age at the time he committed the crime, we hold N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1), which does not authorize waiver to adult court of a juvenile under the age of fifteen, has no retroactive application where a defendant's conviction and sentence have been adjudicated with finality. |
Appellate |
Nov. 13, 2018 |
MARILYN FLANZMAN VS. JENNY CRAIG, INC., ET AL. (L-6238-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2580-17T1)
This court invalidated an arbitration agreement because the parties did not understand the rights that ostensibly foreclosed plaintiff's right to a jury trial. They could have designated an arbitral institution (like AAA or JAMS) or they could have communicated a general method for selecting a different arbitration setting. Identifying the arbitration process is important because it provides a "meeting of the minds" about what replaced a judicial adjudication. Here, the agreement ignored the subject altogether. This court therefore reversed the order compelling arbitration for lack of mutual assent and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Appellate |
Nov. 13, 2018 |
State v. Eileen Cassidy
(A-58-16 ; 078390)
The Special Master’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and the Court adopts them. Breath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a NIST-traceable thermometer are inadmissible. |
Supreme |
Nov. 13, 2018 |
P.H. VS. L.W. (FD-02-0659-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5345-16T4)
In this appeal involving an interstate custody dispute, the court reverses the Family Part's order denying the South Dakota mother's motion to dismiss. Applying the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the court concludes the Family Part initially exercised jurisdiction in 2016 based on a mistaken finding that New Jersey was the children's "home state," as the parties' twin daughters did not reside here for six consecutive months immediately before the father filed suit. Furthermore, the trial court should have determined, by the time it decided defendant's motion to dismiss over a year later, that New Jersey lacked "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction," because both parties and their daughters had long been absent from New Jersey, they lacked a significant connection here, and substantial relevant evidence was no longer available here. In any event, New Jersey had become an inconvenient forum. The court remands the case for a stay of further proceedings in anticipation of dismissal. |
Appellate |
Nov. 9, 2018 |
DCPP VS. M.C. AND J.R., IN THE MATTER OF J.C.-R. (FN-15-0211-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-5252-16T3)
This appeal involves the standards and procedures for in camera review and judicial disclosure of a parent's presumptively-confidential juvenile records in child welfare litigation brought by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("the Division"), a context not addressed in existing case law. The Law Guardian objected to the father having unsupervised parenting time with his eighteen-month-old daughter, having learned that he had been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile several years earlier after for committing sexual offenses upon two minors. The father opposed the court reviewing or disclosing the juvenile records, asserting they are confidential under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60. After hearing oral argument, the Family Part judge reviewed the father's records in camera. The judge then released the records in their entirety to counsel, pursuant to a protective order confining their use to the present Title 30 litigation. The father has appealed the judge's rulings. The panel affirms the Family Part judge's decision to conduct an in camera review of the records. The panel also upholds the judge's denial of the father's request for the court to conduct an additional hearing after the in camera review was completed. However, because the court's decision to release the records without further hearing was not accompanied by a statement of reasons, as required by case law and Rule 1:7-4, the panel remands this matter for the court to reconsider the matter, make any appropriate modifications, and generate the requisite statement of reasons. |
Appellate |
Nov. 8, 2018 |
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, ETC. VS. DEBBIE A. WEINER, ET AL. (F-026288-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2110-17T4)
A statute of limitations enacted in 2009 bars residential foreclosure actions commenced after the earliest of three points in time: six years from "the date fixed for the making of the last payment or the maturity date set forth in the mortgage or the note," N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a), thirty-six years from the recording of the mortgage, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(b), and twenty years from an uncured default, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(c). In this appeal, the court rejected a mortgagor's argument that a foreclosure action was time-barred because it was filed seven years after a default and the acceleration of the loan. The court determined that the triggering event in subsection (a)'s six-year provision is the date "set forth in the mortgage or the note," and not the date upon which the mortgagee accelerated the loan, because of subsection (a)'s clear and unambiguous language and because subsection (c) provides a time-frame – twenty years – that begins to run upon an uncured default. |
Appellate |
Nov. 8, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. QUIASIA N. CARROLL (W-2018-005075-0408, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0152-18T6)
The court reverses and remands for reconsideration the trial court's order of pre-trial detention. The State charged defendant with cyber-harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1(a)(2); and retaliation against a witness, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(b), based on Facebook posts in which defendant, in coarse language, identified and castigated a witness at a murder trial, and expressed her hope that someone would "blow [his] glasses . . . off his face." The court reverses the trial court's findings of probable cause with respect to cyber-harassment, as the posts did not involve lewd, indecent, or obscene statements. Applying First Amendment principles governing "true threats," and "advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action," United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012), the court affirms the trial court's finding of probable cause to charge retaliation, but concludes that the "weight of the evidence against the . . . defendant," N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(b), was nonetheless weak, requiring reconsideration of the detention decision. |
Appellate |
Nov. 7, 2018 |
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS CASTELLANO, ETC. (CP-0212-2016, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0165-17T3)
N.J.S.A. 9:17-43(a)(1) establishes a presumption that "[a] man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if . . . [h]e and the child's biological mother [were] married to each other and the child [was] born during the marriage." The decedent here died intestate, leaving siblings and a child, who was born when his mother was married to another man. Decedent's siblings claim this presumption, as well as other circumstances, required the court to assume that the mother's husband had "equitably adopted" the child and thereby severed the child's relationship to the decedent. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that N.J.S.A. 9:17-43(a)(1)'s presumption had been rebutted by DNA evidence that conclusively established that the decedent fathered the child, and that the other circumstances were of insufficient weight to cause a break in that natural relationship. |
Appellate |
Nov. 5, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SHAWN JOHNSON and RUMIEJAH UKAWABUTU
(17-04-00232)
Three issues were presented to the court as part of, or as a result of, the State’s speedy trial motion, each requiring application or interpretation of the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to 2A:162-26: first, whether the case should be designated complex pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(g) and Rule 3:25-4(i)(7); second, whether any portion of time since indictment should be deemed excludable from speedy trial calculation due to extraordinary circumstances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(f) and Rule 3:25-4(i)(6); and third and finally, whether excludable time attributable to one defendant should be attributable to all defendants who are joined for trial, even over their objection or opposition. The court found that the case should be designated complex and excluded 60 days from speedy trial computation. The court excluded an additional 8 days from speedy trial computation due to extraordinary circumstances. Finally, the court held that all post-indictment periods of exclusion are attributable to each defendant since defendants Johnson and Ukawabutu are joined for trial. |
Trial |
Nov. 5, 2018 |
State v. Nicholas Kiriakakis
(A-51-17 ; 080100)
The four-year period of parole ineligibility imposed by the court in exercising its sentencing discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) fell within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict and therefore did not violate Alleyne or the Sixth Amendment. In issuing a mandatory-minimum term, the court merely identified and weighed traditional sentencing factors to set an appropriate sentence within the statutory range set by the Legislature. The aggravating factors found by the court here were not the functional equivalent of the elements of an offense. |
Supreme |
Nov. 5, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. BENTEE M. GOINES
(MA-37-2016)
Rutgers University police arrested the defendant in New Brunswick and charged him with drunk driving. Rutgers and New Brunswick had an agreement that allowed Rutgers to patrol only certain streets within New Brunswick. The defendant was arrested on a street that fell outside that agreement raising a jurisdictional question. The jurisdictional question on appeal from municipal court turned upon interpreting two conflicting statutes. The first gives "any law enforcement officer" authority to arrest those committing Title 39 infractions, and more specifically, jurisdiction to arrest those who drive while intoxicated. See N.J.S.A. 39:5-25. The second statute limits university police jurisdiction to the boundaries of their campuses, unless the towns within which the universities are located agree to permit additional jurisdiction. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.7. The court held that Rutgers University police had jurisdiction to make the stop and arrest the defendant, as well as charge him with driving while intoxicated. It reached this decision, in part, based upon the Legislature’s decision to amend N.J.S.A. 39:5-25 to allow “any law enforcement officer” to arrest drunk drivers, while knowing that case law had interpreted the statute to give statewide jurisdiction to municipal officers to make these arrests. |
Trial |
Nov. 5, 2018 |
UNIVERSAL NORTH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. and UNIVERSAL NORTH AMERICAN as subrogee of THOMAS LASPADA v. BRIDGEPOINTE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCATION, INC.
(L-000771-18)
The issue before the Law Division, was whether an insurance carrier is barred from maintaining a subrogation claim on behalf of a unit owner against a condominium association if the association’s by-laws compel a waiver of such claims. The facts are straightforward. A unit owner at a condominium association obtained homeowner’s insurance. The unit owner’s unit sustained damages as the result of a fire. The carrier paid $222,172.84 to the unit owner. Thereafter, the carrier, as the unit owner’s subrogee, filed suit against various entities, including the condominium association, alleging that the condominium association failed to properly maintain the premises, which contributed to the fire. The carrier sought to recover the insurance monies it paid to the unit owner. The association’s by-laws prohibited such subrogation claims. Based on the reasoning adopted by the Appellate Division in Skulskie v. Ceponis, 404 N.J. Super. 501, 514 (App. Div. 2009), which upheld a waiver scheme in a condominium community, the Law Division held that the carrier’s claim was barred and granted the association’s motion for summary judgment. The Law Division held that a contrary result would penalize all of the unit owners regardless of fault and pit unit owner against unit owner, and unit owners against the association--a result contrary to the concept of a condominium. |
Trial |
Nov. 2, 2018 |
RADIATION DATA, INC. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ET AL. (L-1260-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0707-17T2)
Plaintiff is a certified radon measurement and mitigation business regulated by the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") and the largest radon measurement business in the State. While the DEP was pursuing a regulatory enforcement action against the company, the company filed suit against the DEP and several DEP officials in the Law Division, alleging improper conduct and violations of its constitutional, statutory, and common-law rights. Defendant moved to dismiss the company's constitutional and civil rights claims, asserting their alleged conduct was shielded under principles of qualified immunity. The trial court partially denied the immunity motion and ordered the parties to proceed with discovery. The panel concludes the trial court misapplied principles of qualified immunity and should have dismissed the corresponding counts of the complaint. The DEP did not violate "clearly established" equal protection and due process rights by pursuing a regulatory enforcement action against the company, and by directing that communications between the company and the agency be channeled through their respective attorneys while the contentious administrative litigation was ongoing. Among other things, the panel notes that a regulatory agency must retain the discretion to interact with private parties in a manner it deems most efficient and effective, so long as it responds to outside inquires within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Discovery on these claims was unnecessary, as defendants have qualified immunity from suit, not just a final judgment. The matter is remanded to adjudicate other open counts of the complaint. In a separate unpublished opinion issued today, the panel affirmed in part the findings of the DEP Commissioner and the two administrative law judges that the company committed various regulatory violations, and reversed and remanded those findings in part. |
Appellate |
Nov. 1, 2018 |
DEXTER RAMPERSAUD, ET AL. VS. RONALD A. HOLLINGSWORTH, ET AL. (LT-015717-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2897-16T1)
In this appeal, a now-evicted tenant of a residential apartment, which he sublet to another, argued that only the subtenant, whose conduct generated the tenancy action, could be evicted. In affirming a judgment of possession, the court rejected the tenant's strained interpretation of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c), and conclude that a wrongful act of one permits the eviction of all occupants. |
Appellate |
Oct. 30, 2018 |
State v. Rainlin Vasco
(A-54-17 ; 080426)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Espinosa’s dissenting opinion. Defendant’s guilty plea is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Supreme |
Oct. 30, 2018 |
DCPP VS. P.O. AND M.C.D., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.D.C.-O. AND J.E.C.-O. (FG-15-0017-13, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)(CONSOLIDATED)
(A-1871-16T2/A-1872-16T2)
Although the court affirmed the termination of parental rights of these parents, who executed an identified surrender and were removed to Peru, their country of origin, the court emphasized the need to put on the record all matters in child protective services litigation resulting in an order, even when the parties present consent to the order. Notice should also be provided to biological parents when the Division of Child Protection and Permanency seeks to vacate an identified surrender and seek termination of parental rights. |
Appellate |