Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Nov. 30, 2021 |
TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR COMMITTEE OF PETITIONERS, ET AL. VS. TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR ET AL. (L-2724-20, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2315-20)
Defendant's municipal clerk determined that plaintiffs' petition for a referendum on a rent-regulation ordinance lacked sufficient signatures; the clerk's decision resulted from her discerning of differences between some of the petition's e-signatures and the corresponding voters' pen-and-ink signatures on the voter rolls. The court affirmed the trial judge's determination that the clerk acted arbitrarily and capriciously because, among other things, the court found it was unreasonable, in light of the limiting circumstance of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Governor's emergency order precluding door-to-door solicitations, for the clerk not to reach out and provide voters with an opportunity to cure any alleged uncertain signatures before attempting to disenfranchise them from the referendum process. |
Appellate |
Nov. 24, 2021 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. HANEEF MOLLEY
(17-10-0737)
Defendant filed a Motion for Release Due to Illness or Infirmity under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) and a Motion for a Judicial Furlough under State v. Boone, 262 N.J. Super. 220 (Law Div. 1992). Defendant had asserted that, as an insulin dependent diabetic requiring two injections daily, his continued incarceration had placed him at a very high risk of contracting COVID-19 and suffering extremely serious health consequences, including death. After rejecting the State’s contention that defendant was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing such motions, the court addressed both motions on the merits. With respect to the Motion for Release Due to Illness or Infirmity under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), the court weighed the factors set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 135 (1985), for determining whether an inmate should be released. In so doing, the court held that while defendant had proven that he was suffering from an illness, defendant had not presented any evidence that the pandemic was having a "deleterious effect" on his medical condition and did not show that medical services unavailable at the prison would be essential to prevent further deterioration of his health. Similarly, while the pandemic constituted a change in circumstances, the Department of Corrections had taken efforts to mitigate and protect against the spread of the disease and defendant failed to present any evidence that COVID-19 was causing a "serious deterioration" to his health. Lastly, due to defendant’s extensive prior record and the serious nature of the charge for which defendant was incarcerated, defendant’s release would not be in the best interests of public safety and welfare. Thus, the motion under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) was denied. With regard to the Motion for a Judicial Furlough under Boone, the court noted that the defendant in Boone required lifesaving treatment out-of-state and there was no statutory or rule-based authority for granting such relief. As such, the trial court in Boone exercised its inherent authority to grant a judicial furlough to save the defendant’s life. Here, the court found that there was explicit statutory authority, vested in the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and his agents, through which defendant could seek a furlough. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.3. Since defendant had statutory authority by which to seek a furlough, the court found it had no authority to grant a judicial furlough and denied the motion. |
Trial |
Nov. 18, 2021 |
G.C. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services
(A-35/36/37-20 ; 084417)
The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s invalidation of N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.4(d)(1) as inconsistent with its state enabling legislation and contrary to legislative intent. But the Court has grave concerns that the regulation’s method of operation is also inconsistent with the federal Medicaid law. The Court accordingly vacates that portion of the Appellate Division’s analysis that rejected the federal-law argument by cross-petitioners. |
Supreme |
Nov. 18, 2021 |
IN THE MATTER OF THE VERIFIED PETITION OF THE RETAIL ENERGY SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, ETC. (NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES)
(A-1229-20)
On January 22, 2019, the staff of the Board of Public Utilities issued a "Cease and Desist and Refund Instructions" Letter (2019 Letter) stopping third-party suppliers of electricity generation and transmission from passing through a price increase to their fixed- or firm-rate customers when those increases were allegedly due to a new provision of the Clean Energy Act, L. 2018, c. 17 (eff. May 23, 2018). Appellant, an organization representing these suppliers, filed a petition with the Board seeking the withdrawal of the 2019 Letter. Two other providers, together with the Division of Rate Counsel, asked to participate in the matter. Although the Board's Secretary later offered other providers the opportunity to "reach resolution and close out the matter" and "thereafter be released" from the terms of the 2019 Letter, the Board never addressed appellant's petition asking that the directive be withdrawn in its entirety. After waiting over twenty months for the Board to act, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the Board's inaction. Under these circumstances, the court remanded the matter and directed the Board to consider and resolve appellant's petition within sixty days of the date of the remand. |
Appellate |
Nov. 17, 2021 |
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A MINOR CHILD BY J.B.
(FA-000010-20)
In re Adoption of a Minor Child by J.B. analyzes whether the precedents of Garden State Equality v. Dow and Obergefell v. Hodges have impacted the scope of the second parent exception to New Jersey’s Judgment of Adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50—particularly, whether its requirement that all parental rights, except for those rights of a legal parent who is the "spouse" of the petitioner, must be terminated upon the entry of a Judgment of Adoption. A strict reading of the statute contrasts with numerous court rulings issued prior to Garden State Equality v. Dow, yet the ability for same-sex couples to now marry removes a barrier to recognition that would allow for satisfaction of the statute’s restrictive requirements. Before same-sex couples had a legal pathway to marriage, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 was interpreted to allow unmarried couples to adopt without terminating a biological parent’s rights in cases such as In re Adoption of a Child by A.R., 152 N.J. Super. 541 (Probate Div. 1977), In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. 622, 623 (Ch. Div. 1993), and In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. 1 (1995). Yet, those cases carefully articulated that the petitioning couples had no legal ability to wed and were thus unable to satisfy the statute’s "spousal" requirements. Now that same-sex marriage has been legalized by Dow and Obergefell, the question of whether the exception still applies—after it was based upon couples for whom marriage was prohibited—must be answered, as well as to clarify that the statute’s strictly read requirements remain unnecessary. Despite the conflict between statutory language and relevant case law, the second parent exception should be affirmed to avoid terminating the rights of worthy, unmarried parents and petitioners seeking to form a family unit. |
Trial |
Nov. 4, 2021 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. COUNTY OF OCEAN (L-0527-20, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3665-19)
An Ocean County Prosecutor's Office (OCPO) detective was operating a county vehicle while performing official duties when she struck another vehicle injuring a passenger. After the passenger sued the OCPO and the detective for personal injuries, the State agreed to defend and indemnify both defendants. However, the State asserted that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10A-5 it could avail itself of the County's self-insurance and excess insurance policies mandated by N.J.S.A. 40A:10-3 as the primary sources to satisfy any judgment or settlement in the tort case. The State sued the County seeking a declaratory judgment to this effect. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court affirmed and held that N.J.S.A. 59:10A-5 grants the Attorney General the ability to direct who shall take up the defense on behalf of the State. However, pursuant to Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), where an employee is entitled to a defense by the State, the State shall also bear the costs of indemnification. N.J.S.A. 59:10A-5 does not alter the State's obligation to defend and indemnify utilizing its resources. |
Appellate |
Nov. 3, 2021 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOELLE D. CARONNA STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FREDDY COLLADO (20-02-0221, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-0580-20/A-0581-20)
This court held that the exclusionary rule applies where police violate Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution by unreasonably and unjustifiably ignoring a search warrant requirement that they knock and announce their presence before entering a dwelling. Doing so deters police from flagrantly violating knock-and-announce search warrant requirements; safeguards against unconstitutional, unreasonable, and illegal search and seizures under New Jersey law; and, importantly, upholds the rule of law and integrity of our administration of justice. |
Appellate |
Nov. 1, 2021 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANTHONY SCUDIERI (20-004, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0352-20)
In this appeal, the court held that the Legislature intended prospective application of the amended refusal statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. That intent was manifested by the Legislature's express statement that the amended legislation—which imposed on all defendants convicted of refusal the less onerous penalty of installing an interlock device rather than forfeiting his or her license as mandated by the former statute—would become effective on December 1, 2019, over four months after it was signed into law, and apply only to those defendants who committed an offense on or after that date. That unequivocal legislation pronouncement militates against retroactive application even for defendants who were sentenced after December 1, 2019. In such circumstances, courts need not consider the common law exceptions to the presumption of prospective application as discussed in Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 (1981) and James v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552 (2014), nor the timing of the penalty incurred under the general savings statute, N.J.S.A. 1:1–15. The Legislature's determination that interlock devices serve as a greater deterrent than license forfeiture supports the conclusion that the amended legislation was neither ameliorative nor curative, in any event. |
Appellate |
Oct. 27, 2021 |
CHARLES J. PARKINSON VS. DIAMOND CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC., ET AL. (L-1341-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2639-20)
On leave granted, the court holds that the tax filings of corporations and other businesses receive the same presumption of confidentiality as individual tax records. Hence, the heightened requirements for disclosure specified in Ullmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 87 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div. 1965), apply to such business tax filings as well. As Ullmann instructs, a civil litigant can only obtain an opposing party's tax filings through discovery by demonstrating to the court: (1) the filings are relevant to the case; (2) there is a "compelling need for the documents because the information likely to be contained within them is "not otherwise readily obtainable" from other sources; and (3) disclosure would serve a "substantial purpose." Id. at 415-16. |
Appellate |
Oct. 22, 2021 |
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB VS. PATRICIA E. DAW, ET AL. (F-007259-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0829-19)
After appellants’ home was severely damaged by Superstorm Sandy, they defaulted on their mortgage loan. Their flood insurer paid out $150,000 in benefits for the damage. Pursuant to the contract terms, the lender’s assignee held the insurance funds in escrow, while it decided whether repairs to the house would be "economically infeasible" or would lessen its security. Over three years passed before the lender ultimately applied the insurance proceeds to the homeowners' outstanding debt. During that lengthy interval, over $40,000 in mortgage interest accrued. The homeowners unsuccessfully argued to the Chancery judge they were entitled to a credit on the foreclosure judgment for that portion of the interest, due to the lender’s allegedly unfair conduct. Consistent with principles of fairness and reasonableness set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) (1997), this court holds the lender in such situations owes the borrower an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in determining how to dispose of the property or flood insurance funds. If the lender unreasonably delays making a decision about the proposed use of the insurance funds for repairs, the Chancery judge has the equitable power to abate the mortgage interest that accumulated in the meantime. Additionally, the lender must place the insurance funds in an interest-bearing, segregated account until the proper use of those funds is resolved. Having announced these governing principles, the court remands this matter to Chancery Division to develop the record more fully and evaluate whether the mortgage company breached the implied covenant. |
Appellate |
Oct. 18, 2021 |
GREEN KNIGHT CAPITAL, LLC VS. GABRIEL CALDERON, ET AL. (F-005626-20, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1265-20)
In this action to foreclose a tax sale certificate, plaintiff appeals from three Chancery Division orders. The first denied plaintiff's motion to bar redemption and impose a constructive trust. The second granted the respondent investor's motion to intervene and permit redemption. The third denied plaintiff's motion to set the time, place, and amount of redemption as moot. The court held that when an investor has an interest in the property in foreclosure, is prepared to redeem the tax sale certificate, and files a motion to intervene in the foreclosure action before the entry of an order setting the last date for redemption, the investor is permitted to intervene and redeem the tax certificate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the three orders entered by the trial court. |
Appellate |
Oct. 18, 2021 |
JWC FITNESS, LLC VS. PHILIP D. MURPHY, ETC. (L-0388-20, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0639-20)
In this latest appeal arising from executive orders (EOs) issued by the Governor of New Jersey in response to health-related emergencies caused by the spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus, plaintiff JWC Fitness, LLC, which until October 2020 operated a kickboxing business, claimed entitlement to compensation under the New Jersey Civil Defense and Disaster Control Act (Disaster Control Act), N.J.S.A. App. A:9-30 to -63, for the closure and limitations placed on its business under some EOs. According to plaintiff, the EOs that temporarily limited and shut down the operations of health clubs, including gyms and fitness centers, effectively "commandeered and utilized" its property under N.J.S.A. App. A:9-34, such that the State must establish an "emergency compensation board" under N.J.S.A. App. A:9-51(c), in order to provide "payment of the reasonable value of such . . . privately owned property." N.J.S.A. App. A:9-34. Plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment that the EOs effectuated a taking of its property without just compensation, in violation of the New Jersey Constitution, art. I, ¶ 20, and the United States Constitution, amends. V and XIV. The court concluded that plaintiff's arguments were without merit as the statutory standard for compensation had not been implicated, and the EOs did not effectuate a taking of plaintiff's property within the meaning of the state and federal constitutions. |
Appellate |
Oct. 6, 2021 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. KYLE POWELL
(19-10-02086)
The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he was charged with bias intimidation, among other crimes, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(2). Defendant admitted to sending messages via MeetMe.com to the victim threatening to harm her biracial daughter, in which he referred to the child as a "mutt" and "mongrel" and referred to the victim as a "spic loving whore." Defendant asserted that the grand jury was not presented with any evidence demonstrating that defendant directed the threats at the victim and her daughter based on racial motivation. The messages were in reference to the daughter’s race and not the victim’s who was the recipient of the threats. The State argued that the grand jury was presented with testimony that defendant stated he disliked interracial relationships and children of those relationships. The court denied defendant’s motion, holding that, by defendant’s own admission, the threats were motivated by the victim’s identity as a white female who engaged in a biracial relationship with a Hispanic male and bore a biracial daughter. Additionally, the court reasoned that the victim’s biracial daughter was also a foreseeable third-party victim of the threats even though she was not the recipient. As the standard for upholding an indictment weighs heavily in favor of the State, here defendant’s admissions satisfied the requisite evidence needed to demonstrate racial motivation for N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(2). |
Trial |
Sept. 28, 2021 |
C.R. v. M.T.
(A-58-19 ; 083760)
The appropriate standard to determine whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA is not the prostration of faculties standard, which focuses on the mental state of the defendant, but rather the standard articulated in State in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992), which is applied from the perspective of the alleged victim. The M.T.S. standard requires a showing that sexual activity occurred without the alleged victim’s freely and affirmatively given permission to engage in that activity. The standard for consent for an alleged victim in a SASPA case should be no different than the standard for consent for an alleged victim in a criminal sexual assault case. The Court reverses and remands this matter to the trial court for assessment under the standard articulated in M.T.S. |
Supreme |
Sept. 27, 2021 |
CITY OF NEWARK VS. NEWARK POLICE SUPERIOR OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION, ET AL. (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-0146-21/A-0159-21)
The court holds that the Mayor of the City of Newark has the authority, as a managerial prerogative, to mandate that all City employees be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. Nine unions representing City employees filed unfair labor practice charges against the City with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) and requested an injunction to prevent the implementation of the mandate before the City negotiated with the unions. A Director of PERC issued an order granting in part and denying in part the unions' request for preliminary injunctive relief. On leave granted, the court affirms the portion of the PERC order that held that the Mayor has a managerial prerogative to issue the mandate but vacates the portion of PERC's order that imposed restraints on the City or required any negotiations concerning the implementation, timing, or enforcement of the City's vaccination mandate. |
Appellate |
Sept. 27, 2021 |
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. J.R.-R. and G.R.-R
(A-56/57-19 ; 083807)
The Legislature placed on DCPP the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent abused or neglected a child, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1), and the Judiciary has no commission to exercise equitable powers to alter the statutory burden of proof set forth by the Legislature. The Court disapproves of the Appellate Division cases that have imported the doctrine of conditional res ipsa loquitur from the common law into a comprehensive statutory scheme to relieve DCPP of its burden of proving that a particular parent abused or neglected a child. The Court remands for a new hearing. |
Supreme |
Sept. 27, 2021 |
MORGAN DENNEHY VS. EAST WINDSOR REGIONAL BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-1333-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2497-19)
Plaintiff Morgan Dennehy appeals from a February 18, 2020 order denying her motion for reconsideration of a previous order granting summary judgment to defendants East Windsor Regional Board of Education, Hightstown High School, James W. Peto, Todd M. Peto, and Dezarae Fillmyer. Plaintiff was a student at Hightstown High School and a member of the field hockey team. On September 9, 2015, the field hockey team was waiting for its scheduled practice on Hightstown High School's turf field to begin and was conducting drills in the "D-zone," an area between the recently renovated turf field and the track. Some members of the team were participating in the drills while others watched. A twenty-foot-tall ball-stopper is located at each end of the turf field and separates the "D-zone" from the turf field. While the field hockey team was practicing drills in the "D-zone," the boys soccer team was practicing on the turf field and plaintiff observed several soccer balls vault the ball stopper. After the team concluded its drills, plaintiff asked defendant Coach Fillmyer if she could take a shot on goal. Defendant agreed because plaintiff rarely had the opportunity to shoot on goal. Plaintiff left the area directly behind the ball stopper and, after she finished shooting, she was struck in the back of the neck by an errant soccer ball that went over the ball stopper. Plaintiff was later taken to the hospital and was diagnosed with a concussion. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants were negligent and negligent in hiring, retaining, training, and supervision of employees. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the motion judge erroneously applied the heightened recklessness standard set forth in Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494 (1994). After reviewing the applicable case law, the court concluded that the motion judge erred in applying the heightened recklessness standard from Crawn. In this case, defendant Fillmyer was not a co-participant who directly injured plaintiff and, therefore, Crawn does not apply. The court also determined that Rosania v. Carmona, 308 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1998) does not apply to this case. In Rosania, a martial arts instructor participated in a sparring match with a student and kicked the student in the head causing his retina to detach. The martial arts dojo had a written rule that prohibited targeting of the head. The Rosania panel determined that if the jury found the risks inherent in the karate match were materially increased by an instructor beyond those reasonably anticipated by the dojo rules, it should have been charged on the ordinary duty owed to business invitees rather than the heightened recklessness standard for competitive contact sports. The court declined to apply Rosania in this case for two reasons: first, defendant Fillmyer was not a co-participant; and second, the Rosania panel's decision was informed by cases decided by the New York Court of Appeals which contemplated a different heightened standard. The court concluded that because defendant in this case is a public employee, her duties, responsibilities, and immunities are clearly established in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, and thus defendant is liable to the same extent as a private person for her negligence and the ordinary negligence standard should govern this case. |
Appellate |
Sept. 23, 2021 |
State v. Michelle Paden-Battle
(A-13-20 ; 084603)
The Court reverses in Melvin and affirms in Paden-Battle. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution bestows upon all citizens certain natural and unalienable rights. From those rights flows the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action. Fundamental fairness prohibits courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct as to which a jury found that defendant not guilty. |
Supreme |
Sept. 23, 2021 |
State v. Mark Melvin
(A-44-19 ; 083298)
The Court reverses in Melvin and affirms in Paden-Battle. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution bestows upon all citizens certain natural and unalienable rights. From those rights flows the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action. Fundamental fairness prohibits courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct as to which a jury found that defendant not guilty. |
Supreme |
Sept. 21, 2021 |
IMO John J. Robertelli
(D-126-19 ; 084373)
*After conducting a de novo review of the record and affording deference to the credibility findings of the Special Master, the Court concludes that the OAE has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the RPCs. The disciplinary charges must therefore be dismissed.
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Supreme |