Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
June 6, 2022 |
CATHERINE PARSELLS VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOROUGH OF SOMERVILLE, ETC. (NEW JERSEY COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION)
(A-3084-19)
A tenured teacher asked the board of education about switching from a full-time role to a part-time position with benefits. The board approved her transfer but failed to inform her of the impact it would have on her tenured status. When the teacher re-applied for a full-time role, she did not get the job. The teacher appealed and an administrative law judge found for the board. However, the Commissioner of Education reversed the initial decision, finding instead that the teacher did not knowingly waive her right to a full-time position because the board had a duty to inform the teacher of the consequences of going part-time under Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of Bridgewater-Raritan Sch. Dist., 221 N.J. 349 (2015). The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision and interpretation of Bridgewater-Raritan, which established a school's duty, under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-1.1, to provide notice to replacement teachers concerning the limitations on service time towards tenure. The court held that Bridgewater-Raritan compels school boards to notify in advance a full-time tenured teacher who voluntarily takes a part-time teaching position that she is at risk of not getting her full-time job back. |
Appellate |
June 6, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. QUINTIN D. WATSON (18-02-0234, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0235-19)
The court affirms defendant's jury trial conviction for second-degree robbery of a bank. The court first addresses defendant's contention that the trial judge erred by permitting the jury to hear testimony that the investigating police officer had been contacted by and "consulted" with another police department immediately before filing criminal charges. Defendant contends that such testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. After reviewing New Jersey's Confrontation Clause case law, the court concludes that the police officer's brief answer to the prosecutor's leading question concerning the consultation with the other police department violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because it created an inescapable inference that the other department possessed and shared incriminating evidence about the current offense that was not presented to the jury. The court nonetheless concludes that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court next addresses defendant's contention that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing a police witness to narrate surveillance video as it was being played to the jury. The court surveys the law in New Jersey explaining when a police witness may offer a lay opinion. The court also surveys cases in other jurisdictions that specifically address the admissibility of video narration testimony. The court declines to adopt a rule that would categorically prohibit such testimony, holding instead that a trial court has discretion to permit a witness to offer descriptive comments while a video is being played if the court finds that those specific comments would be helpful to the jury. To assist trial judges in making that determination, the court compiles a list of six factors to consider. In this instance, the court declines to second-guess the trial judge's rulings that sustained some objections to the video narration testimony and overruled others. The court notes that the use of surveillance video evidence at trial is becoming more common because of the proliferation of government, commercial, and residential surveillance cameras. To improve the process by which the admissibility of police narration testimony is determined, the court recommends a new practice and procedure whereby the trial judge would conduct an in limine hearing when the prosecutor intends to present narration testimony in conjunction with playing a video to the jury. At that hearing, the court should rule upon the specific narration comments that will be permitted and those that will be foreclosed, providing clear instructions for the witness to follow. That in limine procedure would obviate the need for a series of spontaneous objections in the presence of the jury. The court also notes that there presently is no model jury instruction pertaining to lay opinion testimony. The court recommends that the Model Jury Charge Committee consider whether it would be appropriate to draft a model instruction specifically tailored to address video narration testimony. The court next considers defendant's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the trial court erred by allowing the bank teller to make an in-court identification after having selected the photograph of another person from a photo array. After reviewing the foundational principles that undergird New Jersey's eyewitness identification jurisprudence, the court rejects defendant's request to categorically ban "first-time" in-court identifications. The court declines to impose new bright-line preconditions on when an eyewitness may identify the perpetrator at trial. Rather, the court retains the rule that the decision to allow an in-court identification is made on a case-by-case basis, mindful that suppression of identification testimony is rarely warranted and that the reliability of an identification and the weight to give to it is generally for the jury to decide with the benefit of cross-examination and appropriate jury instructions. The court also addresses defendant's contention that the trial court should have revised the model jury charge sua sponte to explain the inherent suggestiveness of the in-court identification procedure. The court concludes that the trial judge did not commit plain error by relying on the current model jury charge. The court acknowledges, however, that the time has come to reexamine that instruction. After reviewing the case law and scientific literature, the court accepts that the inherent suggestiveness of in-court identifications is comparable to the suggestiveness of one-on-one show-up identifications. And yet, the court notes, the model jury instructions pertaining to in-court identifications are less detailed and precise than the model instruction that explains the risk of misidentification in a show-up procedure. The court recommends that the Model Jury Charge Committee consider revising the model instruction pertaining to in-court identifications, for example, by incorporating language currently used to explain the suggestiveness of one-on-one show-up identifications. |
Appellate |
June 3, 2022 |
LOUIS RIPP VS. COUNTY OF HUDSON (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)
(A-2972-20)
N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.2(a) permits a workers' compensation judge to enforce a court order, statute or regulation by imposing "an additional assessment not to exceed 25% of moneys due for unreasonable payment delay." In this case, the parties settled petitioner's total disability claim, and, the judge imposed the maximum assessment when the county was sixteen days late in making payment required under the order. The court reversed, concluding the judge erred as a matter of law because she considered litigation delays occurring prior to the settlement and entry of the order for payment in fashioning the award. The court also concluded the judge mistakenly exercised her discretion regarding the amount of the award, because she imposed the maximum additional assessment for a relatively short delay. |
Appellate |
June 3, 2022 |
CHERYL ROOTH VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL. (PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM)
(A-2378-20)
A former public school bus driver appealed from a PERS final agency decision declaring her ineligible to file an accidental disability retirement application when separation from service was based upon an irrevocable resignation, not related to a disability, in accordance with N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4. On appeal, the court was required to determine whether a school employee, who irrevocably resigned while an employment grievance was pending, could file an application for ordinary or accidental disability retirement benefits, when the charges underlying the grievance did not relate to a disability. For the reasons stated in the court's opinion, it concluded that , in the first instance, a public school employee's irrevocable resignation from employment rendered the school employee ineligible for ordinary or accidental retirement benefits because the school employee's separation from service was based upon a resolution of the pending grievance, and not an alleged disability. |
Appellate |
June 2, 2022 |
KEVIN MORRIS, ET AL. VS. RUTGERS-NEWARK UNIVERSITY, ET AL. (L-3280-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-0582-21/A-0583-21)
The plaintiffs whose claims are implicated in these interlocutory cross-appeals were members of defendant Rutgers-Newark's 2014-15 women's basketball team. Four plaintiffs describe themselves as African-American and gay, one as African-American and bisexual, and the sixth as Hispanic and heterosexual. They claim they were retaliated against and subjected to a hostile environment in violation of the Law Against Discrimination by defendants because, among other things, their interim coach, defendant William Zasowski, referred to them as "dykes," and "nappy-headed sisters," and asked the team captain for the names of the team members who were gay and, when they complained and sought a school investigation, defendants retaliated. The trial judge granted in part and denied in part defendants' summary judgment motion. The court concluded that the judge did not err in denying summary judgment on plaintiffs' hostile environment claims and did not err in denying summary judgment on the retaliation claims of two plaintiffs; the court held, however, that the judge erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claims of the other four plaintiffs. The court held that both the hostile environment and retaliation claims should be considered, not individually as argued by defendants, but in light of the fact that plaintiffs were members of small, tightly-knit group and that each plaintiff could rely on the experiences of the others even if they did not directly experience or witness defendants' alleged discriminatory comments and epithets, thereby distinguishing Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178 (2008) in this setting. |
Appellate |
June 2, 2022 |
State v. Bradley C. Thompson
(A-41-20 ; 085260)
A plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals that the Legislature intended the statute of limitations to begin to run once the State was in possession of both the physical evidence from the crime and the suspect’s DNA. To hold otherwise would contradict the language of the statute which directs the statute of limitations to begin when the State is in possession of both items needed to generate a match. To find that the statute of limitations begins when a match is confirmed would render the second half of the provision superfluous. Here, the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, when the FBI’s updated scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match based on the DNA samples in its possession. |
Supreme |
June 2, 2022 |
JESSE WOLOSKY VS. FREDON TOWNSHIP, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY)
(A-2382-19)
The court vacates an order of the Tax Court awarding Green Township, pursuant to the frivolous litigation statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, "$45,589.35 in counsel fees and costs for its defense of [defendant Penny] Holenstein"1 in her official capacity as Municipal Tax Assessor. Wolosky v. Fredon Twp., 31 N.J. Tax 373, 405 (Tax 2019). Because the motion for sanctions was filed 679 days after the entry of a final judgment, and after this court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's 2016 complaint challenging a property tax assessment, Wolosky v. Fredon Twp., No. A 1980-16 (App. Div. July 24, 2018), we conclude the Tax Court mistakenly exercised its discretion when it reopened the case and considered the motions as timely filed. We therefore vacate the award of sanctions in favor of Green Township. Plaintiff also appeals from an order denying his motion for counsel fees against defendant Fredon Township. Because the record does not support a finding that Fredon Township acted frivolously, we affirm the denial of plaintiff's motion for sanctions. ________________________________________________________________ |
Appellate |
May 31, 2022 |
CHRISTINE SAVAGE VS. TOWNSHIP OF NEPTUNE, NEPTUNE TOWNSHIP POLICE, ET AL. (L-1528-16, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1415-20)
Plaintiff Christine Savage, a former sergeant with defendant Township of Neptune Police Department, appealed from an order enforcing a "non-disparagement provision" in a settlement agreement. In the underlying employment discrimination case, plaintiff alleged defendants engaged in continuing sexual discrimination, harassment, and unlawful retaliation, in violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, and Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution. On July 23, 2020, the parties settled the employment discrimination action and entered into an agreement, which included a non-disparagement provision, but not a non-disclosure provision. Defendants Michael J. Bascom, the former Police Director for Neptune Township, and James M. Hunt, the Chief of the Neptune Police Department, filed a motion in September 2020, to enforce the settlement, arguing that plaintiff violated the non-disparagement provision during an interview with a television news reporter that aired on Channel 4, NBC news on August 11, 2020. The trial judge granted defendants' motion, finding that N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.8(a) only barred confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements (also referred to as NDAs), and that plaintiff violated the non-disparagement provision in the agreement when she commented during the televised interview that the Neptune Police Department had not changed, and it was still a "good old boys club." The judge subsequently awarded defendants $4,917.50 in counsel fees and costs for breach of the non-disparagement clause. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the judge erred in granting the motion because the non-disparagement provision was against public policy and unenforceable under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.8(a), and thus the judge also erred in denying her cross-motion for counsel fees under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.9. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that even if the non-disparagement provision were enforceable, by adjudicating this dispute as a motion to enforce, rather than as a separate breach of contract action, the judge deprived her of her right to have a jury decide the disputed facts. The court reversed the order granting defendants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement and held that although the terms of the non-disparagement provision are enforceable and the judge properly adjudicated this matter by motion, the judge nonetheless erred in finding that plaintiff violated the terms of the non-disparagement provision during the televised interview. Because defendants' enforcement motion was not successful, the court vacated the judge's award of $4,917.50 in counsel fees to defendants. However, the court affirmed the judge's order denying plaintiff's cross-motion for counsel fees and costs under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.9. |
Appellate |
May 31, 2022 |
Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. State of New Jersey
(A-8/9/10/11-21 ; 085465)
The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Messano’s published opinion. |
Supreme |
May 20, 2022 |
HEATHER J. MCVEY VS. ATLANTICARE MEDICAL SYSTEM INCORPORATED, ET AL. (L-3186-20, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0737-20)
The issue raised in this appeal is whether the First Amendment or Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution prevents a private employer from terminating one of its at-will employees for posting racially insensitive comments about the Black Lives Matter movement on her personal Facebook account. Defendants AtlantiCare Medical System Incorporated and Geisinger Health System Incorporated (AtlantiCare) employed plaintiff Heather J. McVey as a Corporate Director of Customer Service. During the height of the nationwide protests concerning the murder of George Floyd by police in Minnesota, McVey posted that she found the phrase "Black Lives Matter" to be "racist," believed the Black Lives Matter movement "causes segregation," and asserted that Black citizens were "killing themselves." McVey's Facebook profile prominently stated that she was an AtlantiCare Corporate Director. After it discovered the comments, AtlantiCare fired McVey and she filed a complaint alleging wrongful discharge. The court concluded that the First Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution did not bar a private employer from terminating an at-will employee under the circumstances presented in this case, and held that the trial court properly dismissed McVey's complaint. |
Appellate |
May 18, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. YVES M. MARCELLUS (16-11-0791, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4102-19)
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence taken by police from an opaque bag and closed shoebox located in his mother's room in a home owned by his aunt; his aunt had previously barred defendant from the home. Police did not seek a warrant but instead sought and obtained the consent of defendant's aunt to search her home. No effort was made to obtain defendant's mother's consent to search her room, even though the trial judge found she was a tenant, because she spoke only Creole. Notwithstanding questions about the validity of the consent to search defendant's mother's room, the court concluded in reversing that there was no evidence to support a finding that police had a reasonably objective belief that either defendant's aunt or his mother had the authority to consent to a search of the opaque bag and closed shoebox because the record revealed this property belonged only to defendant, who did not consent. That defendant had no possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises where the closed containers were found was irrelevant to the analysis about the validity of the search of the containers. |
Appellate |
May 18, 2022 |
C.E., ET AL. VS. ELIZABETH PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. (L-2231-15, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0173-20)
Plaintiffs, the parents of a special needs child, sued defendants to enforce an Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, request. The OPRA request sought all settlements entered into by the school board before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (OAL) in petitions filed by or on behalf of students subject to an individualized education program or an accommodation plan. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to enforce the OPRA request and award plaintiffs' attorney's fees. The court concludes that pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), and state regulations implementing the IDEA, settlements entered before the OAL are public records and defendants were required to disclose them after redacting personally identifiable information. |
Appellate |
May 16, 2022 |
State v. Rashaun Bell
(A-75-20 ; 084657)
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 applies to the act of fleeing from the scene of an accident. The number of fatalities that may result from the accident is not an element of the offense and thus only one count of the offense may be charged per accident, regardless of the number of victims. Although the Appellate Division correctly reversed the trial court’s judgment with regard to the number of counts that could be charged, the appellate court should have remanded the case to the trial court to permit the parties to negotiate a new plea agreement or go to trial rather than amend the sentence in a manner not contemplated by the plea agreement. |
Supreme |
May 16, 2022 |
NICOLE HOOVER VS. MERRICK WETZLER, M.D., ET AL. (L-2395-20, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2688-20)
In this nursing malpractice case, plaintiff Nicole Hoover appeals from an April 1, 2021 order denying reconsideration of a February 19, 2021 order that dismissed her claims with prejudice for failure to provide an appropriate Affidavit of Merit (AOM) against nurse/defendant Nicole Baughman. After a total-knee replacement surgery, plaintiff sued Wexler, her orthopedic surgeon; defendant, a Registered Nurse First Assistant who was assisting Wexler in the surgery; and others, alleging negligence in the performance of the surgery. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiff filed and served a single AOM applicable to all defendants. The AOM was executed by Dr. Robert Tonks, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon who has experience performing total knee replacement surgery. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, determining that the AOM statute required plaintiff to submit an AOM from either a registered nurse or a physician who is familiar with the nursing standard of care and protocols of nurses. The court finds that the like-credentialed requirements of the Patients First Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53-41, applies only to physicians and not to other licensed professionals under the AOM statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29. See Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (2016) (holding section 41 applies only to physicians and "[t]here is simply no textual support for the application of the like-qualified requirements of section 41" to actions against other licensed professionals under section 27). Because there is no heightened "like-for-like" requirement that prohibited Tonks from authoring an AOM against defendant, he need only have satisfied N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27's requirement that he "have particular expertise in the general area or specialty involved in the action." The court concludes that Tonks is a qualified affiant under the statute. Defendant does not dispute Tonks' expertise in knee-replacement surgery. She concedes she was a member of the operative team and that she actively assisted in the surgery as a perioperative registered nurse. Notably, the central allegation against defendant and Wexler is identical: one or both negligently severed plaintiff's popliteal artery and vein. Under these circumstances, the court finds that Tonks is an expert who satisfies section 27 of the AOM statute and that plaintiff need not have filed an AOM from a registered nurse. Whether and to what extent Tonks may serve as an expert against defendant at trial must be fleshed out in discovery, and the court expresses no opinion on that subject. Accordingly, the court reverses and remands for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. |
Appellate |
May 16, 2022 |
KNIGHTBROOK INSURANCE COMPANY VS. CAROLINA TANDAZO-CALOPINA, ET AL. (L-1056-20, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1115-20)
The court clarified when an insurance company may be relieved of providing insurance coverage to an insured who refuses to cooperate in defending a personal injury victim's claim pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy. An insurance company's satisfaction of either of the two variables identified in Hager v. Gonsalves, 398 N.J. Super. 529 (App. Div. 2008), constitutes appreciable prejudice sufficient to forfeit any obligation on the part of an insurance company to provide coverage to an insured. Under the first variable, a trial court must determine whether an insurer's substantial rights have been irretrievably lost as a result of the insured's breach of the insurance policy. Under the second variable, a trial court must examine an insurer's likelihood of success in defending against an accident victim's claim had the insured not failed to cooperate. In analyzing the appreciable prejudice variables, the court held the first variable applied to an irretrievable loss of substantial rights related to coverage determinations by an insurer. To conclude otherwise would render the second appreciable prejudice variable redundant. The two variables are intended to address different aspects of appreciable prejudice. |
Appellate |
May 16, 2022 |
JACOB MATULLO VS. SKYZONE TRAMPOLINE PARK, ET AL. (L-3117-20, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2813-20)
In this appeal, the court addresses the enforceability of an arbitration provision in an agreement signed by a fifteen-year-old minor to gain access to a commercial trampoline park. The court holds that the arbitration provision is not enforceable because the minor had the right to disaffirm the agreement and the limited exceptions to that right did not apply. Accordingly, the court reverses and vacates the order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. The matter is remanded with instruction that plaintiff's complaint be reinstated so that his claims can be litigated in the Law Division. |
Appellate |
May 16, 2022 |
LOUIE PEREZ VS. SKY ZONE, LLC, ET AL. (L-3464-20, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1861-20)
The court holds that an adult can waive his or her right to bring claims in a court and can be compelled to arbitrate personal injury claims when the adult had reviewed a clearly worded arbitration provision before entering a commercial recreational park. The court also remands for entry of a new order because the trial court erred in dismissing the Law Division action. Instead of dismissing the action, the trial court should have stayed the Law Division action, including the claims against defendants who are not parties to the arbitration provision. |
Appellate |
May 12, 2022 |
METRO MARKETING, LLC, ET AL. VS. NATIONWIDE VEHICLE ASSURANCE, INC., ET AL. (L-2090-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3907-18)
Plaintiffs in this case are affiliated companies engaged in selling extended service contracts 31 to motor vehicle owners over the telephone. They claim that defendants hired away key managers and more than forty members of their sales force, siphoned customers, and misappropriated alleged trade secrets. Relying upon several legal theories, plaintiffs filed suit to recover damages and obtain injunctive relief. In a series of orders, the motion judge granted summary judgment to defendants, dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims now at issue on appeal. In ruling on summary judgment, the motion judge disregarded two certifications submitted by plaintiffs from a codefendant who "switched sides" and became employed by plaintiffs after his deposition. This court holds that the "sham affidavit" doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court in Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 199-202 (2002), can extend to a "side switching" situation. In particular, the doctrine can apply where, as here: (1) a codefendant is deposed, (2) that deponent thereafter obtains a job with the plaintiff, (3) the deponent then aids his new employer by signing certifications recanting his deposition testimony, and (4) the plaintiff offers those certifications in opposing summary judgment motions by the other defendants. Applying the sham affidavit doctrine to this record, the court rules the motion judge appropriately disregarded the side-switching employee's certifications because the employee failed, as Shelcusky requires, to "reasonably explain[]" why he "patently and sharply" contradicted his earlier deposition testimony. Id. at 201. However, the court rules the judge erred in rejecting as evidence a recorded telephone conversation of a different codefendant who was also rehired by one of plaintiffs' companies after his deposition. Because the recording should have been considered as evidence weighing against defendants' summary judgment motion, the court remands this matter to allow the Law Division in the first instance to reconsider its dismissal of the lawsuit in its entirety. |
Appellate |
May 10, 2022 |
Sundiata Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board
(A-73-20 ; 083980)
Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53 (1979), at the time of Acoli’s parole hearing, he was presumptively entitled to release; to overcome that presumption, the Parole Board had the burden of demonstrating that there was a substantial likelihood that, if released, Acoli would commit another crime. The Parole Board did not meet that burden. The record does not contain substantial credible evidence to support the Parole Board’s decision to deny parole to Acoli. Accordingly, the Court is compelled to overturn the judgment of the Appellate Division and grant Acoli parole, consistent with his established release plan. |
Supreme |
May 9, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANDREW N. LAVRIK (19-05-0566, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1540-20)
In this case of first impression, the court considered whether a victim in a criminal matter has standing to appeal from a trial court order granting defendant's motion for a civil reservation, where the victim neither moved to intervene before the trial court nor this court, and the parties to the underlying action did not appeal. Because the victim was aggrieved by the trial court's order, and the civil reservation was neither raised during plea negotiations nor made a condition of defendant's guilty plea, the court held the victim has standing to appeal. However, the court's decision was subject to certain caveats. The court held the victim should have moved to intervene for leave to appeal and file a brief before this court. Because the court would have granted the victim's motion and considered her brief on the merits, the court concluded the victim's procedural missteps were not fatal in this case. As for the merits of the victim's claims, the court concluded the trial court's decision was procedurally and substantively flawed. Because it is unclear from the record evidence whether defendant faces a "precarious financial situation" absent a civil reservation, the court disagreed with the trial court's decision that defendant satisfied the requisite "good cause" standard for entry of the civil reservation order. Moreover, defendant's admission to the pretrial intervention (PTI)program was conditioned on his guilty plea. Until defendant completes – or is terminated from – the PTI program, his guilty plea is considered "inactive" under the PTI statute and the applicable Attorney General guidelines. Thus, the order under review was premature. The court therefore vacated the order under review and remanded for further proceedings. |
Appellate |