Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
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Dec. 6, 2022 |
SILVANA LANSIGAN DELVALLE, ET AL. VS. HENRY J. TRINO, ET AL. (L-5663-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-2248-21/A-2249-21 ; A-2248-21/ A-2249-21)
Our Supreme Court granted leave to defendants Henry Trino, Charlene Trino, Airel Trino, and Kevin Garcia to appeal the denial of their summary judgment motions to dismiss the complaint by plaintiffs Silvana Lansigan Delvalle, as administrator of Raniel Hernandez's estate and individually, and Ralph Hernandez. These appeals were calendared back-to-back and consolidated to issue a single opinion. Plaintiffs' common law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as the claim based on the principal of Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980), arise from the accidental drowning of their son Raniel, while he was swimming, intoxicated, at a pool party hosted by the Trinos. The trial court denied summary judgment to defendants on the ground there were genuine issues of material facts in dispute with respect to their negligence. As to Garcia, the dispute involved his active role in Raniel's drowning. Concerning the Trinos, the dispute involved the common law duty owed to an intoxicated Raniel and the implementation of reasonable pool safety protections to prevent his drowning. The motion court did not address dismissal of plaintiffs' intentional infliction of emotional distress and Portee claims. We reverse. Garcia should have been granted summary judgment because the undisputed record indicates he had no role in Raniel's decision to enter the pool, nor did he have a duty to rescue Raniel. Furthermore, there is no indication Garcia failed to exercise good faith when he tried to save Raniel. The Trinos should have been granted summary judgment because the Social Host Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 to 5.8, does not govern plaintiff's drowning and, under our current state law, they owed Raniel no common law duty to prevent him from swimming while intoxicated. As for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and Portee claims, they fail as a matter of law. Defendants' conduct in not knowing or indicating how Raniel drowned did not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, and there is no viable Portee claim because plaintiffs did not witness the drowning. |
Appellate |
Dec. 2, 2022 |
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT, C.J. (20130055, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1387-21)
This appeal raises the novel issue of whether it is appropriate for a trial court to consider acquitted conduct to determine a registrant's Megan's Law tier designation. The court held the trial court properly considered acquitted conduct because of the non-punitive, civil nature of a Megan's Law proceeding, the public safety purpose underpinning the statute, and the less demanding standard utilized to make a tier designation. The court determined this situation was distinguishable from imposing an enhanced criminal sentence based on acquitted conduct, which our Supreme Court recently held to be improper. State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 352 (2021). This is because the trial court's utilization of acquitted conduct was not for the purpose of increasing the registrant's punishment, but for a legitimate public safety purpose consistent with In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996). The court remanded, however, for the trial court to conduct a more comprehensive review of the record and to consider portions of the trial transcript and other documents identified by the registrant, which he contends rebuts the acquitted conduct relied upon by the court to increase his tier classification. |
Appellate |
Nov. 28, 2022 |
In the Matter of Officer Gregory DiGuglielmo and New Jersey Institute of Technology
(A-33-21 ; 085064)
A plain reading of the relevant statutes dictates that special disciplinary arbitration is not limited to municipal officers, so arbitration is available to public university police officers like Officer DiGuglielmo. Further, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-210, an officer suspended with pay prior to termination is eligible to engage in special disciplinary arbitration. The Court therefore reinstates PERC’s decision.
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Supreme |
Nov. 22, 2022 |
State Of New Jersey In The Interest Of E.S.
(A-41/42-21 ; 086554)
The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hear the defendant’s waiver motion before considering his suppression motion. The Court declines, however, to adopt a preference that the Family Part hear suppression motions before waiver motions, holding instead that it is within the discretion of the Family Part to determine its schedule of proceedings and manage its calendar. The Court sets forth factors that Family Part judges should take into consideration in exercising their discretion as to the order in which to hear waiver and suppression motions. |
Supreme |
Nov. 21, 2022 |
DARO M. LARGOZA, M.D., ET AL. VS. FKM REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL. (L-0531-20, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2456-21 ; A-2456-21 )
The court granted leave to appeal to consider the enforceability of a forum selection clause contained in commercial loan agreements executed by sophisticated parties. The court concluded such provisions are enforceable despite allegations that the contracts in which they are embedded are unenforceable due to fraud, unless the alleged fraud improperly induced assent to the forum selection clause specifically. In doing so, the court relied upon the United States Supreme Court ruling in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967), and the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 216-17 (2019), both of which applied this principle to enforce arbitration provisions. The court also acknowledged authority from other jurisdictions that have applied this rule to uphold forum selection clauses and explained that its holding aligns with the majority approach.
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Appellate |
Nov. 21, 2022 |
State v. Oscar Ramirez
(A-1-21 ; 085943)
After reviewing the relevant statutes and authorities that must be considered in balancing the competing interests and rights of a sexual assault victim and the person accused of the sexual offense, the Court sets forth a framework of procedures and considerations to apply going forward when a prosecutor seeks to withhold from discovery a sexual assault victim’s address. Because neither the ruling of the trial court nor that of the Appellate Division sufficiently addresses the competing interests explored in the Court’s opinion, the Court remands the matter for a more fulsome balancing of the competing interests.
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Supreme |
Nov. 17, 2022 |
Green Knight Capital, LLC v. Gabriel Calderon
(A-40-21 ; 086367)
The Tax Sale Law bears no hostility toward investors who otherwise meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1 when they prematurely attempt to redeem. Although the investor must always intervene before being allowed to redeem, a misstep like that which occurred here puts the tax sale certificate holder in no worse position than it would have possessed had the error not occurred. Here, because the LLC provided Calderon with more than nominal consideration and because the parties had the benefit of the chancery judge’s full consideration of their competing legal and equitable arguments, the LLC’s premature attempt to redeem should not vitiate the right to redeem it fairly acquired.
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Supreme |
Nov. 16, 2022 |
State v. Jamal Wade
(A-31-21 ; 085198)
It was error to admit defendant’s statements after detectives failed to honor his invocation of the right to counsel, and that error was not harmless in light of the circumstantial nature of the evidence against defendant and his statements’ capacity to undermine his credibility before the jury. |
Supreme |
Nov. 14, 2022 |
ASPHALT PAVING SYSTEMS, INC. VS. THE BOROUGH OF STONE HARBOR, ET AL. (L-0345-20, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0712-20 )
The Legislature has declared that no business entity may be awarded a public contract unless, prior to or along with its bid, the business entity submits "a statement setting forth the names and addresses" of the individuals owning more than ten percent of the entity. N.J.S.A. 52:25-24.2 (emphasis added). In this appeal, the court held that the Legislature did not intend the word "addresses" to be synonymous with "home addresses" and that the statute's requirement is met when the bidder provides its owners' mailing addresses. |
Appellate |
Nov. 10, 2022 |
PAUL M. CARELLI VS. BOROUGH OF CALDWELL, ET AL. (L-5938-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1294-21 )
The court granted leave to appeal to consider the denial of cross-motions for summary judgment – based on stipulated facts – about whether plaintiff Paul M. Carelli was entitled to enforcement of a contractual provision, upon the early termination of his third four-year term as the Borough of Caldwell's administrator, that purported to allow him a severance package "equal to one month salary for each year of service." The court concluded that this contractual provision was unenforceable because, in allowing a severance package of more than eight months' salary, it was inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 40A:9-138, which imposes both a ceiling and a floor on a municipal administrator's severance to "any unpaid balance of his [or her] salary and his [or her] salary for the next 3 calendar months." For that reason, the court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment dismissing Carelli's complaint. |
Appellate |
Nov. 9, 2022 |
GUY GILLIGAN, ET AL. VS. SUSAN JUNOD, L.P.N., ET AL. (L-1473-20, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1907-21)
In this appeal the court addresses a question of first impression: is a licensed practical nurse a "licensed person" as defined in and covered by the Affidavit of Merit (AOM) statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29. Defendant Susan Junod, a licensed practical nurse, appeals from orders declaring that plaintiff did not need to file an AOM to pursue professional-negligence claims against her and denying her motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to provide an AOM. The court affirms both orders because the AOM statute applies only to certain specified "licensed person[s]" and a licensed practical nurse is not included in the statute. |
Appellate |
Nov. 1, 2022 |
Options Imagined v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp (3 Appeals)
(10456-20)
Tax Court; Options Imagined v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township; Docket Nos. 010456-2020, 09577-2021 and 007910-2022; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided October 31, 2022. For plaintiff – Robert B. McBriar (Schneck, Price, Smith, & King, LLP., attorneys); For defendant – Richard P. DeAngelis (Connell Foley., attorneys). The court held that Options Imagined, a New Jersey nonprofit and Federal § 502 (c) (3) corporation, satisfied the requirements for property tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, finding that it was actually used in furtherance of the nonprofit’s charitable purpose, to provide care to mentally disabled adults, where its sole and current resident is the son of the President of the corporation. The court found that Options satisfied the Paper Mill use test because it is opened to the public and serves a public purpose. |
Tax |
Oct. 28, 2022 |
ROBERT ALAM VS. AMERIBUILT CONTRACTORS (DIVISION OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION)
(A-2114-21 ; A-2114-21 )
Ameribuilt Contractors appeals the workers' compensation judge's February 1, 2022 order rejecting a proposed settlement and disqualifying its assigned insurance counsel, Brown & Connery, LLP (B&C), on the basis of a perceived conflict between Ameribuilt's workers' compensation carrier, Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co. (Travelers), and Travelers' ostensible insured, respondent Robert Alam. The court concludes that the judge erred in finding that a conflict existed and, thus, there was no basis for the disqualification. Accordingly, the court is constrained to reverse. A trial judge may order the removal of counsel where there is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Here, the judge disqualified B&C based on a violation of R.P.C. 1.7, which states, in pertinent part, that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest." In evaluating whether a conflict exists, however, we are mindful that "[a] corporation is regarded as an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders." Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. Super. 114, 123 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 549 (1996)). Additionally, "a corporation is regarded in law as an entity distinct from its individual officers, directors, and agents." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 761 (1989) (citation omitted). Guided by these well-established legal principles, the court concludes that the trial judge erred in finding a conflict between Travelers and Alam. In reaching that conclusion, we hold that the judge failed to distinguish Ameribuilt, the corporation, from Alam, an owner and shareholder. |
Appellate |
Oct. 27, 2022 |
DCPP VS. D.C.A. AND J.J.C.B., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF I.A.C.C., J.S.C.C., A.I.C.C. AND I.C.C. (FG-06-0025-20, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0735-21 ; A-0735-21 )
Defendant appealed from a judgment of guardianship after trial, terminating her parental rights to four of her children. The panel addressed whether the trial court improperly considered evidence of the children's relationship with their foster parents in violation of prong two of the best-interests test. That prong was recently amended by the Legislature, which removed the sentence: "[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (amended 2021). The Legislature did not alter the other components of the best-interests standard. The panel rejected the argument that, by deleting the above language from prong two, the Legislature intended to bar all evidence concerning a child's relationship with resource caregivers, even in the context of the other prongs of the best-interest standard. Prong two as amended emphasizes consideration of whether a parent is able to overcome harm to the child as well as whether the parent can cease causing future harm. The amendment clearly isolates those specific inquiries from consideration of the bonds a child has forged with resource caregivers. Nevertheless, the amendments to prong two do not mean that such a bond may never be considered within any part of the best-interests analysis. Neither the legislative history nor the plain text necessitates such a sweeping conclusion. The panel construed the deletion from prong two to give greater effect to the alteration, in a manner that remains coherent with prong four. The amended statute requires a court to make a finding under prong two that does not include considerations of caregiver bonding, and then weigh that finding against all the evidence that may be considered under prong four—including the harm that would result from disrupting whatever bonds the child has formed. |
Appellate |
Oct. 26, 2022 |
Morgan Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Board of Education
(A-36-21 ; 086350)
The coach’s acts and omissions alleged here are governed by a simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness the Court applied when one participant injures another during a recreational activity.
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Supreme |
Oct. 25, 2022 |
JAMES MEYERS VS. STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION (STATE HEALTH BENEFITS COMMISSION)
(A-0312-21 ; A-0312-21)
Petitioner, James Meyers, a retired New Jersey State Police captain, appeals from a final decision of the State Health Benefits Commission (SHBC) which discontinued his fully paid health care insurance coverage under the State Health Benefits Plan, and imposed a premium deduction against his monthly retirement check. Petitioner administratively appealed the deduction, contending the SHBC was estopped from terminating his free health care insurance coverage. In an initial decision, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the SHBC was estopped from deducting monthly health insurance premiums from petitioner's retirement payments. In a final decision, the SHBC rejected the ALJ's findings and concluded that it had the right to deduct a premium contribution from petitioner's monthly retirement payments to pay for his family's health insurance coverage. Petitioner appealed the final decision, arguing that the SHBC was equitably estopped from discontinuing no-cost health insurance coverage. The court held that petitioner was not eligible to receive no-cost health care coverage in retirement under N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28d(b)(3), because he did not have the requisite creditable service time as of the effective date of the statute. The court also held that principles of equitable estoppel could not be applied on these facts, where petitioner was statutorily ineligible for such coverage. |
Appellate |
Oct. 24, 2022 |
SF III Kinderkamack, LLC v Borough of Oradell
(005860-2021)
Tax Court: SF III Kinderkamack, LLC v Borough of Oradell; Docket Nos. 005860-2021, opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided October 21, 2022. For proposed Intervenor – Paul Tannenbaum (Zipp & Tannenbaum, LLC, attorneys); for plaintiff – Michael Ash (Carlin, Ward, Ash & Heiart, LLC, attorneys); and for defendant – Alan Spiniello (Alan Spiniello Law Offices, attorneys). Held: Intervenor, Dabby Bergen Medi Pro, LLC, Sianes Bergen Medi Pro, LLC, YB 690 Kinder, LLC, and Yazam Investments, LLC collectively, sought to be joined as a party to the 2021 property tax appeal filed by plaintiff, SF III Kinderkamack, LLC. Intervenor asserted that the court rules pertaining to the transfer of interest, intervention and joinder were applicable; and standing existed to participate in the case as the new owner of the property. Defendant, Borough of Oradell, opposed the motion and maintained that Intervenor did not have standing because it was not the property owner as of the property tax appeal filing deadline, its claim was not within the statute of limitations and the requirements of the applicable court rules were not met. The court determined that Intervenor met the standards to join due to the transfer of interest of the property per the court rules. Moreover, the court found that Intervenor had standing in its fact-sensitive analysis through multiple factors including the review of its financial interest in the property and responsibility to pay taxes. Intervenor was also not barred by the statute of limitations as no new relief was sought. Accordingly, the court granted Intervenor’s motion to join the case as a party. |
Tax |
Oct. 20, 2022 |
JIGNYASA DESAI, D.O., LLC, ETC. VS. NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY (L-5247-21, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0221-21 ; A-0221-21 )
N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.4(e) limits an insurer's liability for a medical expense benefit not set forth in the fee schedules established by the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance to a reasonable amount considering the fee schedule amount for similar services. The regulation further states when a current procedural terminology (CPT) code for the service performed has been changed since the fee schedule was last amended, the provider shall bill the actual and correct code found in the most recent version of the CPT book, and the insurer shall pay the amount. The process of matching the current code with the most recent version of the fee schedule is referred to as "cross-walking." Where cross-walking is not possible because the fee schedule does not contain a reference to similar services, the insurer's liability for the medical expenses is limited to the usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) fee. Plaintiff treated a patient using electromyography and nerve conduction velocity (NCV) tests and received approval from defendant under CPT code 95913, which is defined as thirteen or more nerve studies. This code replaced CPT codes 95903, 95904, and 95934. Plaintiff conducted twenty separate NCV tests, billed defendant using CPT code 95913, but cross-walked the types of tests back to the prior codes, 95903, 95904, and 95934. Defendant reimbursed plaintiff using the more expensive prior CPT code, 95903, and capped the reimbursement at thirteen tests. The parties arbitrated their dispute and a dispute resolution professional (DRP) ruled in favor of defendant. A majority of a DRP appellate panel affirmed. The trial court also affirmed the reimbursement, applying the UCR methodology. On appeal, the court exercised its supervisory authority to resolve a split in the interpretation of CPT code 95913 among DRPs and conducted a de novo review of the parties' arguments interpreting N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.4(e). The court reversed the trial court's application of the UCR methodology, holding that under N.J.A.C. 11:3-29.4(e), the appropriate methodology, absent an updated fee schedule, for reimbursements sought under CPT code 95913, was to cross-walk the tests performed back to CPT codes 95903, 95904, and 95934. |
Appellate |
Oct. 17, 2022 |
C.L. VS. DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL. (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES)
(A-4284-19 ; A-4284-19)
This appeal stems from a final agency decision by the Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS) denying C.L.'s request for Medicaid benefits due to excess resources. DMAHS determined an annuity C.L. purchased from the Croatian Fraternal Union of America (CFUA), which she understood to be irrevocable, was revocable and counted as a resource, thereby disqualifying her from Medicaid benefits. DMAHS further determined the federal injunction against it regarding the identical annuity contract for a different annuitant did not apply in this case because C.L. purchased the annuity prior to the injunction being entered. The court reversed and determined the annuity contract language was unambiguous and the annuity was irrevocable, notwithstanding language in the contract, which allowed CFUA to amend the contract. The court held the plain, ordinary meaning of the contract language expressly stated it was irrevocable, and DMAHS's interpretation would render those provisions meaningless contrary to established contract law and misleading pursuant to New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance regulations. |
Appellate |
Sept. 29, 2022 |
L.R. VS. CHERRY HILL BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-5609-11, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1819-20 ; A-1819-20 )
Plaintiff L.R. is the mother of a disabled student attending the Camden City Public Schools. She served defendant Cherry Hill Board of Education and its record custodian with an Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -17, request for all settlement agreements from all lawsuits in which defendant was sued by a student and/or their parent. The request asked defendant to redact the parent and student names leaving only their initials. Defendant produced the documents sought but redacted all personally identifiable information (PII), including initials. Plaintiff appealed. Following the decisions in L.R. v. Camden City Public School District (L.R. I), 452 N.J. Super. 56 (App. Div. 2017), and L.R. v. Camden City Public School District (L.R. II), 238 N.J. 547 (2019), the trial judge dismissed the complaint finding plaintiff was not entitled to the initials because she: (1) Was not authorized to obtain the information by means of a court order; and (2) lacked a common law right of access to student records because defendant had a legitimate claim of confidentiality under the Family Educational Records and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, and the New Jersey Pupil Records Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19. Following this appeal, the Department of Education promulgated new regulations governing public access to student records under OPRA in response to L.R. II. The regulations define PII and student records that may be released pursuant to a court order provided the records do not contain any PII. N.J.A.C. 6A:32-2.1. They also state student "records removed of all [PII]" may be released without consent. N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(g)(1). On appeal, the court affirmed, holding the new regulations were not retroactive, and even if they were defendant's redaction of the initials was consistent with the regulations and the trial judge's ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to unredacted records. The court held plaintiff's reliance on Keddie v. Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 40 (1997), establishing the public's common law right to records, and C.E. v. Elizabeth Public School District, 472 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2022), establishing the right to settlements entered before the Office of Administrative Law under OPRA, were inapposite because those cases involved the failure to produce documents not whether a defendant should have redacted the PII altogether. |
Appellate |