Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
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Jan. 19, 2023 |
State v. Deje M. Coviello
(A-54-21 ; 086673)
The sentencing court, and not the MVC, has the appropriate jurisdiction over defendant’s motion for sentencing credit concerning the IID requirement.
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Supreme |
Jan. 18, 2023 |
RICHARD LIPSKY, ET AL. VS. THE NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH PLANS, INC., ET AL. (L-3723-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1611-21)
In this opinion, the court addresses the novel issue of whether a party to a pending litigation may compel a non-party State agency to turn over its employees' State-issued and personal cell phones to that party's expert for forensic examination, even when the agency has already produced the relevant records from the devices. Having reviewed this issue in light of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, the court concludes that the trial court misapplied its discretion when it required the New Jersey Department of Health (Department) to give the cell phones to plaintiffs' expert for evaluation. The trial court's order violated civil discovery rules and case law by requiring the production of materials not in the Department's possession, custody, or control, not allowing for privilege and confidentiality review, and being unnecessary and unduly burdensome. The order also contravened the employees' constitutional right to privacy. Therefore, the court reverses the trial court's order mandating that the Department turn over any State-issued or personal electronic devices for examination by plaintiffs' expert, and remands the matter for resolution of any outstanding issues relating to the completeness of the Department's response to plaintiffs' subpoena. |
Appellate |
Jan. 18, 2023 |
W.S. v. Derek Hildreth
(A-46-21 ; 086633)
The plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:8-3(b) dictates that child sexual abuse survivors who file a CSAA complaint against a public entity after December 1, 2019 -- even if their cause of action accrued much earlier -- need not file a TCA notice of claim before filing suit.
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Supreme |
Jan. 12, 2023 |
JOHN ROBERT SCADUTO, ET AL. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF ENRIVONMENTAL PROTECTION (L-2301-20, L-2302-20, L-2305-20, L-2307-20, L-2308-20, L-2311-20 AND L-2314-20, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3240-20)
The court affirms Law Division orders consolidating and dismissing seven inverse condemnation actions against the Department of Environmental Protection under the entire controversy doctrine, leaving plaintiffs to their remedies in the DEP's condemnation action against their homeowners association, in which plaintiffs have been participating since 2019. The case arises out of the State's acquisition of a perpetual storm damage reduction easement by eminent domain in the Association's unbuildable, two-and-a-half-acre beach lot along the Atlantic Ocean in Point Pleasant Beach as part of the Manasquan Inlet to Barnegat Inlet Storm Damage Reduction Project. Plaintiffs are seven of the twenty-two homeowner members of the Association, each holding a non-exclusive easement appurtenant for recreational purposes in the Association's beach. When the court declared DEP had the authority to partially condemn the Association's beach for shore protection in 2016, it entered orders permitting members of the Association to present claims for severance damages allegedly caused to their homes by the partial taking of the beach lot before the condemnation commissioners. Plaintiffs appeared at the commissioners' hearing in 2019 and have appealed from the commissioners' report and award. They have an order in the condemnation action ensuring that among the issues to be tried to a jury will be "the separate just compensation due to each of the respective [plaintiffs] by reason of the taking . . . of property of each . . . and any damages to their respective residential lots." Because plaintiffs' rights to separate awards for just compensation for the loss of value to their homes, if any, resulting from DEP's exercise of eminent domain as to the beach lot are fully protected through their participation in the earlier filed condemnation action, the court affirms dismissal of their inverse condemnation actions under the entire controversy doctrine. The court also affirms rejection of plaintiffs' claim that their recreational easements provided them the right to exclude non-Association members from the Association's beach, as neither the express wording of the easement nor the Association's reservation of the right to operate the beach commercially in a 2005 settlement of public trust litigation supports that claim. |
Appellate |
Jan. 11, 2023 |
State v. Timothy J. Canfield
(A-53-21 ; 086644)
The Court affirms as modified the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Susswein’s published opinion. The Court explains why it does not believe the Appellate Division’s proposed procedural rule is necessary.
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Supreme |
Jan. 9, 2023 |
State v. Eddie L. Oliver
(A-57-21 ; 087088)
Based on the text of the new statute and its legislative history, the Court concludes the Compassionate Release Act affords judges discretion to deny relief, in exceptional circumstances, even if the law’s medical and public safety conditions are satisfied. In individual cases, when the medical and public safety factors are met, courts can assess whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist that justify the denial of compassionate release. That high standard comports with the Legislature’s goal to make greater use of compassionate release. Absent any such circumstances, petitions for relief should be granted.
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Supreme |
Jan. 9, 2023 |
JOSEPH G. COLACITTI, ET AL. v. PHILIP D. MURPHY, ET AL.
(L-0738-21)
HELD: L. 2021, c. 17 (Chapter 17), effective February 22, 2021, was enacted to continue the local property tax (LPT) exemption afforded to nonprofit hospitals, and to extend the same exemption to a nonprofit hospital-owned satellite emergency facilities (SECs), even if areas of the hospital and SECs are used by/leased to, for-profit medical providers “for medical purposes related to delivery of health care services directly to the hospital,” provided that such “portion of the hospital . . . is used exclusively for hospital services.” The nonprofit hospitals and SECs should pay an annual community service contribution (ACSC) to the municipality in which the hospital beds of a nonprofit hospital are located or where an SEC is located. Chapter 17 also bars imposing assessments for tax years 2014 through 2020, which would moot those years’ pending tax appeals all filed because of the alleged for-profit activity conducted by the hospital and/or the for-profit medical providers on the nonprofit hospital premises. The law was enacted to mitigate the effects of a 2015 Tax Court decision which revoked the tax exemption of a nonprofit hospital’s property based on facts that the operations/activities of the plaintiff nonprofit hospital and the for-profit, private medical providers on the hospital property were too blurred. The court here found that (1) the ACSC is not an ultra-vires payment-in-lieu of tax program; (2) the ACSC is not a local property tax for purposes of the Uniformity Clause of the New Jersey Constitution; (3) Chapter 17 is facially constitutional and does not violate the Exemption Clause of the New Jersey Constitution; (4) Chapter 17 is not an invalid special legislation, thus also does not facially violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal and State constitutions; and (5) Chapter 17’s retroactivity is not manifestly unjust, thus, also does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal and State constitutions. The court further found there are no bases for imposing an injunction against Chapter 17 under any of the factors enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1983). The court therefore dismissed the complaint with prejudice. |
Trial |
Jan. 9, 2023 |
State v. A.M.
(A-56-21 ; 087057)
Based on the text of the new statute and its legislative history, the Court concludes the Compassionate Release Act affords judges discretion to deny relief, in exceptional circumstances, even if the law’s medical and public safety conditions are satisfied. In individual cases, when the medical and public safety factors are met, courts can assess whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist that justify the denial of compassionate release. That high standard comports with the Legislature’s goal to make greater use of compassionate release. Absent any such circumstances, petitions for relief should be granted.
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Supreme |
Jan. 5, 2023 |
RICHARD FREEDMAN, II VS. COLLEEN FREEDMAN (FM-04-0314-09, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3425-20 ; A-3425-20)
In this appeal from proceeding filed in the Family Part involving the cremation remains and personal effects of the parties' son, who died unexpectedly and suddenly at age twenty, the mother unilaterally decided to have the body cremated without informing the father that their son had died, preventing him from participating in that decision and attending the memorial service. The mother has sole possession of the cremation remains and the son's remaining personal effects and refuses to divide them with the father. The court concluded the father had ample opportunity to litigate Colleen's alleged alienation of their son's affection and interference with his parenting time and communication with his late son in the Family Part during the years leading up to his son's eighteenth birthday. He chose not to do so, and instead waited until the dispute over the cremation remains and personal effects erupted more than two years after their son turned eighteen to first raise those issues. The court deemed those issues waived and, in turn, concluded that a plenary hearing regarding the parties conduct during the last five years of their son's life is not required as the evidence overwhelming demonstrated the mother had a closer relationship with their son. Applying a four-prong test, the court held the mother shall have control over the cremation remains. The court affirmed the termination of child support, retroactive to the date of death. The court also provides guidance on the proper procedure to be utilized in future similar disputes, by filing a complaint in the Probate Part, rather than applications in the Family Part. |
Appellate |
Dec. 30, 2022 |
JACQUELINE BERNAL MUELLER, ET AL. VS. KEAN UNIVERSITY, ET AL. (L-1538-20 AND L-2947-20, UNION AND ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-1843-20/A-3091-20 ; A-1843-20/A-3091-20)
These consolidated appeals present an issue of first impression – whether plaintiffs state viable claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, or money had and received, because the universities they attended transitioned to total online instruction rather than an in-person, on-campus education experience for which they paid, during the statewide health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The universities contend they are immune from liability pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act (EHPA), N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 to -36, because their decisions to pause in-person instruction were made in compliance with the executive orders issued by the Governor during a public health emergency to limit the spread of COVID-19 among students, faculty, and the community.
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Appellate |
Dec. 22, 2022 |
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY VS. COUNTY PROSECUTORS ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY (L-8169-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2572-20)
In this appeal, plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) contended defendant County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (CPANJ) is a public agency subject to records requests under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right of access. The ACLU requested CPANJ to produce documents regarding CPANJ's funding, the context and contents of its meetings and events (including dates, times, and locations), and the people performing its operating functions. CPANJ denied the records request in its entirety, contending it is "not a public agency subject to the dictates of OPRA or requests made under the common law right of access." The court held CPANJ is not a public agency subject to OPRA and is not a public entity subject to the common law right of access. Therefore, disclosure of the requested records was properly denied. |
Appellate |
Dec. 21, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ERIC A. BURNHAM (21-02-0181, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3519-20 ; A-3519-20)
This case addresses the issue of whether sales tax should be included when calculating the "full retail value" of merchandise under New Jersey's shoplifting gradation statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c). Defendant pled guilty to shoplifting an Xbox One with an advertised price of $499.99. Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree "if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000" and a crime of the fourth degree "if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500." N.J.S.A. 2C:20–11(c)(2) and (c)(3). The State utilized sales tax in grading defendant's offense, and he was therefore charged with a third-degree offense. The court analyzed the theft statute, which specifically utilizes sales tax to calculate the "amount involved" in its statutory gradation scheme. However, the court observed the shoplifting statute contains no such provision. The court concluded because the Legislature did not determine sales tax should be included in the valuation of full retail value in enacting the shoplifting gradation statute, it was improper for sales tax to have been utilized to increase defendant's charge to a third-degree offense. |
Appellate |
Dec. 20, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAREEF O. GRAY (19-10-1681, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2843-19)
Defendant's car was subjected to a warrantless search incident to an unrelated sting operation planned and carried out by New Jersey State Police. The State Police detained defendant after a parking lot melee involving three other persons, including the target of the sting operation. Due to the cold weather, state troopers detained defendant in his car. After a state trooper opened defendant's car door and placed him inside, the trooper smelled the odor of marijuana. Based on the trooper's detection of marijuana, the State Police sought defendant's consent to search the car. After initially refusing, defendant consented, and the State Police conducted a search of the car. The State Police found no marijuana in the car, but they recovered an illegal gun. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun, arguing the initial entry into his vehicle constituted an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied the motion, finding the State Police's justification that it was too cold to detain defendant outside was sufficient under the totality of the circumstances. The Court held that the trial court mistakenly applied State v. Woodson, 236 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div. 1989), and State v. Conquest, 243 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 1990), and that the opening of the car door constituted an impermissible search. Reversed and remanded. |
Appellate |
Dec. 19, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WELDER D. MORENTE-DUBON (17-06-0450, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0459-20 ; A-0459-20)
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, two weapons offenses, and hindering apprehension. Tried to a jury, defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree passion-provocation manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and not guilty of hindering apprehension. The trial court found aggravating factors one, three, four, and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), (3), (4), and (9), and mitigating factor seven N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), but rejected mitigating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9). Following merger of the weapons counts, he was sentenced to a nine-and-one-half-year term, subject to the parole ineligibility and parole supervision imposed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
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Appellate |
Dec. 13, 2022 |
Nancy L. Holm v. Daniel M. Purdy
(A-39-21 ; 086229)
Informed by the Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the Court concurs with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf is eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Court holds that defendant may not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Court disagrees with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause. |
Supreme |
Dec. 12, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. R.O.-S./STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. C.C.
(XP-21-0276/XP-21-1767)
This case raises a question of first impression: whether the recently enacted amendment to the expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3, includes violations of local ordinances, which were amended from Title 2C violations. Petitioners, C.C. and R.O.-S. argued that the “clean slate” statute was designed to remove an individual’s entire criminal history and therefore, must include local ordinances that arise from criminal offenses. The State proposed a strict interpretation of the statute, arguing that only convictions from indictable offenses, disorderly persons offenses, and petty disorderly persons offenses are included. This Court concluded that a liberal interpretation of the statute is consistent with the legislative intent. Local ordinances that arise from criminal offenses are unique in that they are accompanied by police and arrest reports, fingerprint cards, “mug shots,” complaint warrants or summonses and most importantly, they are included on an individual’s criminal case history or “RAP” sheet. Absent an expungement of the local ordinance that resulted from the Title 2C offense, Petitioners would be left with a criminal history. Since this is inconsistent with the intent of the “clean slate” statute, the court finds that Petitioner’s convictions are eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3. |
Trial |
Dec. 12, 2022 |
FRITZY RIVERA VS. CHERRY HILL TOWERS, LLC, ET AL. (L-2216-20, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2394-21)
Plaintiff Fritzy Rivera was shot by her estranged husband after leaving a friend's apartment at Cherry Hills Towers. She alledged defendant Vikco, Inc.'s negligence in failing to provide a safe environment as property manager of Cherry Hills Towers allowed him to enter the apartment complex through an open security gate. Defendant was not the property manager when the assault occurred, but plaintiff contends the open security gate was a practice established by defendant and continued by the new property management company. The motion court denied defendant's summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Having granted defendant leave to appeal, we reverse. We disagree with the court's reasoning that there was a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the jury as to whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty to provide a safe environment at Cherry Hill Towers when it was not the apartment complex's property manager at the time of the shooting. Whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty is a question of law to be determined by the court, not by a jury at trial. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude our common law does not support plaintiff's theory that defendant's duty to provide a safe and secure environment at Cherry Hill Towers continued after its management services were discontinued. Summary judgment is granted to Vikco. |
Appellate |
Dec. 9, 2022 |
ATLANTIC PLASTIC & HAND SURGERY, P.A. v. WILLIAM F. RALLING, ET AL.
(L-3685-20)
This litigation arises from unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by a twenty-four-year-old who was a named “adult child” dependent on his father’s health insurance policy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14(a), of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). This opinion addresses two questions of first impression under New Jersey law.
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Trial |
Dec. 7, 2022 |
AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY, ETC. VS. MERIDIA DOWNTOWN URBAN RENEWAL BOUND BROOK, LLC, ET AL. (L-0527-20, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1868-21 ; A-1868-21)
Plaintiff brought a subrogation claim against defendants to recoup insurance benefits it paid to its insured on account of damage caused by a fire at a construction site. In an effort to obtain relevant information pertaining to the cause of the fire, the civil action parties served a subpoena duces tecum on the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO), a non-party law enforcement agency, and moved to compel production of its criminal investigation file relating to the ongoing prosecution of the individual who was suspected of starting the fire. The trial judge rejected the SCPO's claim that the criminal investigation materials were privileged and confidential, and ordered it to turn over to the civil action parties: (1) videos and photographs depicting the events giving rise to the criminal prosecution, (2) the suspect's statement to police, and (3) witness statements, or alternatively, witness contact information.
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Appellate |
Dec. 7, 2022 |
JPC MERGER SUB LLC VS. TRICON ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. (L-2885-21, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2893-21 ; A-2893-21)
In this contract payment dispute between a general contractor and its subcontractor, the court held as a matter of first impression that a "pay-if-paid" provision in a construction contract is enforceable as a matter of law. The court adopted the construction industry's definition of "pay-if-paid" provisions as conditions precedent to payment that shift the risk of a project owner's nonpayment from the general contractor to the subcontractor, by virtue of which the subcontractor is paid by the general contractor only if the owner pays the general contractor for that subcontractor's work. The court held that subject to the parties' implied duty to not frustrate conditions precedent to performance, such provisions are neither unfair, unconscionable, nor against public policy so long as the contract specifies a clear and unambiguous intent to shift the risk of nonpayment. |
Appellate |