Opinion Summaries

D.T. has not demonstrated that the Archdiocese’s exercise of supervisory authority over McCarthy gave rise to the minimum contacts between the Archdiocese and New Jersey that would be necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles in the setting of this appeal

     Appellants (the "LLCs") appeal from identical orders of the Law Division authorizing condemnation in accordance with the Township of Jackson's exercise of eminent domain against their respective properties, Lots 84 and 90.  The original ordinance authorizing the condemnation of the LLCs' land stated the public purpose for condemning the properties was for use as open space.  The second ordinance, passed after the LLCs had opposed the Township's condemnation efforts, elaborated and stated condemnation of the lots was necessary to affect a land-swap agreement the Township had with a private developer, but still did not otherwise identify the proposed use of the condemned lots.  
     Lots 84 and 90 are not being used for the asserted public purpose of open space—an otherwise valid public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain.  Instead, the lots are being condemned and combined with land the Township already owns to exchange them for land intended to be used as open space.  This court is aware of no reported case in New Jersey, nor has one been brought to its attention, where a private property was lawfully condemned for the sole purpose of exchanging it for other property that will be put to public use.  Neither Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005), nor the Eminent Domain Act, N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -50, contemplates the condemnation of a property for use solely as an asset in a scheme for an otherwise valid public purpose on some other property.  The record before us is bereft of any indication as to the intended use of the condemned lots, other than as what is, in essence, currency, to exchange for open space.
     Moreover, because the trial court's prior order authorizing the Township's land-swap agreement included Lots 84 and 90 although those lots were not owned by the Township, the land-swap agreement does not preclude the LLCs from opposing the condemnation, as claimed by the Township.  The Eminent Domain Act offers the exclusive procedure for a property owner's right to challenge the government's authority to condemn its private property.  Accordingly, the Law Division's orders approving the condemnation of the lots are reversed.
 

Preemption is not an issue here because the N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 does not conflict with the federal regulations that govern U.S. savings bonds. Given that the DSA did not direct the disposition of the savings bonds, the bonds have no bearing on Michael’s -- and later the Estate’s -- obligation to pay Jeanine $200,000, and the bonds’ value should not have been credited against that obligation. Pursuant to the DSA, the Estate must make whatever payments remain to Jeanine. 

The issue before this court, one of first impression, is whether the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, compels the disclosure of email logs of public officials' personal computers discussing public business.  The trial judge's order denied plaintiff Alex Rosetti's OPRA request of defendants Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education (Board) and Thomas Lambe, the Board's records custodian, seeking email logs from the personal computers of past and current Board members (collectively Board members) discussing Board business.  The judge decided the email logs were not government records and, if they were, they are too burdensome to produce. 

The court reverses the trial judge's order and remands this matter.  The court concludes the email logs on private servers are government records under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, and are disclosable based on Ass'n for Government Responsibility, Ethics & Transparency v. Borough of Mantoloking, 478 N.J. Super. 470, 489 (App. Div. 2024), where we held "OPRA's broad reach can include emails concerning government business, sent to or from personal accounts of government officials –– if the emails fall within the definition of government records."  

 
On remand, the Board members must search their personal email accounts to determine if the sought-after email logs are available.  If they determine the email logs are unavailable or there are burdens in producing them, they must produce Paff v. New Jersey Dep't of Labor, 392 N.J. Super. 334, 341 (App. Div. 2007). certifications.  After giving plaintiff the opportunity to respond, the trial judge must then decide if a fact-finding hearing is necessary.  Moreover, the judge must be satisfied the parties made good faith efforts to reasonably resolve their dispute.  Only after this process occurs can the judge decide if production of the email logs should be provided, or if they are too burdensome to provide.  
 

This commercial litigation mainly presents issues under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act ("NJFPA"), N.J.S.A. 56:10-1 to -15.  As its principal claim in this case, defendant/third-party plaintiff Eastern Outdoor Furnishings ("Eastern Outdoor") contends that third-party defendant AMD Direct, Inc., ("AMD") violated the NJFPA in terminating Eastern Outdoor's alleged franchise to sell AMD's products.  AMD denies that such a franchise relationship existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to AMD, dismissing Eastern Outdoor's claims under the statute, upon specifically finding there was no "written agreement" establishing a franchise between the parties.  Eastern Outdoor has appealed that decision, along with other rulings made by the trial court. 

The court affirms the motion judge's grant of summary judgment dismissing the NJFPA claims, albeit based on somewhat different reasoning.  The court holds that to establish a franchise enforceable under the NJFPA, the statute does not require a comprehensive and integrated "written agreement" between the parties.  Instead, N.J.S.A. 56:10-3(a) more flexibly defines a franchise to consist of a "written arrangement" that also meets various other requirements.  Nonetheless, it is clear the record—even when viewed in a light most favorable to Eastern Outdoor—fails to provide sufficient evidence to establish such a qualifying "written arrangement."

Although the court affirms dismissal of the NJFPA claims, it remands the case to adjudicate Eastern Outdoor's separate claims of tortious interference and indemnification that were not expressly addressed in the motion judge's decision.
 

LOCAL PROPERTY TAXATION - FREEZE ACT APPLICATION

Tax Court; Gabriel Ades v. Borough of Deal; Docket No. 007334-2024, opinion by Sundar, P.J.T.C., decided January 24, 2025.  For plaintiff - Chad E. Wolf (Wolf Vespasiano LLC, attorney); for defendant - Paul V. Fernicola (Fernicola & Associates, LLC, attorney).

HELD: A final judgment of a county board of taxation that is coded 2B, which stands for “presumption of correctness not overturned,” does not qualify as a base year’s final judgment for purposes of the application of the Freeze Act, N.J.S.A. 54:3-26.  This is because the judgment was not the result of a value determination by the county board.  That the county board of taxation’s judgment re-states or recites the original assessment in the “judgment” column does not change judgment into one resulting from a determination of the value of the subject property.

(17 Pages)
 

The primary issue in this appeal concerns the applicability of self-defense to all categories of homicide.  The court reaffirms the well-settled principle that self-defense, once found by a jury, shall serve as a complete justification for murder as well as all manslaughter offenses charged or otherwise permitted for consideration as lesser-included offenses.
 

Here, the jury found defendant met the self-defense test for murder but not passion/provocation manslaughter, returning a guilty verdict for the latter offense.  Based on that facially inconsistent verdict, our jurisprudence, and the established precept that self-defense is a complete defense to all categories of homicide, the court reverses defendant's conviction for passion/provocation manslaughter.   
 

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the court addresses defendant's remaining arguments, including the trial court declining to charge aggravated assault, the applicability of self-defense to the weapons charges, the value of Rios's vehicle as it relates to the theft charge, and a review of the sentence imposed, respectively.  These arguments are largely rendered moot, affirmed, or remanded for resentencing. 
 

When a defending physician practices in more than one specialty and the treatment involved falls within any of that physician’s specialty areas, then an AOM from a physician specializing in one of those specialties is sufficient.

Subsection (k) of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5 does not permit plaintiffs to review the video in this case because Fuster has already requested that the video be retained for three years and Devine is neither the subject of the video nor one of the other specified persons entitled to review. The Court does not decide whether subsection (l) of the BWCL abrogates OPRA’s exemptions because there is no OPRA exemption that supports defendants’ refusal to release the video in this case. OPRA does not contain any explicit exemption for information received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or charged. Neither has New Jersey case law ever held that such information must automatically be withheld under OPRA. The Court therefore reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment and orders that the body worn camera footage be released to plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case, without reaching plaintiffs’ common law claims.

When a plaintiff accepts a final judgment, that party may still appeal if the party can show that (1) it made known its intention to appeal prior to accepting payment of the final judgment and prior to executing the warrant to satisfy judgment, and (2) prevailing on the appellate issue will not in any way impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it. Because Brehme cannot show either that she expressed her intention to appeal before accepting payment of the final judgment and before her counsel executed the warrant to satisfy the judgment or that the appeal will not impact the final judgment other than to increase it, Brehme’s appeal cannot proceed. For that reason, no decision rendered can affect the outcome of the case, and her appeal was properly dismissed as moot.

In this interlocutory appeal, the court considers the propriety of a bench warrant issued by the Law Division following defendant's failure to appear in person for a pretrial conference, even though he appeared virtually at this conference and nearly all prior court hearings.  A non-citizen of the United States and Mexican national, defendant was deported after he was indicted for third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b).  The motion judge issued the bench warrant, at the State's request, to serve as a detainer should defendant illegally reenter the United States or if the State elected to extradite defendant from Mexico.  The State thereafter acknowledged it was unlikely to extradite defendant on the third- and fourth-degree charges.  The motion judge denied defendant's ensuing motion to vacate the bench warrant and dismiss the indictment.  
 

On appeal, the court affirmed the order denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, but reversed and remanded for the motion judge to vacate the bench warrant and permit defendant to appear remotely at all proceedings, including trial.  The court was persuaded, under the evolving jurisprudence, the judge erroneously denied defendant's reasonable request to appear virtually at an otherwise in-person trial in view of defendant's inability to legally reenter the United States and physically appear in court.  The court concluded defendant's virtual appearance is a reasonable accommodation given the circumstances presented in this case, not only to afford defendant an opportunity to contest the charges, but also to ensure the victim's rights are protected.  
 

The trial court’s finding that Celestine’s crimes were extraordinarily heinous, cruel, and depraved was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the trial court’s application of extraordinary aggravating factor one was not an abuse of discretion. In addition, in denying Celestine’s petition for compassionate release, the trial court appropriately considered significant mitigating factors raised by Celestine alongside the extraordinary aggravating factors raised by the State.

In this public bidding dispute, the court is asked to determine if an archeologist, who is a subcontractor on a public works project, must be registered in accordance with the Public Works Contractor Registration Act (PWCR Act), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 to -56.57.  Because the archeologist will not be performing "public work" as defined by the Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.25 to -56.47, the court holds that the archeologist was not required to be registered under the PWCR Act.  Accordingly, the court affirms a Law Division order dismissing the challenge of Carbo Constructors Corp., a losing bidder, to the Passaic Valley Water Commission's award of the public contractor to J. Fletcher Creamer & Sons, Inc., the lowest qualified bidder.

The applicable version of the TSL in this case is unconstitutional to the extent it allows for the forfeiture of surplus equity without just compensation. New Jersey recognizes a property right to surplus equity in real property, and because private lienholders act jointly with local government under the TSL to perform a traditional public function -- the collection of taxes -- they may be considered state actors. The Court rejects the argument that the surplus equity initially foreclosed in this case was not taken for a public use. The Court affirms as modified the judgment of the Appellate Division based on the reasoning in Tyler; it does not rely on Rule 4:50-1(f). 

The issue presented on this appeal is whether claims of insurance fraud under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Fraud Act), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30, and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act (RICO), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2, are subject to arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35.  The resolution of that issue involves discerning and harmonizing the Legislature's intent in enacting the Fraud Act, RICO, AICRA, and the arbitration system set up under AICRA for the resolution of disputes concerning personal injury protection (PIP) benefits.  The court holds that insurance fraud claims under the Fraud Act and RICO are not subject to PIP arbitration under AICRA.  Accordingly, the court reverses and vacates three orders in this matter that compelled plaintiffs' Fraud Act, RICO, and related declaratory judgment claims to PIP arbitration.  

Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence pursuant to a "knock and announce" warrant.  The police officers executing the warrant did not activate their body worn cameras (BWCs) until the moment they forcibly breached the door with a battering ram, and therefore, did not electronically record their compliance with the knock-and-announce rule as required by Attorney General directives.  Defendant asks us to create a new rule of law whereby evidence is suppressed when an officer violates an Attorney General directive while executing a knock-and-announce search warrant.  In the alternative, defendant contends the trial court should have drawn an adverse inference against the State and, ultimately, erred in finding that police complied with the knock-and-announce rule based on an officer's testimony that was not supported by a BWC recording.   

 
The court agrees with the motion judge that the failure to comply with an Attorney General directive does not constitute a constitutional violation.  Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a violation of an Attorney General directive triggers the exclusionary rule when, as in this instance, the directive imposes a procedural requirement that neither the United States nor New Jersey Constitutions impose.  The court declines defendant's invitation to create any such new legal principle.

In reaching that conclusion, the court notes the Legislature did not include a suppression remedy in the statute that now governs police use of BWCs, N.J.S.A. 40A-118.5.  That statute incorporates guidelines or directives promulgated by the Attorney General about when BWCs should be activated.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-1-118.5(c)(1).  Instead of requiring suppression, the statute creates a "rebuttable presumption that exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured in favor of a defendant" when a law enforcement officer fails to adhere to BWC recording requirements.  N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q).  

The court holds this rebuttable presumption applies in suppression hearings and not just trials but concludes it does not apply in this case because the BWC statute applies prospectively and did not take effect until after the present search warrant was executed.  The court ultimately concludes there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the motion judge's finding that police did in fact knock and announce their identity and intent before using force to execute the search warrant.      

This appeal presents the question of whether a motor vehicle is defectively designed because it does not include the latest driver-assistance technologies even though not mandated by federal or state law.  Plaintiff contends that a 2016 Honda CR-V was defectively designed because it was not equipped with a lane departure warning (LDW) system and a lane keeping assist (LKA) system.  The court holds that the absence of those available driver-assistance systems, in a vehicle that was otherwise safe and fit for driving, did not, as a matter of law, establish that the 2016 Honda CR-V was defectively designed within the meaning of the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -11.  Accordingly, the court affirms the order granting summary judgment to defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) and dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's product liability and negligence claims.

STATE TAXATION - GROSS INCOME TAX

Tax Court: Amin et al. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, Docket No. 007430-2022; opinion by Sundar, P.J.T.C., decided December 31, 2024.  For plaintiff – Kara M. Kraman, Esq., Irwin M. Slomka, Esq. (Blank Rome, LLP, attorney); for defendant – Anthony D. Tancini (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: The court reversed defendant’s determination to include I.R.C. § 965 income as “deemed repatriation dividends” under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(f).  The latter statute unambiguously defines “dividends” as “any distribution in cash or property made by a corporation . . . out of accumulated [or current] earnings and profits,” thus includes only actual payments or distributions to a shareholder.  Here, the income realized by the controlled foreign corporations, was not actually or constructively distributed to plaintiffs (their shareholders), who were nonetheless mandated to federally report such income. The court also disagreed with defendant’s contention that plaintiffs should report such income because they did so federally and N.J.S.A. 54A:8-3 requires a taxpayer to follow the same federal methods of accounting for New Jersey Gross Income Tax purposes.

(23 Pages)            
 

In this action in lieu of prerogative writs matter, the court holds that the Time of Application (TOA) Rule applies to a Resolution of Approval granted by the City of Hoboken Planning Board to defendant Blue Violets LLC.  Because Blue Violets LLC, an adult micro cannabis retail business, submitted its application to Hoboken's Cannabis Review Board before a newly entered ordinance restricting any cannabis retailer from being located within 600 feet of a primary or secondary school became effective, the court concludes the TOA Rule applies.  Consequently, the court reverses the trial court order, which vacated the Resolution of Approval and reinstates it.
 

The court affirmed the trial court's order finding plaintiff Hoboken for Responsible Cannabis, Inc, has standing as an interested party under the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163.
 

In adopting the present Criminal Code in 1978, our Legislature delineated the insanity defense to criminal charges as follows:

A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 (emphasis added).]

As expressed in these terms, the insanity statute codifies the common-law "M'Naghten" test dating back to nineteenth-century English law.  The Legislature has not revised this definition of insanity since Title 2C's enactment over fifty years ago.

The primary legal issue in this appeal is whether criminal defendants in New Jersey invoking N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 are permitted to testify at trial about their own allegedly insane mental state without accompanying expert testimony from a qualified mental health professional.  The court agrees with the trial judge that such lay testimony, untethered to admissible expert opinion substantiating the defendant's "disease of the mind," is inadmissible under our Rules of Evidence and insufficient to advance an insanity defense under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1.  This conclusion is supported by the history and text of the statute.  It is also consistent with the case law of most states that have addressed the issue under the M'Naghten test.  

Although policy arguments can be made and have been made to revise the criteria of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 and replace the traditional M'Naghten test with modern concepts of mental disorders, the Legislature has not done so.  Nor has our Supreme Court invalidated the statute as unconstitutional or construed the law to allow lay testimony to suffice to establish a defendant's insanity. Consequently, this court holds that defendants must have expert opinion testimony to meet their burden of proving the defense of insanity.  The court affirms the trial court's ruling that disallowed defendant in this case from testifying about his alleged insane state of mind without calling such an expert.

Judge Jacobs has filed an opinion concurring in the result in this case, but asserting that the law should permit defendants, in certain exceptional situations, to testify as lay witnesses in support of an insanity defense without corroboration by an expert witness.