Published Trial Court Opinions

         Following the demise of the Council On Affordable Housing (“COAH”), and at the direction of the Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel IV, 221 N.J. 1 (2015), New Jersey trial courts assumed responsibility for evaluating municipal compliance with the State’s constitutionally mandated affordable housing obligations.  Although most municipalities obtained certification of their municipal plans through settlements of declaratory judgment actions, Princeton and West Windsor in Mercer County sought certification from the court, requiring it to determine each town’s fair share of low and moderate housing units for 1999 to 2015 (Gap Present Need) and from 2015 through 2025 (Prospective Need). Their applications for certification were opposed by the Fair Share Housing Center, an affordable housing advocacy group.  The parties presented to the trial court competing and very divergent methodologies in support of the number of units each claimed satisfied constitutional requirements.

         After a lengthy trial, the Mercer County Superior Court issued a decision reviewing the methodologies proposed by both sides and adopting a formula that the court then applied to each town to establish its fair share of low and moderate income housing units for the period 1999 through 2025.  In 2024, the New Jersey Legislature subsequently incorporated the court’s formula into the amended Fair Housing Act at N.J.S.A. 52:27D-304.3. 

          The case at issue arises out of a homicide which was captured on a home surveillance system that took place during daylight hours in the City of Trenton.  The suspect can be seen on the video walking down the sidewalk seconds before he/she reaches the victim and shoots him in the head, causing his death.  The question presented was whether a proposed expert in the field of digital forensics should be permitted to testify and proffer an opinion at trial regarding the estimated height of the individual captured on the surveillance video based upon the application of a technique called reverse projection photogrammetry.

          The court held a Rule 104 hearing at which time the State’s proposed expert testified.  Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the court ruled that the expert’s testimony was admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E 702.  In that regard: (1) the subject of the testimony was beyond the ken of the average juror and would assist the trier of fact to understand whether the height of the individual depicted in the video was consistent with the defendant’s height; (2) the expert was duly qualified in the field of digital forensics, including reverse projection photogrammetry; and (3) the expert’s testimony and opinions were reliable because they are “based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the field.” State v. Olenowski, ___ N.J. ___ (2023)(slip op. at 8).

On September 25, 2020, J.D. plead guilty to two counts of criminal sexual contact in the fourth degree in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b).  Shortly thereafter, he was deemed incompetent as a result of an intellectual disability, low-IQ and a lack of formal education—having only completed the 8th grade.  Two experts opined that J.D. could attain competency with education, although these opinions were disputed by a third expert.  As J.D. was not deemed a danger to himself or to others, he was not subject to incarceration or institutionalization pre-trial.  In response to a court order requesting guidance on the type of educational services needed to assist J.D. in attaining competency, it was confirmed that no State program exists to provide educational services on an out-patient basis to assist J.D. with attaining competency. 

On December 20, 2022, the State moved to have a Guardian appointed to assist J.D. in procuring disability benefits that could defray the cost of private educational services and to otherwise assist J.D. in procuring private educational services necessary to attain competency.  On March 15, 2023, in an interlocutory Order and opinion of first impression, this court addressed, among other factors, Constitutional considerations and denied the State’s motion to appoint a Guardian and compel J.D., a criminal defendant, to procure private educational services for the purpose of attaining competency. 

Following a competency hearing on July 26, 2023, by separate Order and opinion dated August 1, 2023, the court: (i) determined that J.D. was not competent and was not likely to attain competency; (ii) vacated J.D.'s guilty plea; and (iii) dismissed with prejudice the complaint against J.D.  Based upon the August 1, 2023 Order, the March 15, 2023 Order is now final.

The question presented to the trial court was whether the immunity statute relating to DCPP referrals found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.13 confers immunity to DCPP referrals made with the intent to harass a victim of domestic violence as defined under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. There was no prior precedent resolving this issue. In harmonizing the two statutes, the trial court found that it would be contrary to legislative intent to confer immunity in the realm of domestic violence as that would permit the weaponization of DCPP referrals as a means of perpetrating domestic violence.

This matter arose out of an application for a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. At the conclusion of the trial, the only predicate act surviving was the act of calling DCPP to report allegations of abuse in order to harass the victim. The trial court noted that the Legislature intended to protect children as the primary purpose in enacting the immunity statute regarding DCPP referrals. Additionally, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18 expressly provides that children can suffer emotionally from the exposure to domestic violence, and that children may also be a victim of domestic violence. Thus, the trial court concluded that the application of the DCPP immunity statute to allegations of harassment under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Acts fails as a matter of law under the doctrine of absurdity. Even though the trial court found that the defendant committed the predicate act of harassment by making reports to DCPP, the trial court ultimately found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), and denied the application for a final restraining order.

HELD: L. 2021, c. 17 (Chapter 17), effective February 22, 2021, was enacted to continue the local property tax (LPT) exemption afforded to nonprofit hospitals, and to extend the same exemption to a nonprofit hospital-owned satellite emergency facilities (SECs), even if areas of the hospital and SECs are used by/leased to, for-profit medical providers “for medical purposes related to delivery of health care services directly to the hospital,” provided that such “portion of the hospital . . . is used exclusively for hospital services.”  The nonprofit hospitals and SECs should pay an annual community service contribution (ACSC) to the municipality in which the hospital beds of a nonprofit hospital are located or where an SEC is located.  Chapter 17 also bars imposing assessments for tax years 2014 through 2020, which would moot those years’ pending tax appeals all filed because of the alleged for-profit activity conducted by the hospital and/or the for-profit medical providers on the nonprofit hospital premises.  The law was enacted to mitigate the effects of a 2015 Tax Court decision which revoked the tax exemption of a nonprofit hospital’s property based on facts that the operations/activities of the plaintiff nonprofit hospital and the for-profit, private medical providers on the hospital property were too blurred.

The court here found that (1) the ACSC is not an ultra-vires payment-in-lieu of tax program; (2) the ACSC is not a local property tax for purposes of the Uniformity Clause of the New Jersey Constitution; (3) Chapter 17 is facially constitutional and does not violate the Exemption Clause of the New Jersey Constitution; (4) Chapter 17 is not an invalid special legislation, thus also does not facially violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal and State constitutions; and (5) Chapter 17’s retroactivity is not manifestly unjust, thus, also does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal and State constitutions.  The court further found there are no bases for imposing an injunction against Chapter 17 under any of the factors enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1983).  The court therefore dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

This case raises a question of first impression:  whether the recently enacted amendment to the expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3, includes violations of local ordinances, which were amended from Title 2C violations.  Petitioners, C.C. and R.O.-S. argued that the “clean slate” statute was designed to remove an individual’s entire criminal history and therefore, must include local ordinances that arise from criminal offenses.  The State proposed a strict interpretation of the statute, arguing that only convictions from indictable offenses, disorderly persons offenses, and petty disorderly persons offenses are included.  This Court concluded that a liberal interpretation of the statute is consistent with the legislative intent.  Local ordinances that arise from criminal offenses are unique in that they are accompanied by police and arrest reports, fingerprint cards, “mug shots,” complaint warrants or summonses and most importantly, they are included on an individual’s criminal case history or “RAP” sheet.  Absent an expungement of the local ordinance that resulted from the Title 2C offense, Petitioners would be left with a criminal history.  Since this is inconsistent with the intent of the “clean slate” statute, the court finds that Petitioner’s convictions are eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3.

This litigation arises from unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by a twenty-four-year-old who was a named “adult child” dependent on his father’s health insurance policy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14(a), of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). This opinion addresses two questions of first impression under New Jersey law.

First, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, specifically N.J.S.A. 25:1-15, can a family member’s oral guarantee of payment be enforceable where the promisor has no pecuniary interest? Based on the decades-long thread of pecuniary advantage woven through New Jersey’s leading object exception precedent, the court holds that oral promises supported by familial bonds only – without any pecuniary or economic advantage to the promisor – do not satisfy the leading object exception to the Statute of Frauds.

Second, can a parent, who is the insurance policy holder, be held liable for unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by an emancipated child who is a covered “adult child” dependent pursuant to the ACA? Guided by N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, the court holds that, in the absence of any signed, written guarantee executed by the parent, the parent of an emancipated adult capable of contracting for a provider’s care cannot be deemed liable for unreimbursed medical expenses, even where the “adult dependent” is covered on the parent’s health insurance policy, pursuant to the ACA.

In State v. Kelvin Briggs, defendant moved to suppress internet protocol (IP) address data. In support of his motion, defendant argued that IP address data was akin to cell-site location information (CSLI), which is afforded protection by the United States Supreme Court in Carpenter v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Further, defendant argued that like CSLI data, IP address data should be considered location data that requires a warrant. This issue is one of first impression in New Jersey.

In its decision, the court distinguished between IP address data and CSLI and held that IP address data should not be afforded the same protections as CSLI. More specifically, the court observed that IP address data does not generate the same privacy concerns enunciated in Carpenter. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to suppress was denied.

Based on a close analysis of the statutory language and legislative history, the trial court held that the New Jersey First Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14-7, did not apply to unpaid volunteers serving on government boards. Specifically, the court found that four volunteer members of the Rutgers University Board of Governors who lived outside the State of New Jersey were not subject to the Act and thus would not be removed from the Board based on their out-of-state residence as sought by plaintiff.

In the alternative, the court found that if the New Jersey First Act were applied to volunteer members of the Rutgers Board of Governors residing outside of New Jersey, such an application of the Act would violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions as being inconsistent with the Rutgers Charter, which requires University consent before legislative changes to the governance of the University are enacted.

Plaintiff Estate brought a preemptive action seeking to enjoin defendant, M.A.-V., from filing a sexual abuse complaint using decedent’s actual name rather than initials. Defendant had provided to the Estate’s executors a copy of a proposed complaint that contained specific allegations of sexual abuse alleged to have been committed by decedent against defendant in 1988, when defendant was thirteen years old. Plaintiff argued the statute governing Actions for Sexual Abuse, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1, section (f)(1), was intended to protect confidentiality of alleged perpetrators as well as victims. To obtain the injunction plaintiff would have to satisfy the four-part test of Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1992). The court held plaintiff could not satisfy the second prong, that "the legal rights underlying plaintiff’s claim are well-settled." The court ruled the issue of whether the Sexual Abuse statute afforded a sexual abuse defendant the right to demand confidentiality had been decided in T.S.R. v. J.C., 288 N.J. Super. 48, 53 (App. Div. 1996) ("[T]he statute grants only the plaintiff-victim the option of refusing to disclose identifying information.").

A psychiatric hospital can involuntarily hold a patient for up to twenty-four hours for screening and up to an additional seventy-two hours to make an emergent application to the court to continue involuntary psychiatric commitment. The issue raised here is when the law starts counting the time. To decide the issue the court had to address the role of the County Adjuster and the Public Defender. These are new issues.

This opinion addresses the legal framework as to how to work through the issues and decide whether to issue an order for involuntary commitment. In this case, the court decided that admission to a hospital was not the same as being held involuntarily and that the procedures followed by the hospital were proper. So, the involuntary commitment was granted.

The municipal court found the defendant guilty of violating N.J.A.C. 5:23-2.32(a), a regulation enacted under the Uniform Construction Code Act that prohibits unsafe structures. The municipal court then ordered his building demolished. The defendant appealed to the Law Division, which on de novo review found that the municipal court lacked the authority to order the building’s demolition. The Law Division then dismissed the complaint after finding that the municipality failed to follow the procedures that would have allowed the municipal court to impose a fine.

Plaintiff moved to accept service by mail as good service in a Special Civil Part case based on electronic tracking information. The markings on the mail piece did not indicate good service. The court found that the law requires reference to the mail piece over the electronic tracking information and denied the motion.

In Liriano v. Liberty Mutual insurance Company, (Docket Essex L-5379-20), the court found that the plaintiff was barred by the entire controversy doctrine from asserting a claim for underinsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff had previously brought a lawsuit in another county naming the same defendant and based on the same accident and the same policy of insurance. In the earlier suit, which resulted in entry of a final judgment, plaintiff had made a claim for uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff had become aware during the pendency of the earlier suit that the tortfeasor was underinsured, not uninsured.

The court found in the circumstances of this case, that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.

This matter concerns the right of a foreign country to modify a child support order entered in New York and subsequently registered in New Jersey. The parties, who had three children together, were divorced in New York in 2011. At the time, they entered into a marital settlement agreement which required Plaintiff to pay Defendant child support in the amount of $1,700 per month. Defendant and the children moved to New Jersey in 2012 and the parties later consented to the registration of the foreign divorce in New Jersey. Defendant and the children have lived in New Jersey continuously since that time. Plaintiff was deported to Ireland in 2014. While there, the Probation Division commenced proceedings for the international enforcement of Plaintiff’s child support obligation. In response to this enforcement action, Ireland entered an order reducing Plaintiff’s child support obligation. Plaintiff eventually returned to the United States. Defendant sought to enforce the original child support obligation and argued that Plaintiff owed her the balance between what he was required to pay under the original support order and what he actually paid pursuant to the Ireland order. Conversely, Plaintiff argued that the Ireland order was binding, his future support obligation should be the amount established by the Ireland court and he did not owe Defendant any arrears.

The court first determined which treaty governing the international enforcement of child support orders applied: The United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, New York, 1956 (1956 UN Convention) or The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (Hague Convention). The court concluded that the Ireland court inappropriately applied the 1956 UN Convention, because the United States was never a signatory to this treaty. The court then determined that it was the Hague Convention that was binding on the two nations, since both Ireland and the United States were signatories to that treaty at the time the Ireland order was entered. The Court next analyzed the provisions of the Hague Convention and its implementing legislation, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), to ascertain those circumstances where a receiving country may modify a support order. It concluded that Ireland did not have the authority to modify the support order in this case, where Defendant and the children have lived in New Jersey since 2012. The court further concluded that, under UIFSA, the original child support order is the "controlling order" since Defendant and the children continuously resided in New Jersey, making New Jersey the children’s “home state” and because both parties consented to jurisdiction in New Jersey, even when Plaintiff was residing in Ireland. Accordingly, the court held that Ireland did not have the authority to modify the original child support order and that Plaintiff owed the amounts that had accrued since the Ireland order was entered.

This post-judgment dissolution case concerns a question of first impression: may a child support obligation be modified retroactively prior to the date of application where the substantial, permanent change in circumstances is an adult adoption that terminated the obligor’s parental rights.

The parties are divorced and share three children. For the relevant time period, the child support obligation was allocated for the oldest child, but unallocated for the two other children. In 2018 – after their respective eighteenth birthdays – the two oldest children were adopted by their stepfather. Although the parties agree that the adoptions qualify as a change in circumstances warranting a modification to child support for the third child, they dispute whether the modification can be retroactive to the date of the adoption, as opposed to the date of application.

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a generally prohibits retroactive modifications of child support prior to the date of application. Caselaw, however, established limited exceptions to the statute’s general prohibition, including emancipation. The limited emancipation exception is based on the underlying premise that on emancipation, any duty of support is extinguished.

Based on the similarities between emancipation and adult adoption, most noteworthy being that by requesting an adult adoption the child has removed him- or herself from the parental sphere of influence thereby extinguishing any duty of support, the court holds that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a does not bar termination or modification of child support retroactive to the date of the supported child’s adult adoption.

In this adoption matter, the court examined whether a minor child, W.S., who was born in Mexico, is considered a "habitual resident" of the United States at the time of her adoption in order to comply with the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention). Petitioner, S.S., sought to amend a Final Judgment of Adoption that was entered on December 21, 2016, to reflect that the adoption of W.S. was in compliance with the Hague Adoption Convention which will resolve W.S.’s immigration status and allow W.S. to return to the United States.

The court’s opinion highlighted the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719 (2020), which directly addressed the definition of "habitual residence" under the Hague Adoption Convention. In accordance with the new guidance set forth in the Monasky decision, the court concluded that W.S. was a "habitual resident" of the United States, not Mexico, at the time of her adoption on December 21, 2016, and held that the adoption complied with the requirements of the Hague Adoption Convention.

In this opinion, the court examined the newly enacted legislative changes in the Legal Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-69 to -71, which created a streamlined process for same-sex couples to obtain a co-parent adoption. Petitioners G.A.S. and M.A.S., a same-sex couple, sought a Judgment of Adoption pursuant to the streamlined procedures under the Legal Parentage Act and for the Atlantic County Surrogate’s Court to process the family’s adoption complaint without requiring background checks and a home study. The court’s opinion highlighted the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Order issued on May 26, 2020, and the Notice to the Bar issued on June 4, 2020, by the Administrative Office of the Courts, which outlined the streamlined process of establishing the legal parentage of a non-biological parent under the new statute. The Court concluded that Petitioners satisfied all three requirements under N.J.S.A. 9:17-71(b), and the court entered a Judgment of Adoption.

This non-dissolution case concerns a question of first impression in New Jersey regarding a threshold inquiry to the application of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Convention"). Specifically, this case addresses whether accession by the child’s country of habitual residence mandates application of the Convention where the United States has not yet accepted that accession.

In early 2020, A.R. and the child left the Philippines—the child’s country of habitual residence—for the United States. J.R. filed an application seeking the child’s return pursuant to the Convention. Although the United States’ status as a Contracting State to the Convention was patent, the Philippines did not accede to the Convention until March 2016. The United States has not accepted that accession.

Articles 35 and 38 of the Convention collectively provide that for a non-Contracting State that accedes to the Convention, such "accession will have effect only" where the other country has "declared their acceptance of the accession."

Based on the clear, express, and unambiguous language of Articles 35 and 38, analogous federal and state precedent, and scholarly consensus, the court holds that where the United States has not accepted another country’s accession to the Convention in accordance with Articles 35 and 38, the court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the Convention’s prompt return protocols.

On January 24, 2020, defendant ordered a floral arrangement that was to be delivered to his former girlfriend on February 13, 2020. One week after the order was placed, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was entered against defendant, prohibiting him from having contact with his former girlfriend. Defendant made no effort to cancel the delivery, which did not occur until after the entry and service of the TRO on defendant. Defendant was charged with contempt for violation of a TRO entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

Following trial, it was determined that the State was not able to satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "purposely or knowingly" violated the TRO, and the complaint was dismissed. Since the TRO had not yet been entered at the time the defendant ordered the flowers, he could not have possessed the requisite mental state for a finding of contempt.

Similarly, the argument that defendant had an affirmative obligation to recall the communication initiated prior to his having been served with the TRO was rejected, because the TRO provided no notice of any such requirement.

Defendant filed a Motion for Release Due to Illness or Infirmity under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) and a Motion for a Judicial Furlough under State v. Boone, 262 N.J. Super. 220 (Law Div. 1992). Defendant had asserted that, as an insulin dependent diabetic requiring two injections daily, his continued incarceration had placed him at a very high risk of contracting COVID-19 and suffering extremely serious health consequences, including death. After rejecting the State’s contention that defendant was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing such motions, the court addressed both motions on the merits.

With respect to the Motion for Release Due to Illness or Infirmity under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), the court weighed the factors set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 135 (1985), for determining whether an inmate should be released. In so doing, the court held that while defendant had proven that he was suffering from an illness, defendant had not presented any evidence that the pandemic was having a "deleterious effect" on his medical condition and did not show that medical services unavailable at the prison would be essential to prevent further deterioration of his health. Similarly, while the pandemic constituted a change in circumstances, the Department of Corrections had taken efforts to mitigate and protect against the spread of the disease and defendant failed to present any evidence that COVID-19 was causing a "serious deterioration" to his health. Lastly, due to defendant’s extensive prior record and the serious nature of the charge for which defendant was incarcerated, defendant’s release would not be in the best interests of public safety and welfare. Thus, the motion under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) was denied.

With regard to the Motion for a Judicial Furlough under Boone, the court noted that the defendant in Boone required lifesaving treatment out-of-state and there was no statutory or rule-based authority for granting such relief. As such, the trial court in Boone exercised its inherent authority to grant a judicial furlough to save the defendant’s life. Here, the court found that there was explicit statutory authority, vested in the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and his agents, through which defendant could seek a furlough. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.3. Since defendant had statutory authority by which to seek a furlough, the court found it had no authority to grant a judicial furlough and denied the motion.

In re Adoption of a Minor Child by J.B. analyzes whether the precedents of Garden State Equality v. Dow and Obergefell v. Hodges have impacted the scope of the second parent exception to New Jersey’s Judgment of Adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50—particularly, whether its requirement that all parental rights, except for those rights of a legal parent who is the "spouse" of the petitioner, must be terminated upon the entry of a Judgment of Adoption. A strict reading of the statute contrasts with numerous court rulings issued prior to Garden State Equality v. Dow, yet the ability for same-sex couples to now marry removes a barrier to recognition that would allow for satisfaction of the statute’s restrictive requirements.

Before same-sex couples had a legal pathway to marriage, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 was interpreted to allow unmarried couples to adopt without terminating a biological parent’s rights in cases such as In re Adoption of a Child by A.R., 152 N.J. Super. 541 (Probate Div. 1977), In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. 622, 623 (Ch. Div. 1993), and In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. 1 (1995). Yet, those cases carefully articulated that the petitioning couples had no legal ability to wed and were thus unable to satisfy the statute’s "spousal" requirements. Now that same-sex marriage has been legalized by Dow and Obergefell, the question of whether the exception still applies—after it was based upon couples for whom marriage was prohibited—must be answered, as well as to clarify that the statute’s strictly read requirements remain unnecessary. Despite the conflict between statutory language and relevant case law, the second parent exception should be affirmed to avoid terminating the rights of worthy, unmarried parents and petitioners seeking to form a family unit.

The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he was charged with bias intimidation, among other crimes, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(2). Defendant admitted to sending messages via MeetMe.com to the victim threatening to harm her biracial daughter, in which he referred to the child as a "mutt" and "mongrel" and referred to the victim as a "spic loving whore." Defendant asserted that the grand jury was not presented with any evidence demonstrating that defendant directed the threats at the victim and her daughter based on racial motivation. The messages were in reference to the daughter’s race and not the victim’s who was the recipient of the threats. The State argued that the grand jury was presented with testimony that defendant stated he disliked interracial relationships and children of those relationships.

The court denied defendant’s motion, holding that, by defendant’s own admission, the threats were motivated by the victim’s identity as a white female who engaged in a biracial relationship with a Hispanic male and bore a biracial daughter. Additionally, the court reasoned that the victim’s biracial daughter was also a foreseeable third-party victim of the threats even though she was not the recipient. As the standard for upholding an indictment weighs heavily in favor of the State, here defendant’s admissions satisfied the requisite evidence needed to demonstrate racial motivation for N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)(2).

A levy was placed on a bank account belonging to defendant judgment-debtor. Defendant objected to the levy on the grounds that the only money in the account was from the part of defendant’s wages that were exempt from a wage garnishment. The question presented is whether a levy can be made on money deposited in a bank account from wages that were previously subject to garnishment. Based on the applicable statutes, the court found that previously garnished wages deposited in a bank account does not exempt the money from levy.

Lakeview Memorial Park Association v. Burlington County Construction Board of Appeals involves a novel question of whether the New Jersey Cemetery Act, N.J.S.A. 45:27-1 to -41, preempts local municipal regulation in accordance with the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -63. Specifically, this opinion examines the interplay between the two statutory schemes to determine whether the local municipality has the power to require zoning permits pursuant to local ordinances for mausoleum construction where the Department of Community Affairs has already approved the site plans for the construction in accordance with N.J.S.A. 45:27-27(b). The Supreme Court’s only decision related to this matter, Trinity Cemetery Association v. Township of Wall, only speaks to municipal regulation of cemeteries in the Court’s concurrences, authored separately by Justice Zazzali and Justice Verniero, and does not speak directly to whether the Cemetery Act preempts municipal regulation pursuant to the MLUL. See 170 N.J. 39 (2001).

In reviewing this question, this opinion finds that the Legislature empowered the local municipalities, pursuant to the MLUL, to enact ordinances to regulate the use and development of land. As part of the regulation of land use and development, a municipality may require site plan approval to oversee the effect of the development on the public health and safety. The municipality’s power to regulate as such is not preempted by the DCA’s power to approve site plans for construction pursuant to the Cemetery Act. Therefore, the plaintiff-cemetery in this matter was required to follow municipal regulations and obtain the requisite zoning permits and site plan approval before beginning its mausoleum expansion project.

This non-dissolution case addresses whether partition of a residence remains an equitable remedy among unmarried, cohabitating intimates engaged in a joint venture following 2010 amendments to the Statute of Frauds – a question of first impression.

In 2010, the Statute of Frauds was amended to extend its writing requirement to any “promise by one party to a non-marital personal relationship to provide support or other consideration for the other party.” N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h). Although the amendment clearly made unwritten palimony agreements unenforceable, no published opinion has yet addressed whether, in the absence of a writing, the equitable remedy of partition among unmarried, cohabitating intimates survived.

Here, although the deed and mortgage to the home were in S.R.’s name only, C.N. was heavily involved in the home’s purchase by, among other things: communicating with the realtor; providing $10,000 of the $15,000 down payment; being solely responsible for the inspection; negotiating a $10,000 seller’s concession; and being a named insured. Once in the home, although S.R. largely paid the monthly mortgage, C.N. was responsible for the majority of the home’s upkeep costs, such as gas, electric, water, sewer, security, landscaping services, garbage, and pest control. He oversaw contractors. He purchased furniture. And, he worked with a lawyer to appeal a tax assessment.

After reviewing pre-amendment precedent, the plain text of the statutory amendment that used palimony language from a precedential Appellate Division opinion, and the legislative history undergirding enactment of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) – legislative history that expressly discussed palimony caselaw, yet was silent as to partition – the court holds that, in the absence of a writing, partition of a residence remains an equitable remedy among unmarried, cohabitating intimates engaged in a joint venture.

This matter was before the court on applications filed by both parties seeking relief concerning child support and custody. In its written opinion, the court addressed the issue of whether, for purposes of calculating child support, the court may find a parent to be underemployed, and impute to that parent income based on available overtime, where the available overtime is greater than the amount of overtime the parent had worked in the past.

The court held that a parent was not “voluntarily underemployed” for not working all available overtime, without regard to past practices. The court held that for purposes of calculating child support, the parent’s income is his or her salary plus an additional amount based on past earnings from overtime and second jobs.

This case presents the question of whether petitioner A.R.'s convictions fall within the "crime-spree" exception contained within N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), making them eligible for expungement. Specifically, the granting or denying of petitioner’s expungement petition turns on the phrase: “crimes [which are] interdependent or closely related in circumstances and were committed as part of a sequence of events that took place within a comparatively short period of time.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). Petitioner and the State concede that this phrase is undefined in the statute, yet offer competing interpretations. The State proposes a strict interpretation of this language, whereas petitioner asserts that the expungement statute – as remedial legislation – should be liberally interpreted. This court concludes that a liberal interpretation of this language is consistent with the general purpose of the expungement statute. Petitioner’s convictions are “closely related in circumstances” because they stem from two instances where he engaged in the unlawful sale of narcotics to a “friend” and an undercover officer, and were committed over a period of six weeks, which is a “comparatively short period of time.” Therefore, petitioner’s convictions are eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a).

This domestic violence case concerns the breadth of “household member” jurisdiction in the context of a modern, blended-family where the parties are adult, half-siblings who shared meaningful, regular parenting time with their common father during their youth – though never resided together. Throughout their youth, the parties regularly and consistently spent substantial periods of time at their common father’s home, including the defendant spending overnights every other weekend during the school year and more extended times during the summer at their father’s home. Although he did not have a bedroom, he had a fixed sleeping arrangement and drawers containing underwear, gym shorts, and toiletries. During and after college, their in-person contact decreased, but they still gathered informally and at family milestones and vacations.

In view of those facts, for purposes of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act’s (“PDVA”) jurisdictional “household member” requirement, the court holds that a child whose parents are separated during youth but who spends meaningful, regular periods of time at a parent of alternate residence’s home such that he or she is substantially integrated into that household may have two “households” creating jurisdiction vis-à-vis a victimized half-sibling who resided solely with the common parent. “Household member” as used in the PDVA’s definition of “victim of domestic violence” must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the ever-changing dynamics of modern families. To restrict a child whose parents are separated to only one household despite meaningful, regular time in a second household would untenably alter the statutory construct, discriminate against members of blended families, and unduly restrict the broadly designed, legislatively crafted protections afforded victims of domestic violence.

This matter was before the court on defendant’s application to disestablish paternity, terminate child support, and vacate child support arrears. After genetic testing confirmed that defendant was not the child’s biological father, the court granted those parts of the application seeking to disestablish paternity and terminate ongoing support.

The court denied that part of defendant’s application seeking to vacate arrears. In particular, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the arrears could be vacated on equitable principles.

In February 2017, defendant was charged with the crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in a quantity greater than twenty-five pounds and was released on home arrest with electronic monitoring (PML3+EM). On December 17, 2018, defendant entered a guilty plea to count one of the indictment, as amended to a second-degree offense. In consideration for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a maximum sentence of a five-year state prison term. Defendant requested an extended sentencing date to “put his life in order” before commencing the custodial term. The court set April 5, 2019, as the sentence date and, in its discretion, continued defendant on pretrial release.

Defendant retained new counsel and on June 10, 2019, present counsel for defendant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, requesting that the sentence be adjourned and that he continue free on pretrial release, pending the return of the motion. Defendant argued that pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJR), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, he was entitled to remain on release until sentencing or the resolution of the motion to vacate the plea. The court denied the request to remain free, holding that CJR did not vest defendant with any substantive or procedural grounds to remain free on pretrial release after entering a plea of guilty. Instead, in its discretion, the court remanded defendant pending same.

The matter presents the novel issue as to whether a defendant is entitled to continue pretrial release pursuant to CJR.

This case addresses the question of whether a residential landlord’s failure to comply in all respects with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-70 (a tenant protection measure within the New Jersey Foreclosure Fairness Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 to -71) precludes the landlord’s right to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent when the tenant’s defense is that the rent has been paid to the former landlord because the tenant was unaware of the existence of the new landlord. The court answered the question in the affirmative.

This application raises a novel question concerning whether an error made by condemnation commissioners should negatively impact the right of the defendant property owner to file an appeal of the commissioners’ award. More specifically, if the commissioners’ award is filed without the statutorily required oath, does the time limit to appeal the award start to run when the award is filed or when the oath is subsequently filed? The court also considered whether good cause exists to extend the time to file the appeal. In a case of first impression, the court held that the report was not considered “filed” until the oath was filed; thus, the appeal was timely as it was filed within forty-five days of the filing of the commissioners’ oath.

Plaintiff, John Doe, initiated this tort action in New Jersey against the Archdiocese of Philadelphia and St. Charles Borromeo Seminary (hereinafter “Archdiocese defendants”). The Archdiocese defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint raising the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction, statute of limitations and forum non conveniens. The motion was initially denied and a plenary hearing on the issue of the statute of limitations was scheduled; however, that hearing was adjourned nearly one year as the court permitted an additional period of discovery. The Archdiocese defendants subsequently renewed their prior motion seeking a decision as to whether Pennsylvania or New Jersey law applies. The choice-of-law question raised in the motion is particularly important because under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff’s mental state cannot toll the statute of limitations. After oral argument, the court determined it would not violate the Archdiocese defendants’ due process rights to subject them to in personam long-arm jurisdiction of the courts of New Jersey. Additionally, the court conducted a forum non conveniens analysis, and found New Jersey to be an appropriate forum for this action. The court next must determine if New Jersey’s statute of limitations precludes further adjudication of this claim. A plenary hearing, pursuant to Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973), will be scheduled.

Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment to which plaintiff responded with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On January 1, 2000, the parties entered into an Operating Agreement in order to form the limited liability company, PediatriCare. Subsequently, on March 12, 2001, the parties executed an amended and restated Operating Agreement, which was the operative document governing the relationship. In January 2016, plaintiff announced his intention to retire, which triggered Section 10 of the Operating Agreement. Section 10 provided the process for calculating the retirement purchase price, which required a net worth valuation methodology, in order to determine a value for a negotiated buyout price of plaintiff. However, various calculations of fair market valuation were done in order to effectuate a settlement as to a voluntary buy-out number, which the parties agree was never reached

Defendants then sought to invoke the net worth valuation of Section 10 of the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff argued that over a sixteen-year period, the Operating Agreement was modified to use the fair market value as opposed to a net worth valuation, based on the parties’ conduct over this time period. Defendants argue that the Operating Agreement is clear in its express provision concerning how to calculate the buyout price. Moreover, defendants note that the Operating Agreement also unambiguously states that it may be modified only through a vote of 80% of the membership interests in the company, and not through the course of conduct that plaintiff contends. The court found, upon reviewing the plain language of the Operating Agreement, and upon a lack of evidence that it was changed by the remaining members, that the net worth valuation methodology remained a part of the Operating Agreement and was the correct method for a retirement purchase price.

In addition, plaintiff suffered no oppression since the economic loss doctrine bars recovery when entitlement flows from the Operating Agreement. There was also no breach of fiduciary duty when the members acted in conformity with the provisions of the Operating Agreement. The court ultimately granted in part, and denied in part, defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. As such, the court dismissed Counts I, II, and III of plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff’s application and defendant’s counterclaim. In her application, plaintiff seeks, among other things, an initial custody determination concerning the parties’ minor child. In his counterclaim, defendant opposes plaintiff’s application and contests jurisdiction. Plaintiff, the child’s natural mother, resides in New Jersey. Defendant, the child’s natural father, resides in New York.

On March 7, 2018, J.T. (hereinafter “J.T.”),1 a senior at LEAP Academy University Charter School in Camden, New Jersey (hereinafter “LEAP Academy”), received an Instagram message from defendant, a middle school guidance counselor at the same school. That message asked J.T. to “[s]how me them huge rockets of your [sic] . . . .” Defendant was subsequently charged and indicted with third-degree endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1).

This case presents an issue of first impression: whether an out of state conviction for an offense classified as a crime in a foreign jurisdiction acts as a bar to the expungement petition of a successful graduate from the drug court program, when that same offense is classified as a motor vehicle offense in New Jersey? During his term on special probation, the petitioner was arrested in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and charged with driving under the influence. J.S. was convicted of this charge on January 3, 2017. Under Pennsylvania law, this DUI charge is graded as a misdemeanor level crime. The Prosecutor opposed this petition for expungement on the basis that petitioner had been charged and convicted of a crime in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania while a participant in the drug court program.

The court found that the Pennsylvania DUI conviction is not a statutory bar to this drug court graduate’s expungement because: (1) there exists a strong presumption towards expungement; (2) petitioner completed the drug court’s rigorous monitoring program, and; (3) such an offense, under the laws of the State of New Jersey, does not constitute a crime, disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense.

In this landlord-tenant case, the court was charged with deciding whether the City of Newark’s rent control ordinance prohibited the assessment of “additional rent,” for purposes of a summary dispossess action, if the total amount assessed, including this contractually provided for “additional rent,” exceeded the maximum rent permitted by the ordinance. The court answered the question in the affirmative.

This was an action seeking eviction for non-payment of rent. The tenant brought a motion arguing that the local rent control ordinance prohibited the incorporation of additional rent of the kind that was at issue in a summary dispossess action. The tenant argued that the ordinance established a maximum rent cap and any rent that exceeded that amount could not form a basis for eviction. The tenant further argued that regardless of whether defined as “additional rent,” fees should be considered in the ordinance’s definition of “rent” and thus capped thereby. The landlord countered that assessing the additional rent was not contrary to the subject ordinance and the lease expressly provided for such assessment. The landlord further argued that the fees sought are such a common form of additional rent that the local ordinance’s failure to specifically exclude it in the definition should be understood to be mean that the ordinance does not prohibit it.

The court held that the landlord was not entitled to evict the tenant based upon the failure to pay the “additional rent,” notwithstanding that the lease memorialized that legal and late fees were collectible as “additional rent.” The court found that the total amount of rent that could be assessed and thus put at issue in a summary dispossess case was limited by the local ordinance. The court established that the assessment of “additional rent” is still the imposition of rent, and because the ordinance governs all rent without exception, the rent could not exceed the municipal ordinance rate cap. Accordingly, the landlord was disallowed from seeking any rents in excess of the maximum rent permitted by the ordinance in a summary dispossess action. The landlord’s contractual remedy was preserved.

Following juvenile T.D.’s admission to committing the offense of shoplifting, under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11, the court placed T.D. on a twelve-month deferred disposition and imposed a condition that T.D. complete thirty hours of community service. In light of the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c) indicating that “any person convicted of a shoplifting offense shall be sentenced to perform community service[,]” the parties expressly contemplated that the community service hours imposed in this case were mandatory.

The matter was returned to court post-disposition on probation’s recommendation, due to T.D.’s failure to complete the community service hours. The court concluded that the community service hours were not mandatory, notwithstanding the language within subsection (c) of the shoplifting statute. The court reasoned that the Legislature did not explicitly apply the mandatory penalty provisions of the shoplifting statute to juveniles, as it has done with other statutory schemes. The court further found that the imposition of mandatory community service hours for shoplifting offenses was incompatible with the imposition of a deferred disposition resulting in the dismissal of the complaint, in the absence of any specific requirement to impose such a penalty on juveniles. Upon consideration of T.D.’s representations that she and her mother were experiencing homelessness, and mindful of the rehabilitative goals of the Juvenile Code, the court vacated the imposition of the community service hours as a condition of T.D.’s deferred disposition.

This case is a domestic violence action in which plaintiff had employed defendant as a nanny. The issue is whether plaintiff is a party entitled to protection under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, given the economic relationship of the parties. It is held that under the circumstances, plaintiff is a party entitled to such protection.

Plaintiffs sought recusal of assigned trial judge based upon alleged violation of "objectively reasonable" standard of impropriety set forth in DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008) based on the alleged personal animus of the judge against plaintiffs’ counsel. Before becoming a member of the judiciary, the judge had been a candidate for local office in his town approximately 14 years prior. Plaintiffs’ counsel was a member of the opposite party and also resided in the same town and was politically active. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleged that anonymous and other sources had indicated the judge held him responsible for campaign materials which called into question the judge’s character and fitness for office during the campaign in 2004. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleged the judge, when he was county chairman, took action to thwart his renomination to a state commission in 2013 four years before joining the judiciary, which was alleged to evidence the judge’s personal animus. Additionally, the judge had also served as county chairman of his political party for the 6 years prior to joining the judiciary. During this time, the son of the principal member of plaintiff LLC was an elected official in the judge’s home town and a member of the judge’s opposite party during which time the judge, as county chairman, had supported the members of his own party over the principal member’s son.

The court held that, under the DeNike standard, a reasonable, fully-informed person would not have doubts about the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances in this matter. The court considered the lack of a prospective financial benefit to the judge, the remoteness in time of the alleged statements by the judge to the present matter, the lack of evidence of a continuous personal animus, the professional dealings between Plaintiff’s counsel and the judge when he was a practicing attorney, and the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm, of which Plaintiffs’ counsel was a named partner, had previously appeared before the judge without objection or incident, all weighed against recusal under the standard. The court also found political motive is not objective evidence of personal animus. The motion to recuse was denied.

Defendant was charged with third degree theft of services for the alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8(a). The indictment resulted from defendant’s use of EZ Pass only lanes on 220 occasions without possessing an EZ Pass transponder. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment.

The court concluded that the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for violation of the statute. The court first found that traveling through the EZ Pass only lane was a representation that the vehicle operator possessed a valid EZ Pass. The court further held that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b), the theft grading statute, permitted the aggregation of 220 bridge crossings for purposes of establishing that the crime fell within the third degree range. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the existence of civil penalties precluded criminal responsibility for the same conduct.

Plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. Prior to trial, defendant had the plaintiff examined by a board certified orthopedic surgeon who prepared a written report describing his examination and conclusions. In the report, the physician identified a number of published medical articles that presumably supported the opinions contained in the report. Plaintiff’s counsel demanded that defendant supply copies of the articles. The orthopedic surgeon refused to produce copies of the articles claiming that to provide copies of the articles would violate unspecified copyright laws.

The court ordered the defendant to supply plaintiff’s counsel with copies of the articles within 20 days. If the defendant fails to supply copies of the articles to plaintiff’s counsel within 20 days, the orthopedic surgeon is precluded from referring to the articles during his testimony at trial.

A three-year-old girl sustained personal injuries while on property owned by defendant Road Runner Sports, Inc. Her parents then filed suit against Road Runner and many others on her behalf. Defendants sought an Order compelling plaintiff, now seven years old, to attend two independent medical examinations without the presence of her parents, or any recording device. Plaintiff then cross-moved to permit either an audio or video recording of the examination and that a third party be present.

The court held that under R. 4:19 this decision lies within the court’s discretion. The court held that the benefits of an unobtrusive video recording by a cell phone or a small video recording device by the child’s parents or counsel far outweighs any prejudice that may befall the defendants. As such, the court denied defendants’ motion and granted plaintiffs cross-motion.

The question presented is whether or not defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent detained outside of New Jersey to answer foreign charges. Defendant was arrested and detained in New Jersey on New Jersey charges. He was thereafter transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center to answer federal charges which were lodged subsequent to his New Jersey charges. Because defendant’s transfer was performed pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, defendant was always in New Jersey custody and is entitled to jail credit for time spent detained outside of New Jersey to answer foreign charges.

The issue in this opinion is whether plaintiff’s counsel can question his client about whether a passenger in plaintiff’s vehicle sustained an injury in order to help establish that plaintiff was also injured in the accident. The court ultimately ruled that the question was not relevant. There are many variables that factor into whether an individual sustains an injury in a motor vehicle accident. Some individuals are frail while others are not readily susceptible to injury. Certain individuals involved in the same accident may sustain the brunt of the impact from the other vehicle or may be positioned in such a way to cause them be more susceptible to being injured. In short, simply because one person gets injured in an accident does not mean that someone else in the same vehicle must have also sustained an injury.

The issue in this opinion is whether it is appropriate, in the context of an automobile negligence case, for plaintiff's counsel to question his client as to whether his vehicle was "totaled" as a result of the accident with defendant's vehicle. The court determined this was not an appropriate inquiry. Because the term "totaled" has a colloquial meaning and an objective meaning within the insurance industry, whether a car was totaled does not provide the jury with meaningful information with respect to the severity of the impact. Accordingly, any line of inquiry regarding whether a vehicle was totaled in an accident in the context of a personal injury action is irrelevant.

Decedent’s parents, who are divorced, each filed petitions seeking control over their son’s remains pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:27-22. Decedent’s father wished his son’s remains to be buried, while decedent’s mother wished her son’s remains to be cremated. Decedent was unmarried and died without issue, without a will, and without any written directive regarding his funeral or disposition of remains. While the Statute provides the order of persons to be granted the right to control the funeral arrangements and disposition of human remains, and the court is empowered to resolve disputes, there is no guidance in the Statute, or in New Jersey case law, on how to resolve a dispute that arises between even numbers of next-of-kin of equal statutory standing (i.e., surviving adult children, parents, siblings or other next-of-kin according to the degree of consanguinity). Finding that the statutory intent of the Statute is to adhere to the wishes and desires of the decedent, the court held that where next-of-kin of equal statutory standing find themselves in dispute over funeral arrangements and/or disposition of remains, the court should consider the following factors when selecting the person in control under N.J.S.A. 45:27-22: (1) Who is more likely to abide by the wishes and desires of the decedent as expressed through communications with another, to the extent the decedent made those communications; (2) Who established a closer relationship to the decedent and is thereby in a better position to surmise the decedent’s desires and expectations upon death; (3) Who is more likely to adhere to the religious beliefs and/or cultural practices of the decedent, to the extent that funeral arrangements and/or disposal of remains are addressed by such beliefs and practices, and to the extent that those beliefs and practices are relevant to inform the court as to the wishes, desires and expectations of the decedent upon death; and (4) Who will ultimately be designated administrator(s) of the estate and act in the best interests of the estate to: (a) determine the costs of funeral arrangements and/or disposition of human remains; (b) assess the ability of the estate to pay for the costs of funeral arrangements and/or disposition of human remains; and (c) arrange for alternative funding and/or resources to effectuate the funeral and/or disposition in the event that the estate does not have the ability to pay for the costs of human remains (i.e., locating funding from other next-of-kin, charities, fraternal organizations, religious institutions, governmental agencies, etc.). If material facts are in dispute, an expeditious plenary hearing should be held. When rendering its decision, the court should conduct a qualitative analysis of each factor, giving due weight to each as appropriate. Upon review of all relevant factors, the court granted relief to decedent’s father who had been the next-of-kin with a closer relationship, as he had lived with the decedent for several years up until his death.

This is an appeal from the decision of the trial court which found that a condition attached to a variance approval, which required the property owner to file a deed with restrictive covenants permitting only one of two units in this two family home to be rented to a tenant, was illegal and unenforceable. The court found it was contrary to public policy to impose as a condition of zoning board approval a restriction that treated a tenant different from an owner-occupant of property. The trial court reasoned the condition was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because it was based upon the status of the occupant of the property, rather than the use of the property. The court further found the condition reflected an illegal bias based upon a perceived notion that tenant occupied use was a less desirable use of property than occupancy by an owner.

This case presents the court with an issue of first impression in New Jersey. Namely, whether, after a defendant has been detained pretrial, a later defense attack on the state’s detention hearing proffer can be sufficient to reopen the detention hearing. On June 6, 2017, the trial court ordered defendant detained pending trial. The thrust of defendant’s motion to reopen the detention hearing attacks the state’s detention hearing proffer related to probable cause. The court ultimately held that a defendant who has been detained pretrial cannot attack the initial detention decision by seeking to undermine the state’s probable cause proffer. Unless some new information would create serious doubt about the state’s initial proffer, and only where a grand jury has not yet handed up an indictment, would the court consider disturbing an initial finding of probable cause.

The State sought to introduce into evidence the statements made by the mother of the victim to a physician providing treatment to her child. The court held that N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4) permits the admission into evidence not only of statements made by a patient to a physician for purposes of obtaining medical treatment, but also statements made by others to a physician for the purpose of providing medical treatment where sufficient indicia of reliability exists.

The main issue before the court is whether a non-monetary class-action settlement is "fair and reasonable" to the class pursuant to Rule 4:32-2. The parties agreed to settle the matter for "Supplemental Disclosures" and attorneys' fees. Stockholders received no financial compensation. In the analysis, the court formally adopts the nine Girsh factors to determine whether to approve the non-monetary settlement. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975).

Rutgers University police arrested the defendant in New Brunswick and charged him with drunk driving. Rutgers and New Brunswick had an agreement that allowed Rutgers to patrol only certain streets within New Brunswick. The defendant was arrested on a street that fell outside that agreement raising a jurisdictional question. The jurisdictional question on appeal from municipal court turned upon interpreting two conflicting statutes. The first gives "any law enforcement officer" authority to arrest those committing Title 39 infractions, and more specifically, jurisdiction to arrest those who drive while intoxicated. See N.J.S.A. 39:5-25. The second statute limits university police jurisdiction to the boundaries of their campuses, unless the towns within which the universities are located agree to permit additional jurisdiction. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6-4.7. The court held that Rutgers University police had jurisdiction to make the stop and arrest the defendant, as well as charge him with driving while intoxicated. It reached this decision, in part, based upon the Legislature’s decision to amend N.J.S.A. 39:5-25 to allow “any law enforcement officer” to arrest drunk drivers, while knowing that case law had interpreted the statute to give statewide jurisdiction to municipal officers to make these arrests.

The issue before the Law Division, was whether an insurance carrier is barred from maintaining a subrogation claim on behalf of a unit owner against a condominium association if the association’s by-laws compel a waiver of such claims. The facts are straightforward. A unit owner at a condominium association obtained homeowner’s insurance. The unit owner’s unit sustained damages as the result of a fire. The carrier paid $222,172.84 to the unit owner. Thereafter, the carrier, as the unit owner’s subrogee, filed suit against various entities, including the condominium association, alleging that the condominium association failed to properly maintain the premises, which contributed to the fire. The carrier sought to recover the insurance monies it paid to the unit owner.

The association’s by-laws prohibited such subrogation claims. Based on the reasoning adopted by the Appellate Division in Skulskie v. Ceponis, 404 N.J. Super. 501, 514 (App. Div. 2009), which upheld a waiver scheme in a condominium community, the Law Division held that the carrier’s claim was barred and granted the association’s motion for summary judgment. The Law Division held that a contrary result would penalize all of the unit owners regardless of fault and pit unit owner against unit owner, and unit owners against the association--a result contrary to the concept of a condominium.

Three issues were presented to the court as part of, or as a result of, the State’s speedy trial motion, each requiring application or interpretation of the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to 2A:162-26: first, whether the case should be designated complex pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(g) and Rule 3:25-4(i)(7); second, whether any portion of time since indictment should be deemed excludable from speedy trial calculation due to extraordinary circumstances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(f) and Rule 3:25-4(i)(6); and third and finally, whether excludable time attributable to one defendant should be attributable to all defendants who are joined for trial, even over their objection or opposition. The court found that the case should be designated complex and excluded 60 days from speedy trial computation. The court excluded an additional 8 days from speedy trial computation due to extraordinary circumstances. Finally, the court held that all post-indictment periods of exclusion are attributable to each defendant since defendants Johnson and Ukawabutu are joined for trial.

The issue in this opinion is whether defense counsel can question plaintiff about whether or not the airbags deployed in his vehicle at the time of the accident in the context of an automobile negligence case. The questioning by defense counsel is a common line of inquiry in automobile negligence cases and is often the subject of in limine motions and/or objections at the time of trial. The court ultimately determined the question was improper. The court determined that whether or not the airbags deployed is not relevant in the absence of expert testimony because it does not, without more information, tend to prove or disprove an issue in the case. In the absence of expert testimony, the jury would not know the amount of force needed to trigger the specific airbag contained in the subject vehicle. Moreover, without an expert providing an explanation as to how an airbag system functions, a jury would not know the location of the airbag sensors on the subject vehicle. Accordingly, a jury would not be able to understand why an airbag system did, or did not activate, in a particular accident.

The issue in the opinion is whether it is appropriate in an automobile negligence case to utilize a modified version of Model Jury Charge (Civil) §5.34, “Photographic Accidents in Motor Vehicle Accidents,” when there is testimony regarding the damage to both of the motor vehicles involved in the subject accident, but no photographs were entered into evidence. In most automobile negligence cases, either the plaintiff or defendant produces photographs of the vehicles from the accident and requests the jury instruction set forth in Model Jury Charge (Civil) §5.34, “Photographic Accidents in Motor Vehicle Accidents.” This charge is commonly referred to as a Brenman charge because it is derived from our Supreme Court’s decision in Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18 (2006). The court ultimately permitted the charge to be given having determined the importance of the charge is not so much based on the existence of photographs in a particular case, but rather how a jury should evaluate motor vehicle damage in relation to the alleged injuries. In short, that evidence of vehicle damage is in the form of testimony rather than photographs should not govern whether the charge is given.

The court granted defendant’s objection to a levy on a bank account as to the part of the funds deposited from child support. Child support is exempt from levy because those funds belong to the child rather than the judgment-debtor parent. The court granted plaintiff’s motion to turn over funds as to the non-exempt funds.

The issue in the opinion is whether an individual who expects to named as a defendant in a law suit cognizable in the State of New Jersey may file a petition pursuant to Rule 4:11-1 for pre-suit discovery. The court ultimately determined the rule allows both defendants and plaintiffs to obtain pre-suit discovery in limited circumstances. The opinion further addresses a recurring issue with respect to the propriety of utilizing Rule 4:11-1 to obtain discovery to investigate facts relevant to a potential claim prior to a law suit being filed. In the court’s view, this rule is often improperly utilized and misunderstood. The court attempts to provide some insight as to the proper circumstances under which a party may properly file a petition as contemplated by the rule. Rule 4:11-1 is routinely misunderstood because the plain language of the rule does not alert attorneys that the rule may only be utilized in those limited circumstances when there exists a genuine risk that testimony could be lost or evidence destroyed before the suit can be filed.