Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
May 18, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MARIANNE MCINTYRE-CAULFIELD (17-09-0823, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1277-17T1)
The legal question – when enrollment into the PTI program is contingent on a defendant pleading guilty to a second-degree charge – is whether the civil consequences of wreaking devastating personal financial havoc on a defendant constitutes good cause under Rule 3:9-2. This court held that such a financial circumstance establishes good cause permitting a civil reservation. The court emphasized that the civil reservation eliminated the obstacle to avoiding an unnecessary criminal trial against defendant, who feared that the civil claimants would later use her plea of guilty as a devastating admission of civil liability. |
Appellate |
May 16, 2018 |
HARRY SCHEELER VS. ATLANTIC COUNTY MUNICIPAL JOINT INSURANCE FUND, ET AL. LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW VS. ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. BARRY SCHEELER VS. CITY OF CAPE MAY, ET AL. (L-0990-15, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWID
(A-2092-15T2/A-2704-15T2/A-2716-15T2)
The right to request and obtain government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) is not limited to citizens of New Jersey. According, the out-of-state plaintiffs had standing to pursue their OPRA claims against the public entity defendants in these three cases. |
Appellate |
May 11, 2018 |
IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS #17dfPP00144, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT (DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DIVISION OF PURCHASE AND PROPERTY)
(A-4751-16T1)
The panel considers incumbent vendor Express Scripts, Inc.'s appeal of the Acting Director of the Division of Purchase and Property's final agency decision sustaining the Division's award of a three-year contract for Pharmacy Benefit Management to OptumRx, Inc. Although anticipated changes in Plan Design affecting the Contract make the question more difficult than it might otherwise appear, we conclude Optum's statement "reserv[ing] the right to modify Financial Contracted Terms based on changes by the State in formulary or any carve out of services set forth in the Agreement, including but not limited to Specialty Pharmacy services," constitutes a substantial deviation from a material, non-waivable price term in the Solicitation and thus reverse the decision of the Acting Director and order the Contract rebid as expeditiously as possible. Whether that can occur in sufficient time to allow the Vendor to prepare for open enrollment next October is a matter we leave to the Acting Director. |
Appellate |
May 10, 2018 |
JOHN S. WISNIEWSKI, ETC. VS. PHIL MURPHY, ET AL. IN THE MATTER OF THE NJEDA/STATE LEASE REVENUE BONDS 2017 SERIES AND STATE LEASE REVENUE REFUNDING BONDS 2017 SERIES (STATE HOUSE PROJECT) AND IN THE MATTER OF STATE CAPITOL JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMISSION MOT
(A-4689-16T2/A-4693-16T2/A-4698-16T2)
These consolidated appeals involve a challenge to decisions by two state agencies to finance a comprehensive renovation of the State Capitol complex. The agencies resolved to issue $300 million in bonds and to repay the bonds with rental payments pursuant to a lease of the State Capitol complex. Plaintiff John S. Wisniewski, then a state legislator, filed a complaint challenging the agencies' actions on the basis that they violated the Debt Limitation Clause (DLC) of the New Jersey Constitution. At the time the complaint was filed, the bonds had already been sold and distributed into the marketplace. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the complaint as moot. In No. A-4689-16, plaintiff appeals the trial court's determination that his complaint is moot. In Nos. A-4693-16 and A-4698-16, he appeals the final agency decisions. The panel finds the appeals are technically moot. Notwithstanding, the panel addresses the merits because the issue raised is a matter of significant public importance that is capable of repetition while evading review. The panel concludes the issuance of the bonds to finance the renovations of the State Capitol complex did not violate the DLC. The panel further concludes the State Capitol Joint Management Commission acted within its delegated authority in approving the renovations and entering into the lease/leaseback agreement, and the New Jersey Economic Development Authority possessed the requisite authority to issue the bonds to fund the renovations. |
Appellate |
May 9, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ROBERT J. KOSCH, JR. (13-05-0188, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2982-16T3)
In a prior appeal, State v. Kosch, 444 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 369 (2016), the court vacated three of defendants' nine theft convictions and remanded for a new trial on those three theft-of-immovable-property counts; the court also held that "once those three counts are finally adjudicated, defendant should be resentenced on all " in light of potential merger issues, id. at 392-93. Without disposing of the three counts, which still remain unadjudicated, the judge reshaped the prior sentence and imposed the same aggregate prison term as before. Defendant appealed and the court reversed. Although the court recognized the new judgment was not a final order, the court granted leave to appeal out of time and reversed because the trial judge failed to comply with the "peremptory duty to obey" our mandate "precisely as it [was] written"; that mandate unambiguously precluded resentencing without an adjudication of the theft-of-immovable-property counts. |
Appellate |
May 8, 2018 |
In the Matter of State and School Employees’ Health Benefits Commissions’ Implementation of In the Matter of Philip Yucht
(A-21-17 ; 079966)
Because significant questions exist concerning the extent of the notice actually provided, either by the Commissions or through their agents to active employees, former employees, and retirees, a hearing is necessary. The hearing is to be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in this opinion and, at the hearing, the adequacy of the content of the notice can be raised. |
Supreme |
May 8, 2018 |
RAUL AUGUSTIN JIMENEZ, ET AL. VS. RAUL ANIBAL JIMENEZ (L-0025-12, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2495-16T1)
This appeal poses the legal question of whether N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4, a statute that became effective in 1988, precludes a spouse's unsecured creditor from obtaining the forced partition of real property the spouse and his non-debtor spouse own together as tenants by the entirety. The panel affirms the trial court's ruling that the statute prohibits such non-consensual partition. The statute supersedes and nullifies earlier case law, such as Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 262 (1976), which had allowed such a creditor's remedy in certain equitable circumstances. |
Appellate |
May 7, 2018 |
STUART GOLDMAN VS. CRITTER CONTROL OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. STUART GOLDMAN VS. MADISON CARLSTROM, ET AL. (L-1852-16 AND L-1173-16, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-1392-16T2/A-3906-16T2)
In these appeals, consolidated for our opinion, plaintiff sued defendants under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (PCAA), N.J.S.A. 4:22-11.1 to -60, to recover civil penalties for acts that he contended constituted animal cruelty under its provisions. Plaintiff lacked standing to sue in his individual capacity and the cases were dismissed. He contends the complaints were filed as qui tam actions under N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 which provided, in relevant part, that a person who violates the PCAA shall pay a civil penalty according to a schedule in the statute "to be sued for and recovered, with costs, in a civil action by any person in the name of the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals". We decline to interpret N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 as authorizing private citizens, who otherwise would not have standing, to sue for civil penalties under the PCAA in qui tam actions against other parties, who they alleged may have committed acts of animal cruelty. The language relied on by plaintiff does not signal authority for qui tam litigation in light of the PCAA's other provisions nor was it supported by the legislative history or case law. We affirm the dismissal of these cases for lack of standing |
Appellate |
May 7, 2018 |
Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. Asher Adelman
(A-39-16 ; 078597)
The single publication rule applies to an internet article. However, if a material and substantive change is made to the article’s defamatory content, then the modified article will constitute a republication, restarting the statute of limitations. In this case, there are genuine issues of disputed fact concerning whether Adelman made a material and substantive change to the original article, and the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the defamation action based on the single publication rule. However, the modified article is entitled to the protection of the fair report privilege. The article is a full, fair, and accurate recitation of a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed the defamation action, and on that basis the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment |
Supreme |
May 7, 2018 |
IN RE ADOPTION OF N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 AND 17:1-7.10 (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DIVISION OF PENSION AND BENEFITS)
(A-2171-16T3)
The New Jersey Education Association challenged regulations pertaining to the disability retirement process for various State retirement systems. In upholding most of the regulations – except those requiring applicants to pay for subsequent independent medical examinations and related addenda – this court maintained the requirement that eligibility for disability retirement benefits requires members to show that they cannot work due to a disability. |
Appellate |
May 3, 2018 |
DCPP VS. T.D., R.C. AND R.G., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.G., B.C. AND A.G. (FG-20-0040-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-4918-15T1/A-4923-15T1)
The New Jersey Division Of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), and the Law Guardian on behalf of the two young children, appeal from the Family Part's order denying termination of parental rights following an extended eighteen-month trial at which twelve witnesses testified and hundreds of exhibits were admitted into evidence. This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of T.D., a mother suffering from multiple sclerosis and R.C., the father of her two youngest children, born in 2012 and 2014, and removed from the care of their parents shortly after birth. The trial judge found, in particular, that the Division did not provide meaningful services to the mother, who uses a wheelchair. Considering the limited standard of review of a decision not to terminate parental rights, we affirm. |
Appellate |
May 3, 2018 |
Jaclyn Thompson v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund
(A-5-17 ; 079359)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Leone’s majority opinion |
Supreme |
May 2, 2018 |
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Rochelle Hendricks
(A-22-16 ; 077885)
Judicial review is premature because factual disputes require resolution before the Secretary can make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter is remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants |
Supreme |
May 1, 2018 |
State v. Jonathan Mercedes
(A-6-17 ; 079995)
The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status. |
Supreme |
May 1, 2018 |
ESTATE OF RONALD DOERFLER, ET AL. VS. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY STEPHANIE E. DOERFLER VS. CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY (L-2960-14 AND L-0483-14, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-3352-15T2/A-3353-15T2)
This court consolidates these two insurance coverage cases for purposes of this opinion. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The motion judge reserved decision at the conclusion of oral argument and entered orders that same day that granted the insurers' motions for summary judgment and denied the insureds' cross-motions. The judge did not issue a written opinion or oral decision, nor make factual findings or conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). In a Final Judgment entered a month later, the judge dismissed the insureds' complaints with prejudice "for the reasons set forth in [the insurers'] motion papers." Although the standard of review from the grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo, the function of an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa. The requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a) are unambiguous and cannot be carried out by the motion judge by a nebulous allusion to "the reasons set forth in defendant[s]' motion papers." Reversed and remanded. |
Appellate |
May 1, 2018 |
State v. Hassan Travis
(A-7-17 ; 080020)
The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status. |
Supreme |
April 30, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ALLAQUAN JACKSON (00-03-0886, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1884-16T2)
Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in 2001, filed his first post-conviction relief petition in 2007, and filed his second petition in 2015. The Appellate Division ruled defendant's second petition was untimely under Rule 3:22-12's time limits. Those limits cannot be relaxed by invoking Rule 1:1-2. In 2009, the Supreme Court amended Rule 1:3-4(c) to prohibit enlargement of the time limits in Rule 3:22-12, and added Rule 3:22-12(c) prohibiting relaxation except as provided by Rule 3:22-12 itself. Moreover, in 2010, the Supreme Court amended Rule 3:22-4(b) and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) to require second petitions to be filed within one year of specified events. Because that time limit applies "notwithstanding any other provision of this rule," it cannot be relaxed by showing excusable neglect and a fundamental injustice, as permitted for first petitions under the 2010 amendment. These amendments to the procedural rules of court apply to previously-convicted defendant, who had no vested right to file a petition fourteen years out of time. |
Appellate |
April 30, 2018 |
State v. Allen Alexander a/k/a Karon Keenan
(A-49-16 ; 078515)
Under the circumstances of this case, aggravated assault is, at most, a related offense of the State’s robbery charge. The trial court had no obligation to charge the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the State’s robbery charge. |
Supreme |
April 27, 2018 |
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, ETC. VS. STEVEN LONEGAN (L-2169-11, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1767-16T3)
In this case, we affirm the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's qui tam complaint which alleged defendant Steven Lonegan violated the New Jersey False Claims Act (FCA), N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-1 to -18, by submitting a false statement in a request for public campaign funds. Although the trial court dismissed on other grounds, we affirm the grant of summary judgment because we hold plaintiff lacks standing to bring the FCA complaint. We conclude the record clearly shows plaintiff is not the original source of the information supporting the allegations in his complaint. |
Appellate |
April 27, 2018 |
FELICIA PUGLIESE VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY EDGARD CHAVEZ VS. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX COUNTY (COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION)(CONSOLIDATED)
(A-3689-15T1/A-5527-15T1)
In Pugliese v. State-Operated School District of City of Newark, 440 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015), the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration anew an arbitrator's award sustaining tenure charges against appellants. In this appeal, the court had to construe N.J.S.A. 18A:6-14 and determine what impact its decision to remand had on the suspended educators' entitlement to back pay while the remand was pending. The statute provides for an educator's suspension without pay for 120 days or until the issuance of a final determination of the disputed tenure charges, whichever is sooner. If the matter is not resolved within 120 days, compensation must resume until a determination is reached. In this case, the court concluded that the entitlement to compensation after 120 days continues under the statute despite the fact there was an initial award terminating employment that was vacated and remanded, without a dismissal of the tenure charges. |
Appellate |