Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
June 17, 2019 |
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ET AL. VS. L.O. (DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0007-15T2)
In this appeal, the court considered whether indigent parents and guardians – once notified that an investigation has substantiated them for child abuse or neglect – are entitled to the appointment of counsel when exercising their right to an administrative hearing to challenge that determination. The court held that, because the potential consequences of such administrative proceedings – including permanent listing in the Child Abuse Registry – are of significant magnitude, counsel must be made available for indigent parents and guardians both at the administrative level and in any appeal of right to this court, just as that right exists in Title Nine actions commenced in Superior Court. The court also determined that until such time as the Legislature addresses this constitutional right, the Madden list may be utilized for the appointment of counsel. |
Appellate |
June 17, 2019 |
In the Matter of Corey Corbo, Union City Police Department
(A-72-17 ; 081005)
The Court modifies the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands this matter to the OAL for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records are admissible as business records, and the opportunity to present any other theories of admissibility. |
Supreme |
June 13, 2019 |
RACETRACK SUPERMARKET, LLC. V. THE MAYOR AND TOWNSHIP COUNCIL OF CHERRY HILL
(L-003400-16)
Plaintiffs sought recusal of assigned trial judge based upon alleged violation of "objectively reasonable" standard of impropriety set forth in DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008) based on the alleged personal animus of the judge against plaintiffs’ counsel. Before becoming a member of the judiciary, the judge had been a candidate for local office in his town approximately 14 years prior. Plaintiffs’ counsel was a member of the opposite party and also resided in the same town and was politically active. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleged that anonymous and other sources had indicated the judge held him responsible for campaign materials which called into question the judge’s character and fitness for office during the campaign in 2004. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleged the judge, when he was county chairman, took action to thwart his renomination to a state commission in 2013 four years before joining the judiciary, which was alleged to evidence the judge’s personal animus. Additionally, the judge had also served as county chairman of his political party for the 6 years prior to joining the judiciary. During this time, the son of the principal member of plaintiff LLC was an elected official in the judge’s home town and a member of the judge’s opposite party during which time the judge, as county chairman, had supported the members of his own party over the principal member’s son. The court held that, under the DeNike standard, a reasonable, fully-informed person would not have doubts about the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances in this matter. The court considered the lack of a prospective financial benefit to the judge, the remoteness in time of the alleged statements by the judge to the present matter, the lack of evidence of a continuous personal animus, the professional dealings between Plaintiff’s counsel and the judge when he was a practicing attorney, and the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm, of which Plaintiffs’ counsel was a named partner, had previously appeared before the judge without objection or incident, all weighed against recusal under the standard. The court also found political motive is not objective evidence of personal animus. The motion to recuse was denied. |
Trial |
June 12, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KENNETH D. THOMAS (17-06-0548, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4540-17T4)
The State filed an appeal from a judgment of conviction imposing a probationary sentence on defendant for third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2), involving domestic violence, although aggravating factor fifteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(15), was found by the court and thus a presumption of incarceration applied, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Because the State has no authority to appeal from a sentence for a third-degree crime that is statutorily permitted, the court dismissed the appeal. |
Appellate |
June 11, 2019 |
MARY RICHTER VS. OAKLAND BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0742-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0102-17T2)
Plaintiff Mary Richter, a middle school teacher who suffers from diabetes, alleges she fainted while teaching due to low blood sugar levels when she was unable to eat lunch at an earlier class period and suffered significant and permanent injuries. She contends the accident would not have occurred had defendants Oakland Board of Education (the Board) and Gregg Desiderio granted her accommodation request to eat lunch earlier. The motion judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint, denied Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment, and denied reconsideration of the dismissal. The judge held that as a matter of law, Richter failed to prove a prima facie case of failure to accommodate her disability because she did not establish an adverse employment action. Thus, her bodily injury claim, which is the subject of the Board's cross-appeal, was denied as moot. Under the circumstances of this case, the court reverses the motion judge's grant of summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint. Based on our consideration of Supreme Court decisions in Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2008) and Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482 (2017), the court concludes that Richter need not demonstrate an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of a failure to accommodate claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Because there were genuine issues of material facts concerning whether Richter was provided an accommodation and whether the accommodation was adequate, which must be determined at a trial, the court affirms the denial of Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment. As to the Board's cross-appeal, the court concludes the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, does not bar Richter's bodily injury claim, but should she prevail at trial, the Board should receive a credit based on the amount of medical bills and lost wages it paid in her workers' compensation claim in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.. |
Appellate |
June 10, 2019 |
DCPP VS. J.B. AND C.R., IN THE MATTER OF CA.R. AND C.R., JR. (FN-13-0079-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-3019-18T3)
In this case, two children under the age of five have been in the continuous care, custody, and supervision of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency due to the abuse and neglect of their parents. The trial court granted the Division's application to vaccinate the children with age-appropriate immunizations over the religious-based objections of the parents. The court granted the mother leave to appeal. The children are not students. Therefore, the religious-based exemption to immunization of students afforded by N.J.S.A. 26:1A-9.1 and N.J.A.C. 8:57-4.4(a) does not apply. Rather, the matter is governed by the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6, and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.86(b), which collectively require that children in placement receive adequate and appropriate medical care to maintain and advance their mental and physical well-being, and N.J.A.C. 3A:51-7.1(a)(2), which specifically requires the administration of all age-appropriate immunizations. Parental rights are not absolute and must yield to the safety and well-being of the children. While parents do not lose all of their parental rights when their children are placed in the custody of the Division, they are situated differently than parents who retain legal and physical custody. Pursuant to the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children, the Division has a duty to provide appropriate medical care and treatment to children in its custody. This duty encompasses the authority to administer age-appropriate immunizations over the religious objections of the parents. The court perceives no meaningful distinction between the power to order prophylactic medical care in the form of vaccinations to prevent a child from contracting infectious diseases and medical treatment for diseases already contracted. |
Appellate |
June 10, 2019 |
T.L. v. Jack Goldberg, M.D.
(A-11-18 ; 081135)
The circumstances at issue in McKenney, which heavily depended on the prejudice caused to the party disadvantaged by the surprise change in trial testimony, are distinguishable from the change in testimony here. Here there was no demonstration that the changed testimony caused prejudice to T.L., and the plain error standard does not compel reversal, especially because counsel’s failure to object was likely strategic. Under the circumstances, T.L. is not entitled to a new trial. |
Supreme |
June 6, 2019 |
CAROLINE PALADINO, ET AL. VS. AULETTO ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC. (L-2574-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0232-18T1)
In this appeal, the court clarifies the standard for evaluating a claim of the work-product privilege. Consistent with the language of Rule 4:10-2(c), the court holds that there is no per se or presumptive rule that materials prepared or collected before litigation are not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, as set forth in Rule 4:10-2(c), there is a multi-part, fact-specific test. The first inquiry is whether the materials were prepared or collected in anticipation of litigation or trial by another party or that party's representative. If so, to obtain the materials, a party must satisfy a two-part standard. The party seeking the materials must (1) show a substantial need for the discovery, and (2) demonstrate that he or she is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials |
Appellate |
June 6, 2019 |
ESTATE OF BRANDON TYLER NARLESKI, ET AL. VS. NICHOLAS GOMES, ET AL. (L-7085-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5144-17T4)
In this wrongful death case, the defendant liquor store sold vodka and beer to the nineteen-year-old decedent without checking his identification. Decedent and a group of his friends – all of whom were likewise young adults under the legal drinking age of twenty-one – then converged at the home of one of the youths. They drank the purchased alcohol in the young host's bedroom. Decedent then left the house as a passenger in the car of one of the inebriated youths. He died when the driver lost control of the car and it flipped over. The decedent's estate sued the car driver and its owners for negligence and the liquor store under the Dram Shop Act. The liquor store pled a third-party complaint against the young man who had hosted the gathering and his parents. The trial court granted them summary judgment, finding they had not violated any established legal duty. Under the circumstances presented, the parents had no statutory or common law duty to prevent their adult son from allowing his adult underage friends to drink alcohol in their home without their proven knowledge or consent. Nor did the son who hosted the gathering have a duty of care under current law. |
Appellate |
June 5, 2019 |
STEVEN I. GROSS, ET AL. VS. KEVIN A. IANNUZZI, ET AL. (L-3360-14 AND L-6543-14, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0018-16T2)
Addressing 2017 amendments to N.J.S.A. 58:16A-103 (the Act), the court held that the Act allowed defendant to elevate his Sandy-damaged oceanfront townhome for flood safety, despite prohibitions contained in a Declaration of Covenants governing the townhome development. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that, even if defendant was allowed to raise the elevation of the townhome's first floor, he must maintain the existing height of the roofline by reducing the living space within the townhome. That cramped interpretation, aimed at preserving plaintiffs' ocean view, would defeat the legislative purpose to encourage flood-safe construction after Superstorm Sandy. |
Appellate |
June 5, 2019 |
Janell Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp.; Sasha Robinson and Tijuana Johnson v. Mall Chevrolet
(A-3/4-18 ; 081258)
The trial courts’ resolution of these matters was correct and consistent with clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts on how challenges such as plaintiffs’ should proceed. Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged. Here, plaintiffs attack the sales contracts in their entirety, not the language or clarity of the agreements to arbitrate or the broad delegation clauses contained in those signed arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court’s precedent compels only one conclusion: an arbitrator must resolve plaintiffs’ claims about the validity of their sales contracts as well as any arbitrability claims that plaintiffs may choose to raise. |
Supreme |
June 5, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MORGAN G. MESZ (11-07-0761, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4534-15T3)
A jury convicted defendant of, among other offenses, two counts of attempted murder. Defendant raised pathological intoxication, N.J.S.A 2C:2-8(e)(3), as a defense, attributable to his use of then legally available synthetic marijuana. The prosecutor, while examining the State's psychopharmacology forensic expert, played portions of defendant's four-hour recorded interview. In summation, the prosecutor played portions of defendant's interview again, arguing that defendant's statements directly undercut the defense. The trial judge did not instruct jurors to limit their use of defendant's statements to assessing the merits of the expert's opinion. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, on the basis that the uncounseled statements were used as direct evidence in the absence of any limiting instruction, thereby violating long-standing precedent. A jury must be told that they may not use as direct evidence information provided by a defendant during a mental status interview with a State's expert. |
Appellate |
June 4, 2019 |
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Wells Fargo Bank NA
(A-49-17 ; 080669)
The Court answers both parts of the first certified question in the affirmative: a life insurance policy procured with the intent to benefit persons without an insurable interest in the life of the insured does violate the public policy of New Jersey, and such a policy is void at the outset. In response to the second question, a party may be entitled to a refund of premium payments it made on the policy, depending on the circumstances. |
Supreme |
June 4, 2019 |
GLORIA COLON, ET AL.VS. STRATEGIC DELIVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, ET AL. (L-3994-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2378-17T4)
The court holds that the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, applies to require arbitration of plaintiffs' wage, hour and payment claims if the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 does not apply. Plaintiffs are truck drivers under contract with defendant Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC (SDS) to deliver products to SDS's customers. The contract provides that disputes are to be arbitrated under the FAA. Plaintiffs contend they are not required to arbitrate their claims because they are engaged in interstate commerce, making them exempt from the FAA under Section one. The complaint is reinstated and remanded for the trial court to determine if plaintiffs are exempt under section one of the FAA. If the FAA does not apply, the court holds that the FAA does not preempt arbitration under the NJAA. The court also holds that plaintiffs waived a jury trial and the ability to proceed as a class on their wage, hour and payment claims. |
Appellate |
June 3, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DANIEL MARKS.
(INDICTMENT NO.17-03-00575)
Defendant was charged with third degree theft of services for the alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8(a). The indictment resulted from defendant’s use of EZ Pass only lanes on 220 occasions without possessing an EZ Pass transponder. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for violation of the statute. The court first found that traveling through the EZ Pass only lane was a representation that the vehicle operator possessed a valid EZ Pass. The court further held that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b), the theft grading statute, permitted the aggregation of 220 bridge crossings for purposes of establishing that the crime fell within the third degree range. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the existence of civil penalties precluded criminal responsibility for the same conduct. |
Trial |
June 3, 2019 |
ABC BAIL BONDS, INC. VS. GLENN A. GRANT (C-000075-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3961-17T2)
ABC Bail Bonds appealed from Judge Paul Innes's decision that Administrative Directive #22-17, "Bail and Bail Forfeitures -- Revisions to Procedures and Forms" (Aug. 7, 2017), was not unconstitutional, could be applied prospectively, and did not effectuate an unlawful material change in the terms of existing surety bond contracts. The panel affirmed, finding the Directive was a lawful exercise of the Supreme Court's authority to administer the criminal justice system, should be applied retroactively, and did not result in a material change to existing contracts, despite the one-year limitation to remission after a defendant fails to appear. In accord with N.J.S.A. 2A:162-8, the Directive retains a trial judge's discretion to decide remission. A judge may, where "exceptional circumstances" can be demonstrated, allow remission beyond a year from the failure to appear. |
Appellate |
June 3, 2019 |
160 Chubb Props., LLC v. Twp. of Lyndhurst
(2442-2014,6305-2015)
Tax Court: 160 Chubb Props., LLC v. Twp. of Lyndhurst Docket Nos.002442-2014; 006305-2015; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided May31, 2019. For plaintiff – Joseph G. Ragno and Robert J. Guanci(Waters, McPherson, McNeill, P.C., attorneys); for defendant –Kenneth A. Porro (Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, P.C.,attorneys). Following the court’s decision in 160 Chubb Props., LLC v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 30 N.J. Tax 613 (Tax 2018), defendant, Township of Lyndhurst, moved for reconsideration, primarily based on the same arguments presented in its opposition to plaintiff’s original motion for relief under the Freeze Act, namely, that increased tenant occupancy; the cost of work to be performed under construction permits; and the sales price of the property, demonstrate prima facie that a substantial and meaningful change in value occurred between the base year 2015 and freeze year 2017, warranting a plenary hearing. Defendant’s only new arguments alleged that plaintiff, 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, had no legal standing to file the Freeze Act motion, and by granting Freeze Act relief for the 2017 tax year, the subsequent owner of the property received a “windfall.” The court found that a motion for reconsideration is not meant to re-litigate issues already decided or otherwise award a proverbial ‘second bite at the apple’ to a dissatisfied litigant. The court also found that defendant ignored the reality that it is the new owner, and not plaintiff, asserting entitlement to Freeze Act relief. Because the 2015 base year judgment caption identifies plaintiff as 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, the new owner was required under R. 8:7(d) to adopt this caption for purposes of making the Freeze Act application. The court additionally found that the new owner not only has standing to seek relief under the Freeze Act, but is entitled to invoke its protections. The court determined that defendant’s “windfall” argument does not represent the legislative intent of the Freeze Act, since the Freeze Act is a legislatively conferred right that attaches to ownership. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration. |
Tax |
June 3, 2019 |
State v. Susan Hyland
(A-29-18 ; 079028)
The State may appeal a Drug Court sentence only when the sentencing judge makes a plainly mistaken, non-discretionary, non-factual finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a). Because application of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9) requires fact-finding and an exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion, a sentence based on application of that factor is not appealable as an illegal sentence. |
Supreme |
May 31, 2019 |
GOURMET DINING, LLC VS. UNION TOWNSHIP, ET AL. (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY)
(A-4799-17T3)
The premises on the campus of Kean University where Gourmet Dining, LLC, manages and operates a restaurant and catering facility are exempt from local property taxes because, while Gourmet Dining is a private, for-profit entity, the evidence presented to the trial court establishes that the premises are being used for a public purpose. That evidence shows, among other things, that: Gourmet Dining uses the premises pursuant to a management agreement, not a lease; students and other members of the University community regularly dine at the restaurant; the University views the restaurant as an important recruiting tool for students and faculty members; the restaurant generates management fees which are used for University scholarships; and a substantial percentage of the restaurant's employees are University students. |
Appellate |
May 30, 2019 |
State v. Davon M. Johnson
(A-58-17 ; 080394)
The 2009 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencing structure reflect a more flexible sentencing policy that renders Caliguiri’s reasoning no longer viable. The presumption against PTI for second-degree offenders cannot be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) offenders. And the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcotics was not applicable here because defendant was charged with possession with intent to “distribute” and there is no allegation or evidence that he sold the narcotics. The decision to deny defendant’s application must be reevaluated. |
Supreme |