Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
May 6, 2024 |
Viktoriya Usachenok v. State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury
(A-40-22 ; 086861)
The State Constitution guarantees an affirmative right to speak freely. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 6. The guarantee extends to victims of harassment and discrimination who have a right to speak out about what happened to them. Although N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(j) seeks to advance legitimate interests -- “to protect the integrity of the investigation, minimize the risk of retaliation . . . , and protect the important privacy interests of all concerned” -- it reaches too far in trying to achieve those aims and chills constitutionally protected speech. The rule is overbroad under the State Constitution, and the Court strikes the relevant part of the regulation. 1. New Jersey’s Constitution provides broader protection for free expression than the Federal Constitution and practically all others in the nation. (pp. 12-13) 2. The overbreadth doctrine considers the extent of a law’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression. A law is facially invalid on overbreadth grounds if the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The United States Supreme Court’s application of the overbreadth doctrine in United States v. Stevens illustrates the principle. The Court found that the statute challenged in that case created an offense “of alarming breadth” because, although it purported to criminalize animal cruelty, the statute did not actually require “that the depicted conduct be cruel,” such that hunting periodicals could run afoul of the law. 559 U.S. 460, 474-76 (2010). The Court explained that it “would not uphold an unconstitutional statute based on the Government’s representation that it would use the statute “to reach only ‘extreme’ cruelty,” and that it could not rewrite the statute “to conform it to constitutional requirements.” Id. at 480-81. Because “the presumptively impermissible applications of [the law] far outnumber[ed] any permissible ones,” the Court held that the law was “substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment.” Id. at 481-82. (pp. 14-17) 3. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach, the “first step” in this appeal is to examine the text of the regulation to construe its scope. See id. at 474. The critical language in N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(j) has few, if any, limits. It directs state actors to ask victims and witnesses not to speak with anyone about any aspect of any investigation into harassment or discrimination. That request encompasses a great deal of protected speech, and it has no time limit. One exception appears in the text of the rule -- victims and witnesses can disclose information if “there is a legitimate business reason to” do so -- but the regulation does not offer guidance about what that means. And the regulation does not require that victims be told they are free to decline to follow the request, that they can consult with an attorney about it, or that there will be no repercussions if they exercise their protected right to free speech. Although framed as a request, there is an inherent power imbalance between the investigator who makes the request and the witness who hears it, with the result that many employees will undoubtedly give up their right to speak freely. (pp. 17-20) 4. Counsel for the Attorney General proposed revisions that would help address the regulation’s broad scope, but the Court cannot expand and rewrite the final sentence to render it constitutional. Id. at 481. The regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court acknowledges the State’s good-faith representations that the regulation can be narrowed, but it cannot rely on those representations to uphold the rule. See id. at 480. The Court strikes the last sentence of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1(j) on overbreadth grounds based on the broad protections in the State Constitution. The Court explains why its opinion in R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 185 N.J. 208 (2005), does not alter its analysis here. (pp. 20-22) 5. In striking part of the regulation, the Court does not question the principles the regulation tries to foster. The concerns addressed by confidentiality are entirely legitimate and are also important considerations in criminal and internal affairs investigations. The Court stresses that nothing in its opinion should be construed to limit requests for confidentiality by investigators in those settings. (pp. 22- 23) |
Supreme |
May 1, 2024 |
MARY A. BOTTEON, ET AL. VS. BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK, ET AL. (L-2068-22, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (REDACTED)
(A-1227-22)
This appeal concerns two ordinances of the Borough of Highland Park that amended its municipal code to allow cannabis retailers, consumption lounges, and delivery services to operate in the Borough, subject to operating, licensing, and tax regulations. Although the ordinances were enacted under express authority delegated by the Legislature through New Jersey's recreational marijuana statute, the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (known as CREAMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, several concerned residents of the Borough challenged the ordinances in the Law Division as preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801. They also claimed the ordinances are inconsistent with the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163, and other state and federal laws. The Law Division judge dismissed the complaint as procedurally untimely and also substantively deficient for failure to state a claim. In the published portion of this opinion, the court reverses the Law Division’s dismissal of the complaint as untimely under Rule 4:69-6(a), but affirms the dismissal of plaintiffs' preemption claims. As to the former, the issues presented concern sufficient matters of public interest to qualify under Rule 4:69-6(c) for an enlargement of the 45-day filing period. As to the latter, the court concludes that, as other state courts have found, the text of the CSA and federal marijuana enforcement policies do not require a finding of conflict preemption of CREAMMA or the Borough's ordinances. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the court remands plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims, which were dismissed without an opportunity for discovery and without a possible evidentiary hearing, if one proves necessary to resolve expert opinion and credibility issues. |
Appellate |
April 23, 2024 |
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPETITIVE SOLAR INCENTIVE ("CSI") PROGRAM, ETC. (NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES)
(A-2232-22)
Pursuant to the Solar Act of 2021, N.J.S.A. 48:3-114 to -120, the Legislature directed the Board of Public Utilities to create a solar facilities program for awarding contracts for grid supply solar facilities and net metered solar facilities greater than five megawatts. In addition to setting renewable energy goals for the State, the Act directs the development of policy for grid supply solar siting so as not to compromise the State's commitment to preserving and protecting open space and farmland. To that end, the Board developed a competitive solar incentive (CSI) program in coordination with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Agriculture, and the State Agriculture Development Committee to issue recommendations and a straw proposal on siting requirements. After a four-year process, which included extensive stakeholder engagement, the Board issued an order that launched the CSI Program. N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(c) sets forth seven categories of land where solar facilities shall not be sited unless authorized by a waiver. N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(c)(7) prohibits siting solar facilities on certain agricultural soils where the grid supply solar facility exceeds the Statewide threshold of 2.5% of such soils unless authorized by the waiver process pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f). N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f) describes the waiver process but also states that in no case shall a grid supply solar facility occupy more than 5% of the unpreserved land containing prime agricultural soils and soils of Statewide importance located within any county's designated agricultural development area. Appellant moved for reconsideration, arguing the Board misinterpreted the siting provisions of the Act codified in N.J.S.A. 48:3-119. Among other arguments raised by appellant before the Board and on appeal, appellant claimed the Board misinterpreted the Act and ignored the legislative history. Appellant alleged the 5% per county limit could be exceeded if the 2.5% Statewide limit was not exceeded. The Board interpreted the siting provisions independently and held the 5% per county limit on development could not be waived. The court affirmed the Board's ruling and found the plain language of the Act demonstrated N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f)'s limit on solar development to 5% of a county's agricultural land was unambiguous. The 2.5% Statewide limit expressed in N.J.S.A. 483-119(c)(7) served a different purpose and was not a means for a solar developer to exceed the 5% per county restriction. Moreover, applying the per county limit only after the Statewide limit has been reached could lead to the development of the entirety of a county's agricultural lands. Given the Act's unambiguous language, the court did not need to resort to the legislative history. Even so, the legislative history showed the Legislature intended to minimize the potential adverse environmental impacts of solar development and the Legislature never revised the 5% per county limit or stated the per county limit could be waived in either version of the bill before it became law. The Board's interpretation of the Act balanced the Legislature's intent to preserve the State's vital natural resources while encouraging the development of clean solar energy. |
Appellate |
April 22, 2024 |
BOROUGH OF ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS VS. THOMAS J. TRAUTNER, ET AL. (L-5785-21, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2765-21)
The Borough of Englewood Cliffs retained Thomas J. Trautner and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, (collectively CSG), Albert Wunsch III, and Jeffrey Surenian and Jeffrey Surenian and Associates, LLC, (collectively Surenian) to represent it in affordable housing litigation. After judgment was entered for developer 800 Sylvan Avenue, LLC. (Sylvan), a settlement was reached between the Borough and Sylvan. Thereafter, political control of the Borough Council majority changed hands and the newly constituted Council sued CSG, Wunsch, and Surenian, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting arising from their representation of the Borough in the litigation. The Borough also sued Sylvan, alleging claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting. The trial court granted defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss the Borough's complaint with prejudice. The trial court subsequently granted defendants' motion for sanctions, ordering the Borough to pay their attorney's fees and costs for filing a frivolous lawsuit. The Borough appeals, arguing the sanction applications were procedurally deficient; as a public entity, it is immune from paying sanctions under the FLS; and the trial court abused its discretion in finding the Borough's lawsuit was frivolous.[1] The court rejects the Borough's arguments and affirms based on our interpretation of the FLS that the Borough is not immune from sanctions, defendants' applications for sanctions were procedurally compliant with Rule 1:4-8, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the Borough.
[1] After their merit briefs were filed, the Borough and Jeffrey Surenian and Jeffrey Surenian and Associates, LLC filed a stipulation of dismissal dismissing all claims and counterclaims, including but not limited to claims for attorney's fees. |
Appellate |
April 22, 2024 |
C.R. v. M.T.
(A-47-22 ; 087887)
The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault “destroyed” her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was “terrified” for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a “possibility of future risk” to her “safety or well-being.” The Court affirms.
|
Supreme |
April 19, 2024 |
M.R. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)
(A-2825-22)
M.R. appealed from a final decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC), denying his application for a certificate of eligibility for compassionate release under the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. The DOC denied his application because two licensed physicians designated by the commissioner of the DOC had rendered medical diagnoses in which they found M.R. had neither a terminal condition nor a permanent physical incapacity as defined by the CRA. M.R. argued on appeal the CRA and related regulations required the designated physicians to examine him physically and the DOC's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the physicians had not physically examined him and had failed to make certain findings required under the CRA. The court disagreed, concluding that, while a physician may request a physical examination, the CRA and related regulations did not require one. The court also concluded the physicians had made the requisite findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the DOC's decision. |
Appellate |
April 18, 2024 |
EARNEKA WIGGINS, ET AL. VS. HACKENSACK MERIDIAN HEALTH, ET AL. (L-0005-23, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3847-22)
On leave granted, in this medical negligence matter, we consider whether N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) under the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37 to -42, requires plaintiffs to serve an affidavit of merit (AOM) from a physician board certified in both specialties if defendant physician is board certified in two specialties, and the treatment claimed to be negligent involves both specialties. Plaintiffs rely on Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377 (2011), in asserting they need only provide an AOM from a physician who specializes in either of the defendant doctor's specialties. The trial court agreed and denied defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to provide the proper AOM and for reconsideration. Defendant physician is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He certified that his care and treatment of plaintiffs' decedent involved both specialties. Plaintiffs only served an AOM from a physician board certified in internal medicine. In considering defendants' dismissal motions, the trial court cited to two sentences from Buck: "A physician may practice in more than one specialty, and the treatment involved may fall within that physician's multiple specialty areas. In that case, an [AOM] from a physician specializing in either area will suffice." Id. at 391. Because the facts presented here are distinguishable from Buck and the discrete ruling in Buck was not specific to this issue, and in considering the legislative purpose of the Act, and the principles of law espoused in the subsequent cases of Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 480-88 (2013), and Pfannenstein ex. rel. Estate of Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 90-91 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 254 N.J. 517 (2023), we conclude plaintiffs must serve an AOM from a physician board certified in each of defendant doctor's specialties. We are also guided by the kind-for-kind, credential equivalency requirement articulated in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a). Therefore, we reverse the court's orders denying defendants' motions to dismiss for a deficient AOM and for reconsideration. However, because plaintiffs raised the issue of a waiver from the AOM requirement, and the issue was fully briefed and discussed during oral argument before the trial court, we remand for the court to determine the waiver argument on its merits. |
Appellate |
April 17, 2024 |
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey
(A-33-22 ; 087789)
CPANJ is neither a public agency under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 nor a public entity subject to the common law right of access. The ACLU’s factual allegations do not support a claim against CPANJ under OPRA or the common law. 1. OPRA applies only if the entity to which a request is directed meets the statutory definition of a public agency. For purposes of OPRA, the terms “public agency” or “agency” denote the entities specified in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, which include “any political subdivision of the State or combination of political subdivisions, and any division, board, bureau, office, commission or other instrumentality within or created by a political subdivision of the State or combination of political subdivisions, and any independent authority, commission, instrumentality or agency created by a political subdivision or combination of political subdivisions.” The term “political subdivision” denotes a division of a state that exists primarily to discharge some function of local government, such as a county or municipality, as well as certain entities formed by counties and municipalities, such as parking authorities. The ACLU argues that CPANJ is an instrumentality of the county prosecutors. Accordingly, the core question in this appeal is whether a county prosecutor constitutes a “political subdivision” for purposes of OPRA. (pp. 14-22) 2. A county is indisputably a “political subdivision of the State” as defined in OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The status of the counties themselves as political subdivisions under OPRA, however, has no bearing on the analysis. A county prosecutor is distinct from the county that the prosecutor serves for purposes of OPRA’s reach. A county prosecutor, like the Attorney General, is a constitutional officer who serves by virtue of gubernatorial nomination and Senate confirmation. Although a county exercises considerable control over the fiscal operations of the county prosecutor’s office, a county prosecutor’s law enforcement function is unsupervised by county government or any other agency of local government. In short, the county prosecutor is not the alter ego of the county itself, and does not constitute a “political subdivision” as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. CPANJ, meanwhile, constitutes an organization in which the county prosecutors are members and is not the alter ego of the prosecutors themselves. Because a prosecutor does not meet the definition of a “political subdivision” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s plain language, CPANJ is not a public agency for purposes of OPRA. The ACLU’s factual allegations do not support its assertion that CPANJ is a public agency within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Because the ACLU did not seek the documents from a public agency in accordance with N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5 and -6, the Court does not reach the question whether the documents identified in its request constitute “government records” under OPRA. (pp. 22-26) 3. A public record under the common law is one that is made by a public official in the exercise of the official’s public function, either because the record was required or directed by law to be made or kept, or because it was filed in a public office. Here, the ACLU identifies no statute, regulation, or other mandate requiring CPANJ to create or maintain the requested documents. It suggests no statutory or regulatory mandates of any kind addressing the records at issue. The ACLU does not allege that CPANJ maintains public documents in a public office; indeed, it does not dispute CPANJ’s assertion that it maintains no office at all. The ACLU identifies no precedential decision discussing, let alone upholding, a request for public documents served on a private entity such as CPANJ. In short, the ACLU asserts no factual allegations that would suggest that CPANJ constitutes an entity upon which a common law right of access request for documents may properly be served. The Court does not reach the question whether the documents that the ACLU requested from CPANJ would be considered common law public documents if requested from a public entity. (pp. 26-29) |
Supreme |
April 16, 2024 |
Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C. v. The Valley Hospital
(A-52-22 ; 087469)
Plaintiffs’ good faith and fair dealing claim properly survived summary judgment, but the jury was not correctly charged or asked to rule on that claim. The trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the only underlying contract to which the implied covenant could attach to had to be one beyond the rights afforded by the Bylaws. Adding to the significant uncertainty created by the jury charge and verdict sheet are the improper admission into evidence of the privileged emails and the improper remarks by plaintiffs’ attorney. Those errors, cumulatively, had the capacity to lead the jury to reach a verdict it would not have otherwise reached and thus deprived Valley of a fair trial. |
Supreme |
April 9, 2024 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHANNON A. MCGUIGAN (19-07-0888 AND 20-03-0306, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3224-21)
This appeal addresses whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement defendant had made to police and barring in part the testimony of defendant's expert witness. Several months after the drug-induced death of the victim, a police detective interviewed defendant, eliciting from her information about her cell-phone usage before he advised her of her Miranda rights and information regarding her drug-selling activity and contact with the victim after he advised her of her rights. The detective told defendant he was "not holding anything back" and was "laying it all out . . . on the table" but never mentioned the death of the victim and repeatedly used the present tense when discussing her. Defendant confessed to selling heroin to the victim. The parties did not raise before the trial court the admissibility of defendant's statement, and the statement was admitted into evidence. The trial court granted the State's pretrial motion to bar defendant's expert witness from testifying about drug use and addiction, finding him qualified only in toxicology and not in those fields. A jury convicted defendant of committing a first-degree drug-induced death crime, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(a), along with other drug-related crimes. The court finds the trial court (1) committed plain error by admitting defendant's statement without first conducting a Rule 104 hearing to determine under a totality-of-the-circumstances test the voluntariness of defendant's statement and Miranda waiver; (2) erred in admitting the pre-Miranda questions and answers but that that error did not rise to the level of plain error because other evidence was admitted regarding defendant's cell-phone usage; and (3) abused its discretion by limiting defendant's expert testimony without conducting a Rule 104 hearing regarding the expert witness's qualifications and opinions. The court remands the case and instructs the trial court to conduct evidentiary hearings regarding the voluntariness of defendant's statement, the qualifications of defendant's expert witness, and the admissibility of his opinions. Whether defendant's convictions are affirmed or vacated for a new trial depends on the outcomes of those hearings. |
Appellate |
April 8, 2024 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. J.H.P. (21-12-0268, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0467-23)
At issue in this interlocutory appeal is the propriety of a pretrial order compelling the administration of psychotropic medication in an attempt to restore competency, without a defendant's consent, when the accused has not been deemed a danger to self or others. With defendant's constitutional rights in view, the court applies the four-pronged test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), and concludes the motion judge erroneously determined the State satisfied the second Sell prong. The court therefore reverses the order under review. In doing so, the court departs from the majority of federal appellate courts and holds the standard of review under the Sell test is mixed; the court therefore reviews the motion court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error as to each Sell prong. Having resolved the issues by applying the Sell standard, the court does not reach the constitutional arguments urged by defendant and amici curiae. |
Appellate |
April 5, 2024 |
BRITNEY MOTIL VS. WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY (L-0734-21, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0400-23)
In this automobile insurance coverage dispute, the court considered defendant Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company's appeal from Law Division orders granting summary judgment to plaintiff Britney Motil, entitling her to $100,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage, and denying reconsideration. This appeal presented the novel issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to UIM coverage as a "covered driver" injured in an automobile accident while driving a "covered auto" with an identified alternate garaging address under her parents' automobile policy. Defendant disclaimed coverage, under the policy's uninsured motorist (UM)/UIM endorsement step-down provision, because plaintiff was neither a named insured nor a defined family member. After a de novo review, the court concluded there was ambiguity between the declaration and the policy's step-down provision of $15,000 in UIM coverage because the declaration plainly provided: $100,000 UM/UIM coverage for each person; plaintiff was a covered driver; the UM/UIM premium charged was the same for each vehicle; and plaintiff's vehicle was a covered vehicle with an alternate garaging address. Further, the court concluded the policyholder's reasonable expectation of $100,000 UIM coverage should be afforded. The court affirmed the Law Division's orders finding plaintiff was entitled to $100,000 in UIM insurance coverage and denying reconsideration. |
Appellate |
April 4, 2024 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WONGYU JANG, ET AL. (MA-2022-006 and MA-2022-016, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-2054-22/A-2412-22)
In these cases that were consolidated for the purpose of issuing a single opinion, defendants appeal from their convictions following municipal court appeals because the Law Division decided their appeals without conducting hearings or permitting briefing. In both cases, the Law Division determined briefing was not required and, because defendants did not request argument, decided the appeals based solely on its review of the municipal court transcripts and the police body camera video introduced as evidence in the municipal court trials. The court found it "is incumbent on counsel to . . . tell the court why briefing is necessary and to request argument if they want it." On appeal, defendants argued the court deprived them of their rights to due process and counsel. The court reversed, concluding Rules 3:23-4 and -8 require that the Law Division schedule and conduct a hearing on a municipal appeal. There is no requirement that a defendant request a hearing. The court also noted, although the proceeding is technically designated an appeal, the Law Division must conduct a trial de novo on a municipal appeal. At the trial de novo, the Law Division must make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and, if the court finds the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, sentence the defendant anew. The court also concluded, based on the arguments raised by defendants, it would be appropriate to permit, if not require, the parties to file briefs in these cases. Finally, to avoid any appearance of bias or prejudice, the court required the appeals be assigned to a different judge on remand. |
Appellate |
March 28, 2024 |
RAYMOND G. MORISON, JR. VS. THE WILLINGBORO BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-0092-22, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1280-22)
This appeal concerns issues of preclusion and the relationship between the statutory systems for the Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Examiners revoking or suspending an educator's certificate to teach in the New Jersey public schools under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1, and the separate arbitration process specified since 2012 in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 to -39 2 (the TEACHNJ law) for a school district terminating or disciplining a teacher for improper conduct. Appellant, a tenured teacher, was charged by the local board of education with unbecoming conduct. The school board sought to terminate his employment in the district. The contested matter was tried before an arbitrator. The arbitrator found appellant had engaged in unbecoming conduct, but she imposed a milder sanction of a one-year suspension. The arbitrator's decision was not challenged in court by either appellant or the school board. The Board of Examiners then pursued the revocation of appellant's license based on his same improper conduct, and it is anticipated that contested case will be tried in the Office of Administrative Law. Appellant contends the Board of Examiners and the Commissioner—even though they were not parties to the tenure arbitration—have no authority to pursue the revocation of his license because the arbitrator only suspended his employment for one year. Among other things, appellant invokes a doctrine of "industrial double jeopardy" to support his preclusion argument. He also contends the revocation proceedings violate his constitutional and civil rights. The matter was presented to a Law Division judge, who confirmed the arbitration award but rejected appellant's arguments for preclusion. This court affirms the trial court's decision and holds the Board of Examiners and the Commissioner are not precluded by the arbitration outcome from pursuing the revocation of appellant's teaching certificate. The statewide teacher certificate revocation process authorized in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 and -39 operates separately from the teacher tenure arbitration process under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1. The manifest legislative intent is for the two statutes to be administered independently of one another. The proceedings involve non-identical parties, and also different stakes, procedures, and avenues and standards of appellate review. The court rejects appellant's assertion of industrial double jeopardy and his claims of the violation of his constitutional and civil rights. |
Appellate |
March 27, 2024 |
State v. Kalil Cooper
(A-35-22 ; 087742)
Conspiracy to distribute CDS is not an enumerated predicate offense of the promoting statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, and defendant’s conviction for a crime that does not exist must be vacated. |
Supreme |
March 26, 2024 |
State v. Donnie E. Harrell
(A-13-23 ; 088412)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the |
Supreme |
March 25, 2024 |
Christa Robey v. SPARC Group LLC
(A-50-22 ; 087981)
A plaintiff can establish an ascertainable loss by demonstrating either an out-of-pocket loss or a deprivation of the benefit of one’s bargain. The Court does not find either type of ascertainable loss applicable here because plaintiffs purchased non-defective, conforming goods with no objective, measurable disparity between the product they reasonably thought they were buying and what they ultimately received. Plaintiffs’ CFA claim therefore fails, and, absent an ascertainable loss pursuant to the CFA, plaintiffs are not “aggrieved consumers” under TCCWNA, cannot show injury or damages under their common law claims, and are without claims entitling them to equitable relief. |
Supreme |
March 25, 2024 |
ESTHER OGUNYEMI VS. GARDEN STATE MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL. (L-1263-22, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1703-22)
Plaintiff, who was fired from her job as a physician, appeals from an order of the Superior Court, Law Division staying her complaint against defendants pending arbitration. Plaintiff's claims included allegations of sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a statutory retaliation claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. Defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to plaintiff's employment contract. The trial court granted the motion, finding the contract's arbitration clause was valid and enforceable. The court engaged in a de novo review of the employment contract using well-settled contract principles, and it held the mandatory arbitration clause was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable against plaintiff. Holding the arbitration clause unenforceable, the court declined to reach the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act applies. In a separate opinion concurring with the result, a member of the panel would reverse for a different reason, discerning no ambiguity in the arbitration provision and concluding, unlike the contract at issue in Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553 (2022), the present contract is not governed by the FAA. Accordingly, plaintiff's LAD claims would not be arbitrable pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7. |
Appellate |
March 18, 2024 |
BIG SMOKE LLC VS. TOWNSHIP OF WEST MILFORD, ET AL. (L-3052-22, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1755-22)
In this matter, the court considers the novel issue of the circumstances under which a municipality may decline to adopt a Resolution of Support (ROS) for an applicant seeking to obtain a Class 5 Cannabis Retailer License (CRL) from the State of New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Commission (the Commission) under N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA). Plaintiff filed an order to show cause (OTSC) and a verified complaint against the Township of West Milford, the Council of West Milford Township (collectively referred to as the Township), and SoulFlora, Inc. after the Township effectively denied plaintiff's request for a ROS for its CRL application by not placing it on a public meeting agenda for consideration by the governing body. The Township asserts its de facto denial was predicated on a Township ordinance prohibiting businesses with CRLs to be located less than 2,500 feet from each other. The proposed location of plaintiff's cannabis business was less than 500 feet from SoulFlora's. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to prevent SoulFlora from establishing a cannabis business; enjoining the Township from issuing a ROS to any other new cannabis business applicants; revoking SoulFlora's ROS; and requesting attorneys' fees and costs. The court affirms denial of plaintiff's OTSC under Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982). The court holds plaintiff did not have a likelihood of success on the merits, finding the Township's effective denial of plaintiff's request for a ROS was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable since under CREAMMA, municipalities are delegated the authority to promulgate location and density requirements for cannabis retail businesses and are statutorily vested with the right to decline to provide local support for applicants who fail to meet those requirements. The court reverses the with-prejudice dismissal of the claims against the Township and remands to the trial court to issue a statement of reasons pursuant to Rule 1:7‑4(a), along with an accompanying order. The court affirms the dismissal of the complaint against SoulFlora with prejudice, while finding that it is an indispensable party for notice purposes only. |
Appellate |
March 14, 2024 |
CAROLINE J. FRANCAVILLA, ETC. VS. ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS VI, LLC, ET AL. (L-0170-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2951-21)
In this matter, the court considers whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice after finding it was barred by the entire controversy doctrine and res judicata. Plaintiff's putative class action complaint, filed in Essex County, sought to claw back funds she paid in full satisfaction of a final default judgment, entered in a prior lawsuit adjudicated in Bergen County. The court holds that the entire controversy doctrine precludes plaintiff from relitigating a final default judgment through the filing of a new complaint in a different court when she failed to pursue any of her substantive arguments in the previous litigation. Plaintiff defaulted on paying an outstanding credit card balance, so the bank closed out her account and assigned her outstanding debt to defendants. Through a complaint filed in Bergen County, defendants obtained a final default judgment against plaintiff, which she did not move to vacate or otherwise appeal. Plaintiff fully satisfied the judgment through wage garnishments. Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint in Essex County against defendants seeking a declaratory judgment voiding the debt and any judgments enforcing that debt, as well as treble damages and disgorgement of amounts previously paid to defendants, based on the assertion that defendant was not licensed, as required by the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49. Since the entire controversy doctrine precludes plaintiff from pursuing the Essex County litigation predicated on substantive defenses that could have been raised in the prior Bergen County litigation, there was no amendment to the pleading that could have rendered plaintiff's complaint viable. Thus, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice based on the entire controversy doctrine was appropriate. The court affirms the Essex County order. |
Appellate |