

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE  
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION**

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."  
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the  
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY  
APPELLATE DIVISION  
DOCKET NO. A-0193-16T3

SUSAN S. LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM B. MEGILL, D.D.S.,

Defendant-Respondent.

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Submitted March 12, 2018 – Decided March 29, 2018

Before Judges Ostrer and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,  
Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-  
0885-14.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for  
appellant (Michael Confusione, of counsel and  
on the brief).

Philip M. Lustbader and David Lustbader, PC,  
attorneys for respondent (David Lustbader, on  
the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Susan S. Lee appeals from the summary judgment  
dismissal of her dental malpractice complaint against defendant  
William B. Megill, D.D.S. Judge Yolanda Ciccone found that


plaintiff's July 2, 2014, complaint was time-barred, because the cause of action arose no later than October 27, 2011. Upon our de novo review, see Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010), we affirm.

The undisputed facts are that defendant last treated plaintiff on October 7, 2011. She continued to feel pain in "tooth number three." So, on October 27, 2011, she obtained treatment at the dental clinic of Columbia University Health Care. A dentist there told plaintiff that defendant had drilled "too deep" and hit the horn of the tooth that caused plaintiff pain. At that point, her cause of action accrued, because she knew or reasonably should have known that she had an injury, and it was the fault of another, specifically defendant. See, e.g., Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 70 (1981). As she filed her complaint over two years after that, see N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the court properly dismissed it.

Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

I hereby certify that the foregoing  
is a true copy of the original on  
file in my office.

  
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION