



VIA HAND DELIVERY

February 27, 2025

Hon. Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D. Acting Administrative Director Administrative Office of the Courts of the State of New Jersey Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 25 Market St. Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Re: Request for Multi-County Litigation Designation of Roundup Cases

Dear Judge Grant:

Please accept this letter on behalf of Plaintiffs in 36 matters who now seek designation of their cases and those of five other plaintiffs—41 cases in total—currently filed in courts across eight different New Jersey vicinages, for centralized management in The Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County vicinage before the Honorable John C. Porto, P.J.Cv. Plaintiffs make this renewed request pursuant to R. 4:38A and codified thereunder in Directive 02-19: Multicounty Litigation Guidelines and Criteria for Designation ("Guidelines").²

When Plaintiffs originally made their request on January 22, 2024, there were only 10 Plaintiffs with cases filed in only four counties. After considering the prior application, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' request, specifying that "[t]he Court based its denial on the limited number of cases at present." Letter from Acting Administrative Director of the Courts (May 28, 2024), attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Supreme Court further advised that "[t]he application may be resubmitted if the total number of plaintiffs increases." *Id.* The number of plaintiffs has since quadrupled and, as evidenced by the multiplication of such cases without centralization, Plaintiffs anticipate that the total number of cases subject to this Court's petition order, if granted, will likely exceed one hundred.

As set forth herein, centralized management is consistent with the Guidelines for several reasons. Chiefly, it will allow for the conservation of judicial resources and will curtail, if not eliminate, duplicative and inconsistent rulings that are inevitable if Plaintiffs' cases remain before various courts

¹ An updated list of currently pending cases is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This list includes six cases that were dismissed for administrative deficiencies, at least four of which are in the process of reinstatement.

² Per the Guidelines, Plaintiffs will provide the required notice of this petition for centralized management to all parties. Further, Plaintiffs move that if this petition is granted, the Court also orders that all subsequent related actions currently filed in counties other than the vicinage chosen by the Court be transferred without further application. Guidelines, ¶ 4.

throughout the state. Indeed, over the past several months, multiple judges across New Jersey's courts have ruled on virtually identical motions to dismiss involving substantially similar issues of fact and law in well over a dozen separate cases. Absent centralization, disaggregated and inconsistent rulings will continue, and at the expense of judicial resources. Centralization will also allow for coordinated discovery, which is particularly advantageous where, as here, Plaintiffs' cases involve claims with common issues of law and fact involving a single product, Roundup; a high degree of commonality of injury or damages; and little to no risk that centralization will cause delay or prejudice. In short, centralization is fair and convenient to all parties, counsel, and witnesses, and this petition should be approved.

I. Summary of the Case

Plaintiffs are over 20 New Jersey residents and over a dozen non-New Jersey residents who have filed civil actions for injuries caused by their exposures to Roundup over a period of years at work, at their residences, or both.³ Each Plaintiff claims injuries under the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. §2A:58C-1 et seq. ("NJPLA"), the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A: 15-59, et seq., and the common law of the State of New Jersey, and several Plaintiffs also assert claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. §56:8-1, et seq. ("NJCFA"). Specifically, they assert claims for grievous injuries as a direct and proximate result of their aforementioned exposures to Roundup, including their diagnosis of Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma ("NHL").

Defendant Monsanto Company is now fully owned by Defendant Bayer Corporation ("Bayer Corp."). Bayer Corp., a/k/a Bayer, USA, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Bayer AG. Bayer Corp. runs national operations for Bayer AG and oversees approximately forty consolidated subsidiary companies within the United States, including Defendants Monsanto Company, Bayer CropScience LP, and Bayer U.S. LLC. The Bayer entities are collectively referred to as the "Bayer Defendants." Plaintiffs also bring claims against fifty John Doe or fictitiously-named defendants whose identities are not presently known.⁴

All Defendants qualify as manufacturers/product sellers of Roundup under the NJPLA as set forth and defined in full in the complaints. All Defendants were or are doing business in the State of New Jersey.

³ Roundup here refers to all formulations of Defendants' product line including, but not limited to: Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro Concentrate, Roundup Prodry Herbicide, Roundup Promax, Roundup Quik Stik Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Quikpro Herbicide, Roundup Rainfast Concentrate Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Rainfast Super Concentrate Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Ready-to-Use Extended Control Weed & Grass Killer 1 Plus Weed Preventer, Roundup Ready-to-Use Weed & Grass Killer, Roundup Ultra Dry, Roundup Ultra Herbicide, Roundup Ultramax, Roundup VM Herbicide, Roundup Weed& Grass Killer Concentrate, Roundup Weed & Grass Killer Super Concentrate, Roundup Weed & Grass Killer Ready-to-Use, Roundup Weed & Grass Killer Super Concentrate, Roundup Weed & Grass Killer Ready-to-Use, Roundup WSD Water Soluble Dry Herbicide Deploy Dry Herbicide, or any other formulation of Roundup containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

⁴ Monsanto, the Bayer Defendants, and the fictitiously-named Defendants are collectively referenced as "Defendants" herein.

II. <u>Centralized Management of These Cases Is Appropriate Under the</u> Guidelines

As set forth in the Guidelines, mass tort designation (multi-county litigation) is warranted when a litigation involves a large number of parties; many claims with common, recurrent issues of law and fact that are associated with a single product; the parties are geographically dispersed; and there is a high degree of remoteness between the court and actual decision-makers in the litigation; among other considerations. This litigation meets the above-enunciated criteria.

A. Plaintiffs' Pleadings Present Common Issues of Fact and Law

Plaintiffs bring these claims against Monsanto and the Bayer Defendants for their failure to warn Plaintiffs of Roundup's carcinogenicity. Roundup, which first came onto the market in the 1970s, contains glyphosate and other harmful chemicals. Plaintiffs allege generally that Monsanto knew of glyphosate's dangers and concealed those risks from the public. In 2015, the World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on Cancer ("IARC"), an organization comprised of independent scientists across the world, classified glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, as a Class 2A Probable Human Carcinogen. Monsanto responded to this scientific finding by attempting to wage an attack campaign against IARC and independent scientists. Further, Plaintiffs have all been diagnosed with NHL and have suffered a similar spectrum of damages.

Bayer AG acquired Monsanto on September 14, 2016, combining it with its Bayer CropScience division with the goal of "creat[ing] significant strategic benefits." The Bayer Defendants have continued to manufacture and market glyphosate-containing Roundup. Flaintiffs all allege that the Bayer Defendants are liable for Monsanto's acts as successors and by continuing to sell Roundup with glyphosate. Several Plaintiffs also allege that Monsanto and the Bayer Defendants are alter egos of each other.

Accordingly, the common issues presented in Plaintiffs' complaints evince significant common issues of facts and law, including a high degree of commonality between Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, which warrant centralized management.

B. Centralization Will Promote Judicial Efficiency

The Guidelines delineate several factors supporting centralized management that focus on conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial efficiency:

- "whether centralization would result in the efficient utilization of judicial resources and the facilities and personnel of the court"
- "whether there is a risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders or judgments if the cases are not managed in a coordinated fashion"
- "whether the cases require specialized expertise and case processing as provided by the dedicated multicounty litigation judge and staff"

⁵ Bayer AG announced that it (including the Bayer Defendants here) will replace its glyphosate-based products in the U.S. residential lawn and garden market with non-glyphosate active ingredients beginning in 2023 but will continue to sell Roundup with glyphosate for commercial and agricultural uses in the United States.

• "whether there are related matters pending in Federal court or in other state courts that require coordination with a single New Jersey judge"

Guidelines, at ¶ 2. See also In re Accutane Litig., 194 A. 3d 503, 522-23 (2013) (the New Jersey Supreme Court holding that an MCL is "intended to make more manageable the processing of hundreds and sometimes thousands of cases . . . [with] [o]ne of the reasons [being] to gain the benefits of administrative efficiency").

First, there is no question that centralized management of these cases by a single court will conserve valuable judicial resources, particularly as additional cases are filed in the coming months. Over the last several months, multiple judges across New Jersey's courts have ruled on virtually identical motions to dismiss involving substantially similar issues of fact and law in well over a dozen separate cases and have reached different opinions on whether the environmental tort exception to the New Jersey Products Liability Act applies to certain Plaintiffs' occupational exposure to Roundup. Thus, duplicative and inconsistent rulings are no longer a mere risk—they have already occurred and will continue to occur absent centralization in a single vicinage before a single judge.

Second, centralizing these cases in a vicinage that has substantial experience in handling other complex MCLs will significantly promote efficiency for New Jersey's courts and the parties. MCL judges and the court staff in MCL vicinages are typically well-versed in the common issues that arise in complex matters such as these Roundup cases. Thus, centralizing these cases will allow the parties to benefit from a judge and court staff that are familiar with complex legal and administrative issues that arise in matters such as these and ease the burden on multiple New Jersey vicinages currently dealing with matters that seldom arise in those courts.

Third, Roundup cases are currently centralized in federal and various state courts, and centralizing Roundup cases in front of a single judge in New Jersey will aid in coordination with these other related consolidated proceedings. See Initial Transfer Order, In Re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2741 (United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Oct. 3, 2016) ("On the basis of the papers filed and hearing session held, we find that these actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Northern District of California will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation. These actions share common factual questions arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.") (attached as Exhibit C); Order Granting Petition for Coordination, Roundup Product Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceedings No. 4953 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2018) (centralizing and coordinating all Roundup cases in California state courts in Alameda County) (attached as Exhibit D); Order Granting Petition to Coordinate Roundup Products Liability Cases, In Re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation, No. 550 (Pa Ct. Comm. Pls. May 11, 2022) (centralizing and coordinating all Roundup actions in Pennsylvania state courts in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas' Complex Litigation Center) (attached as Exhibit E).

C. Centralization Will Be Fair and Convenient to the Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel

The Guidelines likewise support the granting of an MCL petition where coordinated discovery will be advantageous, and centralization will not cause unreasonable delay or prejudice. *Guidelines*, at

¶ 2. The circumstances here satisfy both factors. Where, as here, there is considerable overlap of facts and law since all Plaintiffs suffered similar injuries, NHL, from exposure to a singular product, glyphosate-containing Roundup, it is self-evident that general discovery will be markedly similar, if not identical. Centrally managing that discovery will undoubtedly be advantageous for the parties. This coordination of general discovery will also prevent unreasonable delay or prejudice that could result from disparate rulings if these cases continue to proceed in courtrooms throughout New Jersey.

D. The Number of Roundup Cases Pending in New Jersey Courts Warrants Centralization

After considering Plaintiffs' first petition for centralization, the Supreme Court "based its denial on the limited number of cases" then pending in New Jersey courts. See Exhibit B. The Court further advised that "[t]he application may be resubmitted if the total number of plaintiffs increases." Id. There were 10 active cases when Plaintiffs filed their petition and 22 active cases when the Court denied it.

In contrast, there are now 41 active Roundup cases. This number is nearly identical to the 41 Bard Implanted Port Catheter cases that were pending when the Court granted⁶ those plaintiffs' petition⁷ for centralization in Bergen County after denying a previous petition due to the limited number of then-pending cases. The need for centralization is more acute for the Roundup cases because, unlike the Bard cases that were all pending in Bergen County and filed by the same plaintiffs' counsel, these cases are scattered across eight New Jersey Counties and vicinages, assigned to 10 different judges, and represented by six separate law firms.

III. Atlantic County Is the Proper Vicinage for Centralized Management of the Roundup Cases

It is within the Supreme Court's discretion to choose the proper vicinage for centralized management of these Roundup cases. *Guidelines*, at ¶ 3. In making its decision, the Court will consider "[i]ssues of fairness, geographical location of the parties and attorneys, and the existing civil and multicounty litigation caseload in the vicinage" when determining the vicinage for centralized management. *Id.* Plaintiffs respectfully submit that these factors favor centralization in vicinage one, Atlantic County.

First, Atlantic County is in one of the three vicinages where the Court has previously assigned mass tort cases for centralized management and 33 of the currently pending Roundup cases are located in Atlantic County. See generally, Exhibit A. In contrast, Bergen County only has one pending Roundup case, and Middlesex County only has two. Id. Further, Judge Porto is already familiar with the issues in the Roundup cases as 11 of the 33 cases in Atlantic County are assigned to him, and he continues

⁶ Request Pursuant to R. 4:38A for Multi-County Litigation Designation for Cases Involving Bard Implanted Port Product (May 17, 2024), available at https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/mcl/bard-implanted-port-catheter-products/mcl-application-pdf

⁷ Multicounty Litigation – Designation of Bard Implanted Port Catheter Productions Litigation as MCL (Oct. 15, 2024), available at https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/2024/10/n241021b.pdf?cb=a155b946

to preside over extensive motion practice8. Judge Porto also has extensive experience in managing other complex MCL matters; indeed, even one of the judges—who is presiding over the remaining 22 cases in Atlantic County-has indicated that she would defer to Judge Porto while deciding any motions in the Roundup cases assigned to her. See Exhibit F, Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Riehl, et al. v. Monsanto Co., et al., ATL-L-701-24 before Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff, J.S.C. ("Judge Porto and I have other cases similar to yours, where they're not MCLs, but they're the same complaints, they're the same defendants, different plaintiffs. And I will usually always defer to him each time just because he is the presiding judge of Civil, so you will always see me bump it past whenever he is deciding his motion."). The staff in Atlantic County is also well-versed in issues that typically arise in MCLs. Therefore, centralizing these cases before Judge Porto will ensure that they proceed without delay.

Second, Atlantic County is located conveniently near several international airports (e.g., Philadelphia, Atlantic City, and Newark), easing potential travel constraints to New Jersey by Defendants' nationwide counsel and any out-of-state parties and witnesses. Atlantic County is also within a reasonable driving distance from Defendants' New Jersey offices. Additionally, New Jersey courts routinely allow counsel and parties to appear remotely, further easing any geographic concerns about centralizing these cases in Atlantic County.

Third, the existing civil and multicounty litigation caseload in Atlantic County does not pose Court's centralizing these cases there. Per the http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/index.html, there are eight multicounty litigations centralized in Atlantic County. However, several of these litigations—Abilify, Proton-Pump Inhibitors, and several of the surgical mesh cases—are now largely resolved. In contrast, Bergen County has 10 active multicounty litigations, and Middlesex County has four. Further, the Supreme Court recently centralized the Bard Implanted Port Catheter Products MCL in Bergen County, which will likely increase the caseload in Bergen.

Thus, Atlantic County is the most practicable venue for establishing an MCL, and the County's institutional experience in handling complex mass tort centralizations will allow these cases to proceed efficiently and without delay.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully move that their litigation against Monsanto and the Bayer Defendants be designated as an MCL in vicinage one, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County, pursuant to R. 4:38A and in compliance with the Guidelines promulgated thereunder.

Respectfully/submitted,

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⁸ As of the date of this application, Judge Porto has decided substantive motions in three Roundup cases and has an additional 11 motions pending in six Roundup cases with return dates in the next 30 days.

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Hon. Alberto Rivas, J.S.C. (Via Overnight Mail)

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Hon. Benjamin S. Bucca, J.S.C. (Via Overnight Mail)

Hon. William E. Marsala, J.S.C. (Via Overnight Mai)

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Hon. William J. McGovern, J.S.C. (Overnight Mail)

All Known Defense Counsel (Via Electronic Mail)

All Known Plaintiffs' Counsel (Via Electronic Mail)

EXHIBIT A

SCHEDULE OF ROUNDUP CASES PENDING AS OF FEBRUARY 26, 2025

ATLANTIC COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
51-25	Burch, David v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Gerdes, Jonathan v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
52-25	al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
54-25	Scott, Steven v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
55-25	Dunn, Garland v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	NJLLC
ATL-L-			Sbaiti & Company
40-25	Bailey, Patricia v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Sorlie, Dean, et al. v. Monsanto Co.,		Sbaiti & Company
2551-24	et al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Torres, Jr., Adam v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
2546-24	al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Jackson, Tiffany v. Monsanto Co., et		Sbaiti & Company
2547-24	al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Keltner, Patricia, et al. v. Monsanto	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
2548-24	Co., et al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Kenefsky, Jason v. Monsanto Co., et		Sbaiti & Company
2534-24	al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	O'Rourke, David, et al. v. Monsanto		Sbaiti & Company
2535-24	Co., et al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
2525-24	Jordan, Carly v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Hosea, Don, et al. v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
2511-24	al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Detamble, Richard v. Monsanto Co.,	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
2294-24	et al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-	Butler, John et al. v. Monsanto Co., et		Sbaiti & Company
2192-24	al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
699-24	Caruso, Joseph v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-	Moreland, Nicole v. Monsanto Co., et		Weitz & Luxenberg,
700-24	al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	P.C.
ATL-L- 701-24	Diahl Mighael y Managata Ca -t -1	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
701-24 ATL-L-	Riehl, Michael v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
702-24	Pasquale, Danielle v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Motley Rice, LLC
702-24 ATL-L-	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	J.S.C.	Wilesta California
549-24	Sanderson, Bruce v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Wilentz, Goldman &
ATL-L-	Holland, Donna v. Monsanto Co., et	J.S.C.	Spitzer, P.A.
371-24	al.	Hon John C Bowto BI Co-	Napoli Shkolnik
2/1-24	ai.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	PLLC

ATL-L-	Freed, Leonard v. Monsanto Co., et		Napoli Shkolnik
372-24	al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	PLLC
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Napoli Shkolnik
373-24	Palmer, Dana v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	PLLC
ATL-L-	Chapman, John v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
331-24	al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-	Myaskovskaya, Marina v. Monsanto		
284-24	Co., et al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	Motley Rice, LLC
ATL-L-	Capobianco, William v. Monsanto	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
114-24	Co., et al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-	Engelbrecht, Judith v. Monsanto Co.,	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
115-24	et al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
27-24	Brown, Joseph v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-	Marvel, Donald v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
28-24	al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-	Mirra, Pasquale v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
29-24	al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-	Marra, Salvatore v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Weitz & Luxenberg,
3229-23	al.	J.S.C.	P.C.
ATL-L-		Hon. Danielle J. Walcoff,	Sbaiti & Company
288-25	Rapp, Dean v. Monsanto Co., et al.	J.S.C.	NJ LLC
ATL-L-			Wilentz, Goldman &
547-24	Kowal, Dawn v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. John C. Porto, P.J. Cv.	Spitzer, P.A.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
MID-L-39-25	Lordi, Jr., Richard v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. Alberto Rivas, J.S.C.	Cohen, Placitella & Roth
MID-L-45-25	Reilly, Joseph v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. Joseph L. Rea, J.S.C.	Cohen, Placitella & Roth

MONMOUTH COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
MON-L-4321-	Lied, Barry v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Owen C.	Cohen, Placitella & Roth
_24	al.	McCarthy, P.J.Cv.	

BERGEN COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
BER-L- 1264-24	Westtenhiser, Janet v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. William C. Soukas, J.S.C.	Napoli Shkolnik PLLC

BURLINGTON COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
BUR-L-	Lewis, Eugenia v. Monsanto Co., et	Hon. Eric G. Fikry.	
2380-23	al.	P.J.Cv.	Motley Rice, LLC

GLOUCESTER COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
GLO-L- 1393-23	Connelly, Joseph v. Monsanto Co., et al.	Hon. Benjamin D. Morgan, J.S.C.	Motley Rice, LLC

PASSAIC COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
PAS-L-	McLaughlin, Michael v. Monsanto	Hon. William E.	
3477-23	Co., et al.	Marsala, J.S.C.	Motley Rice, LLC

SUSSEX COUNTY CASES

DOCKET NO.	CASE NAME	ASSIGNED JUDGE	PLAINTIFF'S FIRM
SSX-L-		Hon. William J.	
526-23	Longo, Richard v. Monsanto Co., et al.		Motley Rice, LLC

EXHIBIT B



GLENN A. GRANT, J.A.D.

Acting Administrative Director of the Courts

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex • P.O. Box 037 • Trenton, NJ 08625-0037

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May 28, 2024

Daniel R. Lapinski, Esq. Motley Rice LLC 210 Lake Dr. East Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002

RE: Application Requesting Multicounty Litigation Designation of Roundup Cases

Dear Attorney Lapinski:

This is to advise the Supreme Court has acted on your application requesting multicounty litigation (MCL) designation for New Jersey state-court litigation involving the Roundup cases. After requesting comments to the application and having considered the application and the comments received, the Supreme Court determined not to grant your application. The Court based its denial on the limited number of cases at present. The application may be resubmitted if the total number of plaintiffs increases.

Enclosed for your information is the May 28, 2024 Notice to Bar advising of the Court's action in this matter. I would ask that you promptly provide all counsel of record copies of this letter and enclosure.

Any questions regarding this matter may be directed to Melissa A. Czartoryski, Esq., Chief in the Civil Practice Division of the Administrative Office of the Courts at (609) 815-2900 ext. 54900.

Very truly yours,

Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D.

Acting Administrative Director

Enclosure









Daniel R. Lapinski, Esq. May 28, 2024 Page 2

cc: Steven D. Bonville, Chief of Staff
Jennifer M. Perez, Director, Trial Court Services
Taironda E. Phoenix, Assistant Director, Civil Practice
Special Assistants to the Administrative Director
Melissa A. Czartoryski, Chief, Civil Practice

NOTICE TO THE BAR

DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION DESIGNATION OF NEW JERSEY STATE COURT CASES INVOLVING ROUNDUP® PRODUCTS

A previous Notice to the Bar sought comments on an application for designation as Multicounty Litigation (MCL) of New Jersey state cases against Monsanto Company, Bayer AG, Bayer Cropscience LP, Bayer Cropscience LLC, Bayer Corporation, and Bayer U.S. LLC, alleging injuries as a result of exposure to Roundup® Products. That application was submitted pursuant to Rule 4:38A and the Multicounty Litigation Guidelines and Criteria for Designation (Revised) as promulgated by Directive #02-19. This Notice is to advise that the Supreme Court, after considering the application and all comments received, has determined not to grant the application. The Court based its denial on the limited number of cases at present. Accordingly, all cases involving Roundup® Products should continue to be filed in the appropriate counties of venue.

This Notice will also be posted in the Multicounty Information Center (https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/multicounty-litigation) on the Judiciary's website (njcourts.gov).

Questions concerning this matter may be directed to Melissa Czartoryski, Esq., Chief, Civil Court Programs, Administrative Office of the Courts, Hughes Justice Complex, P.O. Box 981, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0981; telephone (609) 815-2900 ext. 54901; e-mail address:

Melissa.Czartoryski@njcourts.gov.

Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D.

Acting Administrative Director of the Courts

Dated: May 28, 2024

EXHIBIT C

UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL on MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

IN RE: ROUNDUP PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

MDL No. 2741

TRANSFER ORDER

Before the Panel: Plaintiffs in the *Giglio* and *Hardeman* actions listed on Schedule A move under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to centralize pretrial proceedings in this litigation in the Southern District of Illinois. This litigation consists of twenty-one actions pending in fourteen districts, as listed on Schedule A. The actions allege that Roundup, a widely used glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto Company, can cause non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and that Monsanto failed to warn consumers and regulators about the alleged risks of Roundup. Since the filing of the motion, the parties have notified the Panel of another sixteen related actions pending in twelve districts. ¹

All responding plaintiffs support centralization, but suggest different transferee districts. Plaintiffs in three actions and a potential tag-along action support centralization in the Southern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs in another three actions propose centralization in the Central District of California. Plaintiffs in one action suggest centralization in the Southern District of Illinois, the Central District of California, or the Eastern District of California. Plaintiffs in five actions suggest instead centralization in the District of Hawaii. Plaintiff in one action does not oppose the Southern District of Illinois, but suggests that the Eastern District of Louisiana is a more appropriate transferee district. Finally, plaintiff in one potential tag-along action suggests centralization in the Northern District of Illinois. Various plaintiffs alternatively support the Central District of California, the District of Hawaii, or the Southern District of Illinois.

Defendant Monsanto Company opposes centralization. Should the Panel centralize this litigation over Monsanto's objections, it alternatively proposes centralization in the Northern District of California, the Southern District of California, or the Southern District of Florida. Monsanto's primary arguments against centralization are that: (1) individualized facts concerning each plaintiff's case, such as the nature of plaintiff's exposure, the formulation of Roundup to which plaintiff was exposed, and the specific type of non-Hodgkins' lymphoma plaintiff developed, will predominate over common factual issues; and (2) informal coordination and cooperation among the involved parties and courts are preferable to centralization. We are not persuaded by either argument.

There undoubtedly are some individualized factual issues presented by these actions, but they do not negate the efficiencies to be gained by centralization. Regardless of the particular formulation

¹ These and any other related actions are potential tag-along actions. *See* Panel Rules 1.1(h), 7.1, and 7.2.

of Roundup at issue (all of which employ glyphosate as the active ingredient), or the nature of plaintiff's exposure to glyphosate, all the actions entail an overarching query—whether glyphosate causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in persons exposed to it while using Roundup. Monsanto itself implicitly acknowledges the predominance of this common question as it has moved in a number of the underlying actions to bifurcate discovery to address general causation issues before plaintiff-specific ones. In any event, almost all personal injury litigation involves plaintiff-specific questions of causation and damages. Those differences are not an impediment to centralization when common questions of fact are multiple and complex, as they are here. *See In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1404 (J.P.M.L. 2014). When discovery and other pretrial proceedings related to the common issues have been completed, the transferee judge may suggest Section 1407 remand of the actions to their transferor courts for more individual discovery and trial, if necessary. *See In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2011).

Turning to Monsanto's second argument, we conclude that informal coordination among the involved courts and counsel is not practicable in this instance. Including the potential tag-along actions, there are now thirty-seven actions pending in twenty-one districts. More than ten different law firms represent plaintiffs in these actions, which are spread across the country. Even if no additional actions are filed, the present number of cases, districts, and involved counsel, as well as the complexity of the issues presented, warrants centralization.

On the basis of the papers filed and hearing session held, we find that these actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Northern District of California will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation. These actions share common factual questions arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning general causation, the background science, and regulatory history will be common to all actions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and *Daubert* motion practice); and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.

We select the Northern District of California as the appropriate transferee district for this litigation. Two of the earliest-filed and most procedurally advanced actions are pending in this district. The Northern District of California is both convenient and easily accessible for all parties, and we are convinced that the district has the necessary judicial resources and expertise to efficiently manage this litigation. Furthermore, centralization in this district allows us to assign this litigation to the Honorable Vince Chhabria, a skilled jurist who has not yet had the opportunity to preside over an MDL.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the actions listed on Schedule A and pending outside the Northern District of California are transferred to the Northern District of California and, with the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable Vince Chhabria for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

Sarah S. Vance

Chair

Marjorie O. Rendell Lewis A. Kaplan R. David Proctor Charles R. Breyer Ellen Segal Huvelle Catherine D. Perry

IN RE: ROUNDUP PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

MDL No. 2741

SCHEDULE A

Central District of California

MCCALL v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 2:16-01609 HERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 2:16-01988 JOHANSING v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 2:16-05035 SANDERS, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 5:16-00726

Eastern District of California

MENDOZA v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 1:16-00406

Northern District of California

HARDEMAN v. MONSANTO COMPANY, ET AL., C.A. No. 3:16-00525 STEVICK, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 3:16-02341

Southern District of California

GIGLIO v. MONSANTO COMPANY, ET AL., C.A. No. 3:15-02279

Southern District of Florida

RUIZ, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 9:16-80539

District of Hawaii

SHEPPARD, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 1:16-00043 JOHNSON v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 1:16-00075

Northern District of Illinois

GIBBS v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 1:16-07588

Southern District of Illinois

BRIDGEMAN v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 3:16-00812 HARRIS v. MONSANTO COMPANY, ET AL., C.A. No. 3:16-00823 PATTERSON v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 3:16-00825 -A2-

Western District of Kentucky

MEANS v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 5:16-00112

Eastern District of Louisiana

WORK v. RAGAN AND MASSEY, INC., ET AL., C.A. No. 2:16-07491

District of Massachusetts

SCHEFFER v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 1:16-11489

Northern District of Mississippi

COUEY v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 4:16-00149

<u>District of Nebraska</u>

DOMINA, ET AL. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 4:16-03074

<u>Western District of Wisconsin</u>

PORATH v. MONSANTO COMPANY, C.A. No. 3:16-00518

EXHIBIT D



FILED ALAMEDA COUNTY

JAN 0 4 2018

CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
By Millians
Deputy

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 3.550)	JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING No. 4953
ROUNDUP PRODUCT CASES	ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
AND COORDINATED ACTIONS	COORDINATION

A Petition for Coordination was submitted to the Judicial Council on October 17, 2017 ("Petition") by Plaintiffs Loretta Pennie *et al.* The undersigned, Judge Ioana Petrou, was assigned as Coordination Motion Judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 404 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.524, on November 21, 2017. The Petition came on for hearing on December 20, 2017.

The Court, having considered the Petition and the Response thereto, orders that the Petition for Coordination is GRANTED. The Court finds that the included actions listed in the Petition are complex pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.502, and that the included actions meet the standards set forth in Code of

Civil Procedure § 404.1.

While Defendants did not oppose coordination of the included actions for pre-trial purposes, they did oppose Plaintiffs' proposed choices for the site of the coordination proceedings.

Plaintiffs recommended Alameda County as the most appropriate venue for coordination proceedings, with San Francisco County as the next most appropriate venue, and Santa Barbara as the third alternative. Defendants recommended Riverside County as the most appropriate venue, with San Diego County as the alternative venue.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.530(b), in determining the site for the coordination proceedings, the Court may consider any relevant factor, including the following: the number of included actions in particular locations; whether litigation is at advanced stage in a particular court; the efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; the location of witnesses and evidence; the convenience of parties and witnesses; the parties' principal places of business; the office locations of counsel for both parties; and the ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.

The Petition indicates that 14 of the 16 included cases were pending in Alameda County. However, following this Court's July 14, 2017 Order in *Billings v. Monsanto*, Case No. RG17-852375, and the Court's August 4, 2017 Order in *Pilliod v. Monsanto*, Case No. RG17-862-702, only five of the included cases are

properly pending in Alameda County. In addition, pursuant to the December 5, 2017 Joint Stipulation Regarding Venue and Related Issues in *Pennie v. Monsanto*, RG17-853420, the parties have agreed that all 33 Plaintiffs in that case other than Loretta Pennie will dismiss their claims in the Pennie case and refile in the county where their alleged exposure to Defendants' products occurred. None of those exposures occurred in Alameda, San Francisco, or Santa Barbara counties, four occurred in Riverside County, and two in San Diego County.

On December 14, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Potential Add-On Cases, indicating that five multi-plaintiff cases were filed in San Francisco just the day before. Plaintiffs' counsel did not provide any information in that Notice concerning where those alleged exposures occurred, but he admitted that none of those plaintiffs live in San Francisco.

After taking into account this Court's prior orders severing various Plaintiffs from the Alameda cases and ordering them to refile their cases elsewhere and the parties' Stipulation to that effect in the *Pennie* case, approximately half of the Plaintiffs named in the Alameda cases will be refiling their cases somewhere in Southern California. It appears that ten of those cases will be refiled in Kern County, four in Riverside County, and the remainder will be refiled in counties throughout California. This factor may slightly favor coordination somewhere in Southern California, but only very slightly given the distribution of plaintiffs across the State of California.

None of the cases are in a truly advanced stage of litigation. One of the included actions, *Huerta v. Monsanto*, pending in Riverside County, is at a somewhat more advanced stage than the other included actions. The presiding judge, the Honorable Sharon Waters, has conducted five case management conferences, issued a confidentiality order, and bifurcated causation from other issues, but no trial date has been set. Therefore, while this case is more advanced than the others, it is not at a highly advanced stage.

As for the location and convenience of access to witnesses and evidence, approximately half of the named Plaintiffs from the included actions listed in the Petition for Coordination were allegedly exposed to Defendants' products in Southern California. This factor may slightly favor coordination in Southern California, but not strongly so. Conversely, the principal place of business of two Defendants, Wilbur-Ellis Company LLC and Wilbur-Ellis Feed LLC, is in San Francisco, which favors coordination in San Francisco or Alameda Counties.

Regarding ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations, the Court is persuaded that this factor strongly favors coordination in either San Francisco or Alameda Counties, rather than in Riverside or San Diego Counties. While this factor may favor coordination in Los Angeles County, where virtually all counsel are located, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have suggested Los Angeles County.

One factor only glancingly addressed by the parties' filings is that the multi-

district litigation proceeding pending in federal court is being heard by the Honorable Vincent Chhabria in the Northern District of California, located in San Francisco. This factor strongly favors coordination in either San Francisco or Alameda Counties, both to facilitate the coordination trial judge's ability to attend the scheduled Daubert evidentiary hearings and to allow counsel to coordinate hearing dates in Federal District Court and State Court.

Therefore, having considered the factors set forth in Rule 3.530(b), the Coordination Motion Judge hereby recommends to the Chair of the Judicial Council that the coordinated proceedings be conducted in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 404.2, the reviewing court with appellate jurisdiction over the coordinated actions shall be the First District Court of Appeal, San Francisco, California.

The list of cases subject to this Order is set forth below. The Court excludes the case of *Johnson v. Monsanto*, Case No. CGC-16-550128, pending in San Francisco County Superior Court and referenced in the Petition, because that case is already set for trial.

All of the included actions are stayed by operation of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.529(b).

The clerk of the court is directed to serve this order upon Petitioners
forthwith and file proof of such service. Petitioners shall promptly file this order in

each included action, serve it on each party appearing in an included action, submit it to the Chair of Judicial Counsel, and file proof of such service and submission.

(California Rules of Court, Rules 3.529(a); 3.511(a)(9) & (b); and 3.510.)

List of Cases Subject to This Order

- Loretta I. Pennie, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17853420 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- Mary Scalise v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. 17CV02577 (Santa Barbara County Superior Court).
- 3. Gino Roth v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17854000 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- Michael Woodbury v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17855094
 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 5. Charles Baker v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17876143 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 6. Millard F. Billings v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17852375 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 7. Alva Pilliod, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17862702 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 8. William Clevenger v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17872423 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 9. Rick Cole v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17875095 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 10. Kelly Bezzerides v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17873193 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- Gayle Michel v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17872413
 (Alameda County Superior Court).

- 12. John Novak v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17876078 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- Sharon Rowland v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17876283
 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- Sharon McClurg v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17876148
 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 15. Brenda Huerta, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RIC 1600639 (Riverside County Superior Court).
- Thomas Barba v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17876711
 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- 17. Veronica Thompson v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. RG17876733 (Alameda County Superior Court).
- Marjorie Grubka v. Monsanto C(or, if in Southern California, Los Angeles
 County, which neither party has suggested), ompany, et al., Case No.
 MSC17-02338 (Contra Costa County Superior Court).
- John Aiton, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. CGC-17-563100
 (San Francisco County Superior Court).
- Charles T. Baker, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. CGC-17-563101 (San Francisco County Superior Court).
- Joyce Adele Behar, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. CGC-17 563102 (San Francisco County Superior Court).
- Stephen G. Kohn, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. CGC-17-563104 (San Francisco County Superior Court).
- James P. Norris, et al. v. Monsanto Company, et al., Case No. CGC-17-563105 (San Francisco County Superior Court).

//

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 4, 2018

Date

Ioana Petrou

Coordination Motion Judge

ROUNDUP PRODUCT CASES NO. JCCP 4953 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

RECEIVED INNO 8 2018

I certify that the following is true and correct:

I am a Deputy Clerk employed by the Alameda County Superior Court. I am over the age of 18 years. My business address is 1221 Oak Street, Oakland, California. I served the ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR COORDINATION by placing copies in envelopes addressed as shown below and sealing and placing them for collection, stamping or metering with prepaid postage, and mailing on the date stated below, in the United States mail at Alameda County, California, following standard court practices.

Michael L. Baum R. Brent Wisner Pedram Esfandiary, BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI, & GOLDMAN, PC 12100 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 950 Los Angeles, CA 90025	Timothy Litzenburg Curtis G. Hoke Michael J. Miller THE MILLER FIRM, LLC 108 Railroad Avenue Orange, VA 22960
Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Kevin J. Madonna KENNEDY & MADONNA, LLP 48 Dewitt Mills Road Hurley, New York 12443	Nicholas R. Rockforte Christopher L. Coffin Jonathan E. Chatwin PENDLEY, BAUDIN & COFFIN, LLP 1515 Poydras Street, Suite 1400 New Orleans, LA 70112
Aimee H. Wagstaff David Wool ANDRUS WAGSTAFF, PC 7171 W. Alaska Drive Lakewood, CO 80226	Peter A. Miller Thomas F. DellaFera, Jr. MILLER DELLAFERA, PLC 3420 Pump Road, PMB 404 Henrico, VA 23233
Chair, Judicial Council of California Attn: Appellate Court Services (Civil Case Coordination) 455 Golden Gate Avenue, 5th Floor San Francisco, CA 94102-3688	Jeremy C. Shafer MILLER LEGAL, LLP 543 Encinitas Blvd., Suite 111 Encinitas, CA 92024

Dated: January 5, 2018

Chad Finke Executive Officer/Clerk of the Superior Court

By: MMX HOWAW Deputy Clerk

EXHIBIT E

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS TRIAL DIVISION - CIVIL

IN	RE:	ROUNDUP	PRODUCTS	LIABILITY
Lľ	ΓIG	ATION		

May TERM 2022

Complex Litigation Certar

No. 550

MAY 1 1 2022

J Stament

ORDER

AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2022, upon consideration of the Petition to Coordinate Roundup Products Liability Cases (Control No. 22022902; filed under <u>Debra Purnell, et al., v.</u>

<u>Monsanto Company, et al.</u>, June Term 2021 No. 2347), and any response, the Petition is GRANTED.

Accordingly, all currently filed Roundup matters, including those appearing on the attached list of cases, shall be transferred to the Complex Litigation and coordinated under the above-captioned Master Docket. Counsel shall have twenty (20) days in which to submit an agreed-upon Case Management Order No. 1 to the Court. Upon failure to agree, counsel shall notify the Court, and the Court will issue Case Management Order No. 1.

It is further **ORDERED** that all responsive pleading obligations are stayed until responsive pleading deadlines are established under Case Management Order No. 1.

ORDER-in Re: Roundup Products Litigation

220500550000002

Lisette Shirdan-Harris, J.

Administrative Judge, Trial Division

EXHIBIT 1

	Case Name	Court Term	Plaintiffs' Counsel
		and Number	
1	Brought, Susan	210900079	Feldman Pinto LLC
2	Cole, Stacey F.	210900081	Feldman Pinto LLC
3	Dougherty, William	210900083	Feldman Pinto LLC
4	Martel, Kelly J.	210900084	Feldman Pinto LLC
5	Schandler, Albert F., Jr.	210900085	Feldman Pinto LLC
6	Valente, Stephen	210900086	Feldman Pinto LLC
7	Benn, Maurice	210900923	Feldman Pinto LLC
8	Donatelli, Mark S.	210900924	Feldman Pinto LLC
9	Ford, John	21090092	Feldman Pinto LLC
10	Mattioli, Joseph	210900925	Feldman Pinto LLC
11	Murphy, Daniel	210900928	Feldman Pinto LLC
12	Phillips, Mark S.	210900930	Foldman Pinto LLC
13	Smith, Thomas E.	210900931	Feldman Pinto LLC
14	Stewart, William B.	210900932	Feldman Pinto LLC
15	Taylor, Ronald K.	210900933	Feldman Pinto LLC
16	Wagner, William	210900935	Feldman Pinto LLC
17	Brooks, Holly	210902140	Feldman Pinto LLC
18	Cowden, Lawrence M.	210902141	Feldman Pinto LLC
19	Daywalt, Bernadette	210902142	Feldman Pinto LLC
20	dePrimo, Joseph	210902143	Feldman Pinto LLC
21	Glancy, George, H., Jr.	210902144	Feldman Pinto LLC
22	Goff, Joseph C.	210902145	Feldman Pinto LLC
23	Hample, Michael	210902146	Feldman Pinto LLC
24	Jones, Michael	210902147	Feldman Pinto LLC
25	Lenox, Ronald	210902148	Feldman Pinto LLC
26	May, Marvin	210902165	Feldman Pinto LLC
27	McGlone, Gerard	210902154	Feldman Pinto LLC
28	Miechur, Josephine	210902155	Feldman Pinto LLC
29	Shaffer, William H, Sr.	210902156	Feldman Pinto LLC
30	Sinemus, Lon	210902157	Feldman Pinto LLC
31	Weiss, Elliott	210902158	Feldman Pinto LLC
32	Beckley, Karen	211000081	Feldman Pinto LLC
33	Cipollone, Susan M.	211000082	Feldman Pinto LLC
34	Gavarone, Deborah	211000083	Feldman Pinto LLC
35	Gennett, John	211000084	Feldman Pinto LLC
36	Houk, Terry	211000085	Feldman Pinto LLC
37	Miller, Allison, M	211000086	Feldman Pinto LLC
38	Patton, Gregory	211000088	Feldman Pinto LLC
39	Stitt, Alan	211000089	Feldman Pinto LLC

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Case ID: 210602347 Control No.: 22022902

40	Sullivan, John	211000091	Feldman Pinto LLC
41	White, Barbara	211000091	Feldman Pinto LLC
42	White, Sandra	211000094	Feldman Pinto LLC
43	Wolpert, Michael	211000034	Feldman Pinto LLC
44	Bost, Shirley	211000043	
45	Brubaker, Debra		Feldman Pinto LLC
46		211001572	Feldman Pinto LLC
	Budd, Thomas, Sr.	211001573	Feldman Pinto LLC
47	Deascenti, Judy	211001574	Feldman Pinto LLC
48		211001575	Feldman Pinto LLC
49		211001576	Feldman Pinto LLC
50	McGee, Joseph	211001577	Feldman Pinto LLC
51	Schechter, Sidney	211001578	Feldman Pinto LLC
52	Sheaffer, Michelle	211001579	Feldman Pinto LLC
53	Irvine, Denise	220102488	Feldman Pinto LLC
54	Federovitch, Francis	220102489	Feldman Pinto LLC
55	Swenson, John	220102490	Feldman Pinto LLC
56	Stoffa, John J.	220102491	Feldman Pinto LLC
57	Rinchart, Martin Grant	220102493	Feldman Pinto LLC
58	Kiehl, Michael Anthony	220102495	Feldman Pinto LLC
59	Perrelli, Michael J.	220102496	Feldman Pinto LLC
60	Boothby, Roger Wayne	220102497	Feldman Pinto LLC
61	Coughlin, Elizabeth on behalf of Patrick Coughlin	220102499	Feldman Pinto LLC
62	Ballantyne, Carl Rigg and	211201357	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
	Kathleen		Tanada a special, i carinina inini
63	Barron, Lucas Lee, Deceased	220102492	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
64	Brosius, Joyce	220102498	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
65	Brunskill, Nancy	220200040	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
66	Caranci, Ernest and Carmela	210602213	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
67	Deichman, Stephen & Tammy	220200302	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
68	DiGiacomo, Michael & Jeanne	220200305	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
69	Garretson, Susan and Thomas	220200033	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
70	Graham, Dianne	220102501	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
71	Gunn, Jeffrey	210700239	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
72	Hamsher, Jeffrey & Shelley	220200310	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
73	Hodgson, Patricia	220200037	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
74	Keener, Thomas	220200041	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
75	Kulp, Benjamin & Tammy	220200312	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
76	McCrudden, James and Kristina	220200317	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
77	McGowan, Sean & Brianna	220200036	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
78	Medway, Marc	210901933	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
79	Melissen, William	210602578	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
80	Miller, William and Melissa	220200425	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
81	Purnell, Lambert (Dec'd)	210602347	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
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82	Schank, Lorraine and Michael	220200034	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
83	Scott, Tyrone	220200024	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
84	Shafer, David Lee, Dec'd	220200327	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
85	Sterling, Kevin & Debra	220200325	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin -
86	Tapper, Eugene: & Michele	220200333	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
87	Varano, Kenneth and Lori	220200343	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
88	Warwick, Mary and Robert	220200355	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
89	Wilson, Adia	220200038	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
90	Wright, Rodney	220200014	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin
91	Zippi, Carlo and Sueann	220200357	Kline & Specter, P.C./Arnold Itkin

EXHIBIT F

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART ATLANTIC COUNTY, NEW JERSEY DOCKET NO. ATL-L-701-24, et al. A.D. # MICHAEL RIEHL, et al., Plaintiffs,) TRANSCRIPT) OF V.) MONSANTO COMPANY, MOTION HEARING BAYER AG, et al., Defendants. Place: Atlantic County (Heard via Zoom) Date: January 7, 2025 BEFORE: THE HON. DANIELLE J. WALCOFF, J.S.C. TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: MATTHEW B. SICHERI, ESQ. (Sbaiti & Company NJ LLC) APPEARANCES: CHANTAL LEVY, ESQ. (Weitz & Luxenberg) Attorney for the Plaintiffs STEPHEN C. MATTHEWS, ESQ. (DLA Piper) Attorney for the Defendants

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Colloquy

THE COURT: On the record via Zoom on several matters wherein similar motions were filed. I'm going to go through those dockets and then have you enter your appearances. The first is Brown versus Monsanto Company, et al., ATL-L-27-24. The next case is William Capobianco versus the same defendants, ATL-L-114-24. Next is Joseph Caruso versus the same defendants, Docket Number is ATL-L-699-24. Next, John Chapman versus the same defendants, Docket Number is ATL-L-331-24. Next, Judith Engelbrecht versus the same defendants, Docket ATL-L-115-24.

Next, Salvatore Marra, same defendants, Docket Number ATL-L-3229-23. Next, Pasquale Mirra, M-i-r-ra versus the same defendants, Docket Number ATL-L-29-24. Next, Maryann Troster, individually as administrator of the estate of Donald Marvel, Jr., deceased versus the same defendants, Docket Number ATL-L-28-24. And then I have Michael Riehl, R-i-e-h-l versus the same defendants, Docket Number ATL-L-701-24.

So, counsel for plaintiff, go ahead and enter your appearance, please.

MS. LEVY: Chantal Levy from Weitz and Luxenberg on behalf of all of those plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Matthews, good afternoon. Go ahead and enter your

appearance, please.

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MR. MATTHEWS: Good afternoon, Your Honor, and happy new year. Stephen Matthews from DLA Piper on behalf of the defendants, Monsanto Company, Bayer Corporation, Bayer U.S., LLC, and Bayer Crop Science, LP.

THE COURT: Okay. And then I see there may be some other counsel on that may represent plaintiffs in some other matters, whether they be filed in this county or other counties, as I know that they are filed kind of all over the state.

I am going to specifically start my analysis when we get to it by talking about the Michael Riehl, R-i-e-h-l case, the L-28-24 docket, solely because that was the first one that I had picked up before my law clerk was kind enough to make them alphabetical for me. And I wanted to go through everything, and that's complete. To the extent that there's any difference, I will ask plaintiffs' counsel to go through each case and tell me about those.

I note initially that I see is the difference between those plaintiffs, aside from one being deceased, but they each have a little bit of a different diagnosis, but all of which are diagnosed with some subtype of a non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.

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all have many years, all over 20 years, that they alleged of exposure to Roundup in all but three of those plaintiffs.

These three, Capobianco, Chapman, and Mira allege in the opposition brief residential and occupational exposure, where the other ones -- I'm sorry, they do not say residential and occupational exposure. They just say years of use, where everybody else, the other if there's nine of them, the other six of them allege residential and occupational exposure.

But, in all of these motions, I read the defendants' motion to dismiss a portion of the plaintiffs' complaint or amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted filed August 23rd. I reviewed the plaintiffs' opposition that was filed October 1st, 2024. I reviewed the reply brief that was filed by the defendant on October 7.

The motion had been adjourned several times for a couple of reasons and I'm just going to put them on the record. First is, the motions were filed in other cases here in Atlantic County that were pending before Judge Porto, who's the presiding judge of the Civil Division, so I always afford deference to him.

Secondly, we started getting in consent orders and stipulations of dismissals in Monsanto

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cases, just as the dismissal that was filed in this case as to Bayer Crop Science, so I wanted to afford times for the parties to work out whatever they were working on behind the scenes.

And then third, I started receiving stipulations in motions in other cases, that this motion was actually being withdrawn. So, I was waiting to see if that happened with these particular cases. So, that's what brings us to today. I kind of gave it its own return date.

Mr. Matthews, I'm going to start with you, because it's your motion. I took from your filings a couple main takeaways. You want me to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, all of the common law portions of the plaintiffs' amended complaint.

So, the common law portions of Counts 1 and 2, the Count 3, which is negligence, Count 5, breach of implied warranty, and Count 6, the fraudulent concealment count, so that all that would be left of the plaintiffs' amended complaint would be the PLA parts of Counts 1 and 2. And then you also seek to dismiss Count 4, which is for breach of expressed warranty, because your position is that the plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that.

Matthews - Argument

And your position is that the NJPLA is a exclusive remedy for harm caused by a product. So, all those common law causes of action are basically subsumed by the NJPLA. And also with regard to Count 4, you're telling me, look, Judge, there's a lot of generalizations in this amended complaint. There is not factually specific enough to set forth the elements you need for the breach of expressed warranty claim. For example, the allegations don't satisfy the basis of the bargain requirement, amongst other things.

But, those were my main takeaways from your filings. Anything on the same, Mr. Matthews, anything you want to put on the record?

MR. MATTHEWS: No, Your Honor, you did cover it very well. I just want to kind of go through the procedural history with you a little bit, because I think that would be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MATTHEWS: Yeah, obviously, there was hopefully other arguments today, and I withdrew those motions today involving the Motley Rice Firm, because the Motley Rice Firm has actually agreed to amend the complaint to conform to the New Jersey Products Liability Act, which is what we've seen. Not only, you know, obviously Judge Porto's decisions granting the

motion to dismiss in part and to rule that the non-New Jersey PLA claims should be dropped. But, that's actually happened in other counties across the state, Gloucester, Sussex, and Passaic.

And so, you articulated my argument as well as I would articulate it, Your Honor. I don't need to — especially if you have any questions. I would note on the expressed warranty piece, especially as it pertains to plaintiff Marvel, there is no — none of the plaintiffs, there are no specific allegations that they received some expressed warranty and they relied upon it, which is significant for the expressed warranty claim. I'm not saying that the plaintiffs can't amend to articulate it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MATTHEWS: We just haven't stated it here yet. Obviously, it becomes a little more problematic in the Marvel case, 'cause Mr. Marvel has passed. So — but Your Honor is correct. Our view, which is in line with Judge Porto, Judge Marsala, Judge Pawar, and Judge Morgan, among others, is that these complaints, which are all very similar, you know, they assert the same causes of action and claims, should all be subsumed by the New Jersey Products Liability Act, and the environmental tort exception does not apply here

Matthews - Argument

to, you know, Roundup as used in this case, and as, you know, as alleged in the complaints.

This is truly a New Jersey Products Liability Act, and as the cases have shown for years now since the passing of the statute, the Products Liability Act controls and all common law causes of actions are subsumed. Except for that expressed warranty count.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. MATTHEWS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Levy, I took from the opposition a couple of takeaways. You're saying that the NJPLA does not subsume all of the common law causes of action because this case does fall under an exception. It's the environmental tort exception, that based on that exception, the common law causes of action should continue.

And you said, look, the defense is assuming that these plaintiffs' exposure was solely from personal use, but six of the nine of them particularly had occupational exposure. And we did plead sufficiently in all of our filings with regard to Count 4 that addresses breach of the expressed warranties, because we talked about specific affirmations and promises that the defendant made about the safety of Roundup in product labeling, market materials,

advertisements, websites, public statements.

I think Page 9 of your opposition brief listed out specific examples that basically, you know, Roundup is being sold as being safer than table salt, and basically non-toxic to mammals. And then with regard to another element of that type of claim, whether affirmations of fact form the basis of the bargain, that's up to a jury.

But, I can tell you, Judge, that the plaintiff alleges that these promises become part of the basis of the bargain and they help these plaintiffs when they're deciding whether or not to use Roundup. They're relying on these representations. And these representations, affirmations, whatever term you want to use, Judge, induce people to purchase Roundup.

And also we did plead that Roundup doesn't conform to the affirmation, the promise of the description, because it is unsafe for human health and it caused some version of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in all of these plaintiffs. Anything on the same, anything you want to put on the record, Ms. Levy?

MS. LEVY: That's a great summary, Your Honor. I would just like to note two things. First with respect to Judge Porto's decision in the <u>Moreland</u> case, which is our firm's one other case in New Jersey.

Levy - Argument

Judge Porto is in the process of amending his order, because there were some inconsistencies with his rulings during the hearing and --

THE COURT: That makes sense to me, because I listened to his decision, and I looked at those orders and I was completely confused by the language of the orders. So, I went back and I relistened twice to make sure I didn't miss anything. So, that makes sense to me. I follow you on that.

MR. MATTHEWS: Judge, and we -- and the parties, and I owe Ms. Levy a response to the consent order. We're tweaking -- the opinion is right. Judge Porto confirmed that.

THE COURT: Yeah.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MATTHEWS: The order -- the execution on the opinion --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MATTHEWS: -- was the football.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MATTHEWS: And so we're fixing the order to comply with -- to comport with the decision.

THE COURT: I want you to know that the briefs were very well written. I did look at filings in other counties and by other plaintiffs to see what their complaints were, what they were alleging, what

the brief writing in those were. And I was so confused by Judge Porto's orders that — and I'm thinking in my mind, if I don't hear something today that makes me change my mind, in my mind, this is the order I'm entering, and I printed it out to go over with you folks to make sure that this didn't happen. So, go ahead, you wanted to tell me something else though.

MS. LEVY: Well, so just with respect to that order. So, Judge Porto did sustain our breach of expressed warranty claim and provided us with the opportunity to amend our complaint to further allege that the environmental tort exception applies.

So, I just would like to quickly discuss the environmental tort exception. And obviously Your Honor's been very thorough in researching the motion and all of the case law and what not. But, I just want to summarize that, you know, New Jersey courts, including the New Jersey Supreme Court in Fowler in 2022 have been very clear as to how to determine whether the environmental tort exception applies. It's — and in Fowler, the Court specifically said, asbestos claims fall within the category of the environmental tort exception, because such cases largely involve workers' exposure to contaminated air.

So, whether a product falls under the

Levy - Argument

environmental tort exception requires examining the nature of the products itself, not the specific plaintiffs' exposure or their specific use. It's the nature of the product. Is the product primarily intended for personal consumption or is it primarily intended for occupational or industrial use? And then what are the primary methods of exposure for the people who are exposed to the products at issue?

Both answers here are environmental and commercial. Roundup was created for agricultural use in the 1970s. It's -- it currently only persists for agricultural and occupational use for landscapers. Monsanto has actually gotten rid of glyphosate, which is the active ingredient in Roundup for home use. So, it's no longer used for personal consumption. And for the past 50 years it's only been personal -- the personal use of Roundup, the home use of Roundup has only been a tangential use of the product.

The main source of revenue for Roundup has always been agricultural and occupational use. And that seems true for the main method of exposure. Most people in society at large, not just those who use Roundup, are exposed to Roundup through ambient environmental exposure. It's in, as we stated in our complaint, Roundup and glyphosate are in the vast

majority of the population's urine, because we're all exposed to it through food, even if we're not spraying it in our backyards and are not farm workers.

So, for that reason, I think the, you know, the case law is clear. We don't have to look at specific plaintiffs and their use, so we would be more than happy to amend our complaints to specify their specific use and their specific exposures. And we could also further elaborate upon how primary exposure in society is through ambient environmental exposure.

But, I think our complaint already does that, and I think it readily satisfies the standard set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court and other courts.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEVY: That's all I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. Anything you heard,
Mr. Matthews, that you'd like to reply to?

MR. MATTHEWS: Just two quick things. One is, a lot of those statements about the product and the revenues and what have you are in the record, and therefore they really can't be part of this analysis today. But, also, you know, if you go -- if Your Honor would -- I'm not sure, I think we sent it to you. But, you know, Judge Morgan's analysis of this issue is very thorough. And --

Matthews - Further Argument

THE COURT: I am familiar with that.

MR. MATTHEWS: Yeah. And so, you know, it's, you know, and it really kind of links back to before this all began, right, with In re Lead Paint. You know, obviously, lead paint was used ubiquitously. But, you know, in commercial settings and in residential settings it was, you know, people could make the same allegations about, you know, paint chips and paint chips or what have you never having used it.

And there the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically said the New Jersey Products Liability Act applies. And therefore that exception doesn't fit the mold. And so, just as the other judges have done, we'd ask that Your Honor dismiss the common law causes of action. And it's -- and obviously it has to be without prejudice, although we were all a little surprised by Judge Porto's order.

But, if Your Honor is going to allow for an amendment, we just -- just so we can keep docket control, the only thing I would ask is that we put in a time frame if they're going -- if Your Honor's inclined to grant my motion today and if the plaintiffs do want to proceed, just for docket control purposes, we'd ask that they have 30 days or what have you to amend so that we're not -- we're trying to figure out what we're

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supposed to be answering, and I don't want to have -if we don't do that, then the plaintiffs will be getting notices of lack of prosecution, and then we'll be sending in a whole bunch more communications to the Court, which neither Chantal or I probably want to do, so --

> THE COURT: I understand. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. MATTHEWS:

Your Honor, if I may --MS. LEVY:

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LEVY: -- briefly just address the <u>Lead</u> Paint decision? So, I believe that Lead Paint is perfectly consistent with plaintiffs' argument. decision, the Supreme Court says asbestos claims by and large fall under the environmental tort exception because they involve work place exposure to contaminated ambient air, in like manner exposure to fungicides and similar substances in a work place environment fall outside of the PLA.

And then the Court distinguishes lead paint, and then cleaning products that you would use at home that might seep into your skin through a cut saying that those sorts of products the consumers generally use in their homes and in private buildings essentially remain consumer products, rather than products used in

Levy - Further Argument

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an industrial context.

So, the Court is distinguishing fungicides and asbestos and environmental exposures from products that are primarily used and exposed to at home. respectfully, I think it's perfectly consistent with the Court, the Supreme Court's decision in Fowler and in other case law suits.

THE COURT: I have a separate question to ask What portion -- are you telling me that Judge Porto is having you amend your complaint with regard to He's affording time for that? something specific?

So, he said that we can more MS. LEVY: specifically plead whether -- I mean, I wasn't exactly clear, because it wasn't clear from the decision. I think we can more specifically plead how our plaintiffs were exposed to Roundup and also the environmental tort exception argument, is my understanding, that he's allowing for us to clarify both of those arguments in the complaint, like how it's used for industrial, commercial purposes and primary exposure as environmental.

THE COURT: Is that your understanding, Mr. Matthews?

MR. MATTHEWS: You know, I'm not -- I'm not I think -- 'cause -- what I do know is simply sure.

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this, the plaintiffs are the master of their complaint. And the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. So, you know, I don't think that the Court has, you know, asked them for an amendment or instructed them to do it. They're allowed to.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MATTHEWS: And so, obviously, you know, until I see what they're going to allege in the amended complaint, you know, either we're going to answer or we're going to be back here doing another round of motions to dismiss.

THE COURT: So, Judge Porto dismissed all the common law causes of action without prejudice, even though the order -

MR. MATTHEWS: Correct.

THE COURT: -- says with prejudice?

MR. MATTHEWS: Correct.

THE COURT: And what about the Count 4, the expressed warranty?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MATTHEWS: He has allowed the expressed war -- I (indiscernible). He's allowed the expressed warranty to proceed.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MATTHEWS: Obviously --

THE COURT: That's what I thought. Yeah,

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okay. I just wanted to make sure --

MR. MATTHEWS: The only issue I would say -- THE COURT: -- based on whatever happened after that I had what was going on in my mind.

MR. MATTHEWS: That is still the case and obviously we'll reraise that at the appropriate time at the summary judgment phase. The only aspect of this, I would say is unique, is to the Marvel case, where there is no, you know, there is no plaintiff, right, who could allege that they received the warranty.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MATTHEWS: And at the end of the day, an expressed warranty has to be received. It's not general. It's not just statements that are made. It has — someone has to stand up and say, I received that, I received that. And we won't have that in a normal case. But, you know, that's just — as far as I'm concerned, being in this case, it's splitting hairs.

THE COURT: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MATTHEWS: It's not going to impact how we proceed in defending the case or what have you, so I just --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MATTHEWS: -- explained that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you both very much. In the plaintiff Riehl amended complaint, he asserts that he's a New Jersey resident, as do all the other complaints. He alleges that he was diagnosed with lymphocytic leukemia. Other plaintiffs allege different things. I wrote myself, like, a whole list of them, MALT lymphoma, large B-cell lymphoma. Regardless of what the actual diagnosis is they all allege to be subtypes of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.

Around various years, plaintiff Riehls was diagnosed in 2022. Plaintiff Riehl claims to have used defendant Monsanto's Roundup products on a regular basis for 44 years, both at his home and through his work. And he alleges that the defendants as the manufacturers and sellers of Roundup, which is a glyphosate-based herbicide product are the proximate cause of the plaintiff's diagnosis. Likewise, with all the other plaintiffs we're talking about here today.

I did review 4:62(e). It's the rule that governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; Printing Mart, Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp. is our New Jersey Supreme Court case. It's a seminal case for going over the standard for that type of motion. It's found at 116 N.J. 739. It's from 1989.

Decision

It tells me that the Court has to search the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundamental cause of action may be gleaned from even an obscure statement of claim with opportunity to amend if necessary. That's the without prejudice part.

I am not to be concerned with whether or not the plaintiff can prove the allegations. I have to take the allegations as true, along with every reasonable inference of fact that can be drawn therefrom. And I have to do a painstaking examination of the complaint with a generous and hospitality approach.

I did review the plaintiff Riehl's amended complaint filed July 9th, 2024 and the complaints for the other dockets. I also went back and took a look at the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C. I went through lots of the sections. Section 2C:2 establishes the sole method to prosecute a product liability action relating the harms caused by products, except for harm caused by a breach of an expressed warranty.

I have reviewed the various definitions found throughout the PLA, such as the definition of harm, the definition of adequate warning. I went and looked at

the environmental tort exception found in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-6. I reviewed the case law that was in the motion filing of the papers. In my mind, when I follow the law from the court rule, the case law and the statutes, I do find that the plaintiffs' common law claims should be dismissed, because the PLA provides the exclusive remedy for the harm caused by a -- because a PLA provides that the PLA is the exclusive remedy for harm caused by a product.

N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, B-3 states, these actions include any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim, except actions for harm by breach of an expressed warranty.

So, the PLA, there's an Appellate Division case, <u>Tirrell</u>. It's cited in every -- every one of these types of motions; <u>Tirrell v. Navistar</u>
<u>International, Inc.</u>, 248 N.J. Super. 390. It's an Appellate Division decision. Cert was denied by the Supreme Court, 126 N.J. 390 in 1991. The Court said the PLA no longer recognizes a negligence or breach of implied warranty count as a separate claim for harm caused by a defective product or in adequate warning.

So, in my mind, the plaintiffs' common law claims must be dismissed unless an exception applies.

Decision

The plaintiff argues that his claims fall under the environmental tort action exception. That's N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-6. The statute at 2A:58C-1, B-4 defines this as a civil action seeking damages for harm where the cause of the harm is exposure to toxic chemicals or substances, but does not mean actions involving drugs or products intended for personal consumption or use.

For the cases where occupational exposure, as well as residential or personal exposure is alleged, which is all but Capobianco, Chapman, and Mira, I specifically find that on the complaint we have that the environmental tort exception does not apply. I do not take credit for some of the decision language, which I am about to give you. The majority of it came from Judge Morgan's decision in, I believe that was Gloucester County.

He explored the legislative intent behind the NJPLA. The exception for an environmental tort refers to pollution. I agree with him on that. He goes over the statement to Senate Bill Number 2805 and the exception was intended to encompass actions involving pollution of ambient air and of streams and other bodies of water, dumping of toxic waste, and similar activities ordinarily regarded as environmental torts.

The PLA clarifies in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1, B-4

that environmental tort action does not apply to products intended for personal consumption or use. In 2007 our New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the NJPLA and that statement to Senate Bill Number 2805 in <u>In re</u> Lead Paint Litigation, found at 191 N.J. 405.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that lead paint was not included within the environmental tort action exception, because it was ordinarily for personal consumption and use. The paint was a household product and consumers were targeted for personal use of the paint, even though people used it in the commercial setting as well. And painters could go out there and use that lead paint.

For the plaintiffs in the cases presently before the Court where personal and occupational exposure is asserted, again, all but Capobianco, Chapman, and Mira, I specifically find that the environmental tort action exception does not apply, because the product Roundup is intended for personal use. Just like the paint in the case I just mentioned, to be used by homeowners in a work setting, similarly Roundup was marketed and could be used in the work setting, but it could also be used in the personal setting.

Many of the plaintiffs in the cases before me

Decision

used Roundup for personal use for well over 20 years. The use of Roundup through work does not take away that Roundup was still used for consumer use. So, there is no basis for the environmental tort action exception.

I agree with Judge Morgan that the plaintiffs' citation to cases where the exception did apply are factually distinguishable, such as <u>Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp.</u>, 267 N.J. Super. 31, an Appellate Division case from 1931, because the product was sold purely for industrial use and was not to individual consumers.

Also the <u>Macrie</u> plaintiffs were not the ones that were using the product. It was a farmer that had used the product on, I think it was squash or something, and then the plaintiffs were repackaging the produce and that's when the particles were released into the air and caused the <u>Macrie</u> plaintiffs harm. So, that's factually distinguishable. So, I am going to dismiss this without prejudice. The common law claims, that we'll -- I'll go over that language of the order.

Both parties concede that the claim for breach of expressed warranty is exempt from the scope of the NJPLA. That's Count 4 in the amended complaint. I agree with the plaintiff using the standards I've

already gone over when I reviewed their amended complaint that they don't use conclusory terms. I can glean a cause of action in Count 4 that alleges a breach of expressed warranties.

For example, in the amended complaint language, they talk about objective scientists and regulatory agencies agreeing that there's an absence of evidence establishing carco -- carcinogenicity or genotoxicity of glyphosate in Roundup. Glyphosate was a technological breakthrough that could kill weeds without causing harm to people or to the environment. Roundup is safer than table salt and practically nontoxic to mammals, birds, and fish.

Via videos on YouTube and other social media platforms, Roundup Weed and Grass Killer products won't harm anything but weeds. Glyphosate works on an enzyme found in plants, but not in humans. Roundup's safety is comparable to other common household products, such as chocolate, apple cider vinegar, and coffee.

So, my order is going to grant the motion in part and deny it in part. It's going to say that defendants', plural, defendants' motion to dismiss the common law portions of Counts 1 and 2, and to dismiss Counts 3, 5, and 6 is granted. So, all of those are dismissed without prejudice. And then it says,

Decision

defendants' motion to dismiss Count 4 of the amended complaint is denied.

I want to address specifically the complaint of Mr. Marvel. As I said at the outset, in my mind, that's just a little bit different, because he is the only case I have currently before me where the -- where the person is deceased, and it's the estate's claim. I understand the distinction that Mr. Matthews is making to me, and I'm going to distinguish Marvel now.

What I am going to just say on the record is, I don't know that -- and I'll be honest with you, I didn't factually specifically look at it in a differential other than, you know, I looked at the general parts of the complaints where the general allegations were made. And I didn't specifically think about that when I was reviewing the motion on behalf of Mr. Marvel, that because he is deceased, how can he say he relied?

So, I am going to enter one order today that is different than the rest, and that is going to be Mr. Marvels (sic). And on Mr. Marvels, I am going to put a specific portion that says defendant's motion to dismiss Count 4 of the amended complaint is granted. It's going to say as to Mr. Marvel, the estate's case, Marvel's Count 4, is dismissed without prejudice.

And, Ms. Levy, it's going to give 30 days to file an amended complaint with regard to Count 4. So that if you have a way to clear some of that up, you will have the opportunity to do so with regard to Mr. Marvel. Now, I know that was all a mouthful and I thank you for living through that for me. But, Mr. Matthews, do you understand my ruling? Do you have any questions?

MR. MATTHEWS: I understand your ruling, Your

MR. MATTHEWS: I understand your ruling, Your Honor, and I have no questions.

THE COURT: Ms. Levy?

MS. LEVY: I have two questions, Your Honor. So, Mr. Marvel, when his complaint was first filed, the allegations were -- he was alive at the time --

THE COURT: Ah.

MS. LEVY: -- and the allegation for

predicate -- yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEVY: His case was -- his complaint was amended to substitute in his estate.

THE COURT: Okay. MS. LEVY: So --

THE COURT: Do you have that complaint up in front of you? Do you -- that you can direct me to some language where it says he relied?

Decision

 $\,$ MS. LEVY: I mean, it's the same language as all the other.

THE COURT: It's the same language as all the other? There was no differential in that? Okay. All right. I did not realize that. Mr. Matthews, having heard that, do you have anything you want to tell me?

MR. MATTHEWS: Well, Your Honor, I think that the, you know, the -- it's still -- it still gets, I think -- did we lose Your Honor?

THE COURT: No, I'm here. No, I don't why that went. My video still shows as on. I don't know why the screen went blank on that. I apologize for that.

MR. MATTHEWS: No, don't apologize. Don't apologize, Judge. That's how I've been doing this (indiscernible). So, we could just, you know -- we could just call it a wrap.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MATTHEWS: But, you know, there has to be -- there has to be a way that the case can proceed. And eventually these plaintiffs will all be --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MATTHEWS: -- (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MATTHEWS: -- to make that assertion.

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THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MATTHEWS:

That they have specific And we just can't have that with Mr. Marvel. And that's -- unless they prepared a statement for him, you know --

> THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MATTHEWS: I don't know.

THE COURT: I understand.

So --MR. MATTHEWS:

THE COURT: You're, like, where do we go from here, Judge, if there's not already something that we don't have yet --

MR. MATTHEWS: Something in the record --THE COURT: -- in terms of discovery that --MR. MATTHEWS: -- (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: Sure. Sure.

MR. MATTHEWS: Correct, yeah.

THE COURT: I get that. All right. This is what I'm going to do. This is what I'm going to do. am going to enter the same order for Mr. Marvel's case that I'm entering in all the other ones, which says, the motion to dismiss Count 4 is denied. I did not realize that he was still around when the complaint was So, we don't know, 'cause we don't have that filed. discovery.

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motion for summary judgment can be filed at any time,

request for admissions or something flushes that out.

I'm looking at it under 4:62(e), when I have to say,

liberality, taking everything as a yes and all

understand what you're saying for moving it along.

all, that the common law complaints are dismissed

is denied. Now, having said all that, anything

without prejudice, that the motion to dismiss Count 4

course we'll see where discovery takes us.

further, Mr. Matthews?

Honor.

further?

Or however you want to handle that. But, for now, and

under a painstaking, thorough review, and with the most

inferences that can be drawn therefrom, is there enough

The answer in my mind is yes. And then of

So, I am going to enter the same order in

even before discovery is concluded. Maybe a simple

And I'm sure, you know, Mr. Matthews, the

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MR. MATTHEWS: No, nothing from me, Your THE COURT: Okay. MR. MATTHEWS: I still -- I still understand. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Levy, anything Thank you for clarifying that for me. MS. LEVY: No thank you, Your Honor. And so, with respect to the environmental tort exception,

should plaintiffs -- I mean, would it make a difference to Your Honor if we more specifically plead that Roundup is -- has always been since its inception, primarily an agricultural and industrial product? And that the personal consumption and home use has only been tangential use --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LEVY: -- of Roundup?

THE COURT: So, I'm not going to speculate now on what any other future decisions I make would hold, 'cause obviously I'd need them briefed and I would need to review on them. In my mind, based on what I have before the Court, that exception doesn't apply and those counts are dismissed.

Now, obviously, you know the court rule on if you're trying to file an amended complaint. You either get consent or you don't, and you have to file a motion, and we take it from there. And there's going to be opposition, and I would need to see on what basis those — those things are being alleged, because right as you're talking, Mr. Matthews is saying that, Judge, that's not accurate, right? So, you know, I can't rule on future things.

But, normally when I do a motion to dismiss, if I really think there's an opportunity there, I will

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usually say, and you have 30 days and put a timeline in, as I was going to do on Mr. Marvel's case on that other Count 4. But, I'm not putting that in there, because I don't have a clue as to how you would change that under the analysis I've seen, particularly by Judge Morgan. And I have looked at the Fowler case and I have looked at the In re Lead Paint case that would come under that. But, you're more than welcome to file whatever you would like to file.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ LEVY: I understand. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you both for jumping on today. I will get my orders up. And thank you for letting me read those orders to you, because I was a little confused when I did read the other ones. I also have another question just for you folks. I know that when you apply for the multi-litigation MCL, and that was declined, and now so you're doing all this kind of in other, you know, courts and around the way, and I know that on each individual file you need to, you know, protect your interest in that file.

Judge Porto and I have other cases similar to yours, where they're not MCLs, but they're the same complaints, they're the same defendants, different plaintiffs. And I will usually always defer to him

each time just because he is the presiding judge of Civil, so you will always see me bump it past whenever he is deciding his motion. I just give you a heads up on that.

'Cause in these other cases, every time there's a discovery motion or what have you, they started bumping them down the line. But, this is what I ask that you please do not do. I started to notice that in those cases, I started getting discovery motions that encompass both, but they were filed in mine and not Judge Porto's. You know, we had a little discussion about it and they were, like, ah, yeah, and I felt, like, okay, they should — if they're going to be filed, they should be filed in both or with Judge Porto's first, 'cause I will always defer to him.

So, saying you're take the deposition of a Monsanto representative and Mr. Matthews says, do not answer that question, and you file a motion and say, let us come back and take his dep, there was no privilege asserted, he should have to answer that. Don't just file that in front of me. If you were deposing that Monsanto representative for all of the plaintiffs, make sure it gets filed either in front of Judge Porto or at least in front of both of us, so that I'm not stepping on his toes. I'm very low man on the

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totem pole here in Civil, and he's the big cheese. So, I just wanted to bring that up to you folks, and I appreciate if you could adhere to that.

MR. MATTHEWS: That shouldn't be a problem, and I'm hopeful that we won't have that many of those kinds of speech that we have to bring. But, of course if we do, we'll abide by that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, like, we don't need them filed in 500 motions so that it's filed like in the seminal one. And then you can say, I just want to preserve the record and, you know, do something from there. But, you know, then our motion list goes from 100 to 150, and I got to adjourn mine and wait for his. It gets kind of crazy. So, I just wanted to talk to you folks about that for a moment.

But, thank you for your writings. They were very succinct and I appreciate that. I'll get those -- I'll get an order for each of those cases, I think there's nine of them, within the next half hour up onto eCourts. Have a great rest of your day, everybody.

MS. LEVY: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. MATTHEWS: Thank you, Your Honor
THE COURT: Thank you.

CERTIFICATION

I, KIM WEBER, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on audio, playback numbers from 1:03:08 to 1:43:27, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript of the proceedings as recorded, and to the best of my ability.

/s/ Kim Weber
KIM WEBER

APPROVED BY:

/s/ Carole Ritardi
CAROLE RITARDI AOC #228
J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC. DATE: January 31, 2025