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HON. BRUCE J. KAPLAN, J.S.C.

IN RE ZOSTAVAX LITIGATION

Nancy Pierce v. Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., and McKesson Corp.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION – MIDDLESEX COUNTY

MCL NO.: 629

DOCKET NO.: MID-L-006712-18

ORDER

WHEREAS, Plaintiff, by and through counsel, Marc J. Bern & Partners LLP, upon notice to all interested parties, has moved before this Court to vacate this Court's February 13, 2020 Order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and the Court having considered the moving papers, papers filed in opposition, and papers filed in reply along with supporting Exhibits, and for good cause having been shown,

IT IS on this 14th day of May 2021, hereby:

ORDERED that the Motion be and is hereby **GRANTED**; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the dismissal with prejudice is hereby **VACATED**, and Plaintiff is reinstated to the active trial calendar.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be deemed served upon its filing to eCourts. Movant shall serve all parties not electronically served within seven (7) days of the date of this Order in accordance with <u>Rule</u> 1:5-1(a)

[5] Bruce J. Kaplan

HON. BRUCE J. KAPLAN, J.S.C.

OPPOSED

SEE STATEMENT OF REASONS ATTACHED

Statement of Reasons

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate this Court's February 13, 2020 Order dismissing Plaintiff's case with prejudice. The Court notes that it has read the moving papers, as well as the papers in opposition and reply.

The facts giving rise to this Motion are largely undisputed. By way of a brief background, Plaintiff was one of several hundred Plaintiffs whose cases were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to <u>R</u>. 4:23-2 for counsels' repeated failure to comply with numerous Court Orders, including the Court's Plaintiff Fact Sheet Case Management Order ("PFS CMO"), dated June 12, 2019 and the Court's Proof of Use Order ("POU Order"), dated August 23, 2019.¹

Now, Plaintiff's counsel claims that she is in compliance with her discovery obligations to date; specifically, that counsel has served a substantially complete and verified Plaintiff Fact Sheet ("PFS") on defense counsel. In opposition, counsel for Defendants, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. and Merck & Co., Inc. (hereinafter "Defendant"), argues that this Motion should be denied given that Plaintiff is <u>not</u> in "full" compliance with her discovery obligations. Specifically, while defense counsel acknowledges that Plaintiff has served Defendant with a PFS at the time this Motion was filed, it is argued that Plaintiff still has not provided Defendant with any proof of use connecting her alleged injuries to the Zostavax vaccine and therefore has not satisfied this Court's Proof of Use Order. Thereafter, in reply Plaintiff argues that sufficient proof of use has now been supplied.

Accordingly, the narrow issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff's POU is sufficient to warrant vacating her dismissal with prejudice.

With that being said, the Court finds it necessary to highlight for counsel that this Motion should not have been filed at this time. Even assuming arguendo that the Court found this proof of use adequate, discussed below, the proof of use document(s) was not provided to defense counsel under AFTER this Motion and the opposition thereto was filed. Given the backlog of over 950 Motions filed by plaintiff's counsel to vacate this Court's dismissal Orders on cases where Plaintiffs were still not fully complaint, Plaintiffs' counsel was asked to withdraw the Global Motions and to re-file Motions to Vacate for individual Plaintiffs that were fully compliant with their threshold discovery obligations. The Court specifically indicated that it would "like to resolve all the ones first where there is no opposition ... where there is compliance and no opposition." See Ex. D, 4/8/21 CMC Tr., 32:10-15. The Court specifically requested that Motions be filed in "bundles," first starting with the "unopposed" bundle; in this regard, the Court stated that it wants "the ... group to be where there is total compliance on both sides of the aisle, both in terms of proof of use, as well as plaintiffs' fact sheet." See Ex. D, 4/8/21 CMC Tr., 32:16-21. As noted, this Plaintiff did not fall into the category of cases cited above. Notwithstanding same, the Court's goal is to advance this litigation and for that reason alone chooses to decide this Motion at this time.

<u>**R**</u>. 4:50-1 governs relief from final judgments. The <u>Rule</u> provides, in pertinent part, that the Court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for the following:

¹ Numerous Court ordered deadlines were disregarded by plaintiffs' counsel with regards to their proof of use and PFS obligations; notwithstanding same, this Court continued to extend deadlines on multiple occasions to permit Plaintiffs additional time to come into compliance with their obligations. Eventually, the Court decided that the continued and flagrant disregard of its Court Orders warranted sanctions and dismissed hundreds of cases with prejudice via numerous Orders dated February 13, 2020.

a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.

While plaintiff's counsel does not specify which enumerated reason given in <u>R</u>. 4:50-1 warrants vacating Plaintiff's dismissal, the Court notes that none of the enumerated reasons other than (f) can be applicable to this Motion.² "The very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations. And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." <u>DEG LLC v. Township of Fairfield</u>, 198 N.J. 242 (2009) (citing <u>Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo</u>, 48 N.J. 334, 341, 225 A.2d 352 (1966)). Of course, "the grant or denial of a motion for vacating dismissal rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge." <u>Georgis v. Scarpa</u>, 226 N.J. 244, 249 (App. Div. 1988) (citing <u>Zaccardi v. Becker</u>, 88 N.J. 245, 251 (1982)). In sum, "[t]he Court has discretion [to vacate a dismissal with prejudice] ... by the application of <u>R</u>. 4:50-1(f), which permits the court to relieve a party from the operation of an order to achieve essential fairness." <u>Hodgson v. Applegate</u>, 31 N.J. 29, 43 (1959).

Here, plaintiff's counsel notes that Plaintiff's claims are meritorious and that, because a PFS has been served as of February 2020, that Plaintiff's case should be reinstated. Plaintiff's counsel relies on <u>Farrell v. TCI of N.J.</u>, 378 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2005), for the proposition that motions to vacate should be liberally viewed when no prejudice is demonstrated by the defense. However, in opposition, defense counsel argues just that – that Defendants have suffered and continue to suffer prejudice due to plaintiff's counsel's non-compliance with discovery obligations. While defense counsel acknowledges that a PFS has been served, at the time this Motion was filed, Plaintiff's non-compliance with proof of use obligations was outstanding. It is defense counsel's position that Plaintiff's case should not be vacated despite counsel's production of the PFS when Plaintiff has had over a year to come into <u>full</u> compliance and had not done so, especially in light of the fact that plaintiff's counsel has been on notice as early as August 2019 of their proof of use obligations. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's purported POU is merely a "passing reference" in a non-contemporaneous medical record, that Plaintiff "has had the shingles vaccine."

In Plaintiff's reply, counsel argues that the records submitted constitute sufficient proof of use. Specifically, Plaintiff's medical records from Internal Medicine Associates, PC indicate that "Patient has had singles vaccine." While plaintiff's counsel acknowledges that Zostavax is not referenced by name, counsel represents that Zostavax was the only shingles vaccine on the market approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") at the time

² Plaintiffs' counsel indicates that "[b]ecause Plaintiff served a verified and compete PFS on Defendants, the February 13, 2020 Order has an inequitable result and Plaintiff should respectfully be relieved from the final judgment." See Plaintiff's Motion, ¶ 17.

Plaintiff was vaccinated. According to counsel, the FDA did not approve Shingrix, the only other FDA approved shingles vaccine, until October 20, 2017. In light of same, Plaintiff disagrees that this information is insufficient.

The Court notes that counsel was aware at the time Plaintiff's case was dismissed in February 2020 that the Lone Pine Order entered by this Court in August 2019 required plaintiffs to provide documentation to defense counsel for the purpose of objectively identifying which plaintiffs suffered injuries which could credibly attributed to the defendant's product. See In re Zostavax, MCL 629 4/15/21 Order, pg. 6. Also, as recently as April 15, 2021, this Court issued its "Proof of Use" Order/Opinion, further clarifying what constitutes "sufficient" proof of use. The Court's focus was on definitive proof of use that would help the Court objectively determine which Plaintiffs had credible claims; indeed, this is the very purpose of a Lone Pine Order. The Court notified counsel that it would not accept a self-serving Affidavit or Certification from a Plaintiff certifying that they received the Zostavax vaccine, finding that same was not "something definite". In fact, the Court noted that the current definition, in place since CMO 8, requires "corroborative documentation". In re Zostavax, MCL 629, 4/16/21 Order.³

Although compliance is late, at this time, Plaintiff's counsel has supplied defense counsel with a credible evidence of Plaintiff's Zostavax vaccine. Specifically, Plaintiff's proof of use indicates that Plaintiff was vaccinated at a time where Zostavax was the only FDA approved shingles vaccine in the United States. In light of the fact that dismissal with prejudice is the ultimate sanction which "should be imposed only sparingly," <u>Zaccardi</u>, 88 N.J. at 253, and the competing policies involved – i.e., "[t]he defendant's right to have the plaintiff comply with procedural rules [and] the plaintiff's right to an adjudication ... on the merits," <u>Crews v.</u> <u>Garmoney</u>, 141 N.J. Super. 93, 96 (App. Div. 1976), the Court finds that Plaintiff's case is objectively credible and thus extraordinary circumstances exist to vacate the dismissal with prejudice in order to achieve an equitable result and an adjudication on the merits. Specifically, since Plaintiff was vaccinated prior to October 20, 2017 and Zostavax was the only FDA approved shingles vaccine on the market at the time Plaintiff received her vaccine, the Court finds this to be objective, credible evidence and sufficient proof of Plaintiff's Zostavax was approved in the United States.

In sum, <u>R</u>. 4:50-1(f) justifies relief from final judgment in "exceptional circumstances", <u>supra</u>. Given that Plaintiff is in full compliance with discovery obligations, the Court finds that "exceptional circumstances" warrant the relief sought.

In light of the foregoing, this Motion is **GRANTED.** Plaintiff's dismissal with prejudice is hereby **VACATED**, and Plaintiff's complaint is reinstated.

³ Black's Law Dictionary defines "corroborative evidence" as "evidence that confirms or reinforces an allegation"